The future in action: neurophysiological and behavioral evidence of anticipatory motor simulation.

The motor system can no longer be considered as a mere passive executive system of motor commands generated elsewhere in the brain. On the contrary, it is deeply involved in perceptual and cognitive functions and acts as an “anticipation device”. The present thesis investigates the anticipatory motor mechanisms occurring in two particular instances: i) when processing sensory events occurring within the peripersonal space (PPS); and ii) when perceiving and predicting others’actions. The first study provides evidence that PPS representation in humans modulates neural activity within the motor system, while the second demonstrates that the motor mapping of sensory events occurring within the PPS critically relies on the activity of the premotor cortex. The third study provides direct evidence that the anticipatory motor simulation of others’ actions critically relies on the activity of the anterior node of the action observation network (AON), namely the inferior frontal cortex (IFC). The fourth study, sheds light on the pivotal role of the left IFC in predicting the future end state of observed right-hand actions. Finally, the fifth study examines how the ability to predict others’ actions could be influenced by a reduction of sensorimotor experience due to the traumatic or congenital loss of a limb. Overall, the present work provides new insights on: i) the anticipatory mechanisms of the basic reactivity of the motor system when processing sensory events occurring within the PPS, and the same anticipatory motor mechanisms when perceiving others’ implied actions; ii) the functional connectivity and plasticity of premotor-motor circuits both during the motor mapping of sensory events occurring within the PPS and when perceiving others’ actions; and iii) the anticipatory mechanisms related to others’ actions prediction.

Functional and neural mechanisms of intertemporal choice

People are daily faced with intertemporal choice, i.e., choices differing in the timing of their consequences, frequently preferring smaller-sooner rewards over larger-delayed ones, reflecting temporal discounting of the value of future outcomes. This dissertation addresses two main goals. New evidence about the neural bases of intertemporal choice is provided. Following the disruption of either the medial orbitofrontal cortex or the insula, the willingness to wait for larger-delayed outcomes is affected in odd directions, suggesting the causal involvement of these areas in regulating the value computation of rewards available with different timings. These findings were also supported by a reported imaging study. Moreover, this dissertation provides new evidence about how temporal discounting can be modulated at a behavioral level through different manipulations, e.g., allowing individuals to think about the distant time, pairing rewards with aversive events, or changing their perceived spatial position. A relationship between intertemporal choice, moral judgements and aging is also discussed. All these findings link together to support a unitary neural model of temporal discounting according to which signals coming from several cortical (i.e., medial orbitofrontal cortex, insula) and subcortical regions (i.e., amygdala, ventral striatum) are integrated to represent the subjective value of both earlier and later rewards, under the top-down regulation of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The present findings also support the idea that the process of outcome evaluation is strictly related to the ability to pre-experience and envision future events through self-projection, the anticipation of visceral feelings associated with receiving rewards, and the psychological distance from rewards. Furthermore, taking into account the emotions and the state of arousal at the time of decision seems necessary to understand impulsivity associated with preferring smaller-sooner goods in place of larger-later goods.