Essays on the political economy of European integration

Recently, a rising interest in political and economic integration/disintegration issues has been developed in the political economy field. This growing strand of literature partly draws on traditional issues of fiscal federalism and optimum public good provision and focuses on a trade-off between the benefits of centralization, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonizing policies as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of individual preferences in an international union or in a country composed of at least two regions. This thesis stems from this strand of literature and aims to shed some light on two highly relevant aspects of the political economy of European integration. The first concerns the role of public opinion in the integration process; more precisely, how economic benefits and costs of integration shape citizens' support for European Union (EU) membership. The second is the allocation of policy competences among different levels of government: European, national and regional. Chapter 1 introduces the topics developed in this thesis by reviewing the main recent theoretical developments in the political economy analysis of integration processes. It is structured as follows. First, it briefly surveys a few relevant articles on economic theories of integration and disintegration processes (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina et al. 2000, Casella and Feinstein 2002) and discusses their relevance for the study of the impact of economic benefits and costs on public opinion attitude towards the EU. Subsequently, it explores the links existing between such political economy literature and theories of fiscal federalism, especially with regard to normative considerations concerning the optimal allocation of competences in a union. Chapter 2 firstly proposes a model of citizens’ support for membership of international unions, with explicit reference to the EU; subsequently it tests the model on a panel of EU countries. What are the factors that influence public opinion support for the European Union (EU)? In international relations theory, the idea that citizens' support for the EU depends on material benefits deriving from integration, i.e. whether European integration makes individuals economically better off (utilitarian support), has been common since the 1970s, but has never been the subject of a formal treatment (Hix 2005). A small number of studies in the 1990s have investigated econometrically the link between national economic performance and mass support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Kalthenthaler 1996), but only making informal assumptions. The main aim of Chapter 2 is thus to propose and test our model with a view to providing a more complete and theoretically grounded picture of public support for the EU. Following theories of utilitarian support, we assume that citizens are in favour of membership if they receive economic benefits from it. To develop this idea, we propose a simple political economic model drawing on the recent economic literature on integration and disintegration processes. The basic element is the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of centralisation and the costs of harmonising policies in presence of heterogeneous preferences among countries. The approach we follow is that of the recent literature on the political economy of international unions and the unification or break-up of nations (Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Wacziarg 1999, Alesina et al. 2001, 2005a, to mention only the relevant). The general perspective is that unification provides returns to scale in the provision of public goods, but reduces each member state’s ability to determine its most favoured bundle of public goods. In the simple model presented in Chapter 2, support for membership of the union is increasing in the union’s average income and in the loss of efficiency stemming from being outside the union, and decreasing in a country’s average income, while increasing heterogeneity of preferences among countries points to a reduced scope of the union. Afterwards we empirically test the model with data on the EU; more precisely, we perform an econometric analysis employing a panel of member countries over time. The second part of Chapter 2 thus tries to answer the following question: does public opinion support for the EU really depend on economic factors? The findings are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations: the conditions of the national economy, differences in income among member states and heterogeneity of preferences shape citizens’ attitude towards their country’s membership of the EU. Consequently, this analysis offers some interesting policy implications for the present debate about ratification of the European Constitution and, more generally, about how the EU could act in order to gain more support from the European public. Citizens in many member states are called to express their opinion in national referenda, which may well end up in rejection of the Constitution, as recently happened in France and the Netherlands, triggering a European-wide political crisis. These events show that nowadays understanding public attitude towards the EU is not only of academic interest, but has a strong relevance for policy-making too. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the link between European integration and regional autonomy in Italy. Over the last few decades, the double tendency towards supranationalism and regional autonomy, which has characterised some European States, has taken a very interesting form in this country, because Italy, besides being one of the founding members of the EU, also implemented a process of decentralisation during the 1970s, further strengthened by a constitutional reform in 2001. Moreover, the issue of the allocation of competences among the EU, the Member States and the regions is now especially topical. The process leading to the drafting of European Constitution (even if then it has not come into force) has attracted much attention from a constitutional political economy perspective both on a normative and positive point of view (Breuss and Eller 2004, Mueller 2005). The Italian parliament has recently passed a new thorough constitutional reform, still to be approved by citizens in a referendum, which includes, among other things, the so called “devolution”, i.e. granting the regions exclusive competence in public health care, education and local police. Following and extending the methodology proposed in a recent influential article by Alesina et al. (2005b), which only concentrated on the EU activity (treaties, legislation, and European Court of Justice’s rulings), we develop a set of quantitative indicators measuring the intensity of the legislative activity of the Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions from 1973 to 2005 in a large number of policy categories. By doing so, we seek to answer the following broad questions. Are European and regional legislations substitutes for state laws? To what extent are the competences attributed by the European treaties or the Italian Constitution actually exerted in the various policy areas? Is their exertion consistent with the normative recommendations from the economic literature about their optimum allocation among different levels of government? The main results show that, first, there seems to be a certain substitutability between EU and national legislations (even if not a very strong one), but not between regional and national ones. Second, the EU concentrates its legislative activity mainly in international trade and agriculture, whilst social policy is where the regions and the State (which is also the main actor in foreign policy) are more active. Third, at least two levels of government (in some cases all of them) are significantly involved in the legislative activity in many sectors, even where the rationale for that is, at best, very questionable, indicating that they actually share a larger number of policy tasks than that suggested by the economic theory. It appears therefore that an excessive number of competences are actually shared among different levels of government. From an economic perspective, it may well be recommended that some competences be shared, but only when the balance between scale or spillover effects and heterogeneity of preferences suggests so. When, on the contrary, too many levels of government are involved in a certain policy area, the distinction between their different responsibilities easily becomes unnecessarily blurred. This may not only leads to a slower and inefficient policy-making process, but also risks to make it too complicate to understand for citizens, who, on the contrary, should be able to know who is really responsible for a certain policy when they vote in national,local or European elections or in referenda on national or European constitutional issues.

