Da alleati vittoriosi ad acerrimi rivali: i processi di ri-allineamento dopo i conflitti egemonici. Teorie a confronto e studio di casi

Why some powers manage to coordinate their security efforts while others confront each other as rivals is still one of the most relevant and debated questions in the field of IR theory. The dissertation wants to give a contribution to this important debate. In particular, the main goal of the research is to analyse the dynamics of great power interactions after the end of hegemonic conflicts, that is to understand why, following the defeat of the common enemies, some of the winning allies continue to cooperate, while others begin to engage in political and military competition. In order to understand this difference, the study compares the explanatory value of two rival theoretical perspectives: neorealism, in its main version of the balance of power framework, and a liberal approach focused on domestic politics. The thesis is divided in two sections. In the first, I do summarize the main assumptions and predictions of the theories, from which I derive two different sets of hypotheses on the evolution of post-war great power relations. In the second part, I test the hypotheses by focusing on two cases of post-war alignment dynamics: 1) the relations among Austria, Prussia, Russia, Great Britain and France after the Napoleonic wars; 2) the relations among the US, the UK, France and Italy after the end of WWI. The historical cases disconfirm the logic of the balance of power and confirm the liberal hypotheses, seeing that the results of the analysis show changes in the domestic structures of the great powers had a much larger impact on the emergence of new alliances and rivalries than did the international distribution of power. In the conclusion of the dissertation, I provide the reader with a discussion of the main theoretical implications of the empirical findings.

1963-1968. Dall'avvento dell'amministrazione di Lyndon B. Johnson al Trattato di Non-Proliferazione. gli Stati Uniti, la Francia, la NATO e l'Europa agli esordi della distensione. Storia di una "non-crisi" transatlantica e della riorganizzazione dell'Alleanza.

The aim of this proposal is to explain the paradigm of the American foreign policy during the Johnson Administration, especially toward Europe, within the NATO framework, and toward URSS, in the context of the détente, just emerged during the decade of the sixties. During that period, after the passing of the J. F. Kennedy, President L. B. Johnson inherited a complex and very high-powered world politics, which wanted to get a new phase off the ground in the transatlantic relations and share the burden of the Cold war with a refractory Europe. Known as the grand design, it was a policy that needed the support of the allies and a clear purpose which appealed to the Europeans. At first, President Johnson detected in the problem of the nuclear sharing the good deal to make with the NATO allies. At the same time, he understood that the United States needed to reassert their leadeship within the new stage of relations with the Soviet Union. Soon, the “transatlantic bargain” became something not so easy to dealt with. The Federal Germany wanted to say a word in the nuclear affairs and, why not, put the finger on the trigger of the atlantic nuclear weapons. URSS, on the other hand, wanted to keep Germany down. The other allies did not want to share the onus of the defense of Europe, at most the responsability for the use of the weapons and, at least, to participate in the decision-making process. France, which wanted to detach herself from the policy of the United States and regained a world role, added difficulties to the manage of this course of action. Through the years of the Johnson’s office, the divergences of the policies placed by his advisers to gain the goal put the American foreign policy in deep water. The withdrawal of France from the organization but not from the Alliance, give Washington a chance to carry out his goal. The development of a clear-cut disarm policy leaded the Johnson’s administration to the core of the matter. The Non-proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, solved in a business-like fashion the problem with the allies. The question of nuclear sharing faded away with the acceptance of more deep consultative role in the nuclear affairs by the allies, the burden for the defense of Europe became more bearable through the offset agreement with the FRG and a new doctrine, the flexible response, put an end, at least formally, to the taboo of the nuclear age. The Johnson’s grand design proved to be different from the Kennedy’s one, but all things considered, it was more workable. The unpredictable result was a real détente with the Soviet Union, which, we can say, was a merit of President Johnson.