La partecipazione popolare nell'esperienza dei referendum comunali

I Comuni incarnano idealmente delle piazze in cui il dibattito politico può svilupparsi in assenza di particolari filtri ed intermediazioni, con un rapporto diretto tra cittadini ed istituzioni. Essi costituiscono uno snodo di centrale importanza nell'esercizio della sovranità popolare e, al contempo, sono terreno fertile per la sperimentazione di modelli di partecipazione democratica. Prendendo come punto di vista l'esperienza dei Comuni italiani, si è scelto di focalizzare l'attenzione su uno degli strumenti “istituzionali” – nonché uno tra i più tradizionali – di partecipazione popolare, ovvero il referendum, nelle diverse forme ed accezioni che rientrano nel campo semantico di tale espressione. Questa è generalmente impiegata per indicare tutte quelle votazioni popolari non elettive su questioni politicamente rilevanti, formulate attraverso un quesito con due o più risposte alternative tra loro. L'analisi della disciplina legislativa degli istituti di partecipazione negli enti locali e lo studio delle disposizioni statutarie e regolamentari previste dai singoli Comuni, nonché le informazioni raccolte da alcuni casi di studio, rappresentano, in questo contesto, l'occasione per indagare le caratteristiche peculiari dell'istituto referendario, la sua effettività ed il suo impatto sulla forma di governo. In particolare, si è verificata positivamente la compatibilità del referendum, classificato dalla prevalente dottrina come istituto di democrazia diretta, con le forme attuali di democrazia rappresentativa. Si è tentato, altresì, un accostamento ai concetti di democrazia partecipativa e deliberativa, evidenziando come manchi del tutto, nel procedimento referendario (che pure è dotato di massima inclusività) un momento di confronto “deliberativo”. Il raffronto tra le esperienze riscontrate nei diversi Comuni ha consentito, inoltre, di ricercare le cause di alcuni aspetti critici (scarsa affluenza, mancata trasformazione del voto in decisioni politiche, aumento del conflitto) e, al contempo, di individuarne possibili soluzioni, tracciate sulla scorta delle migliori pratiche rilevate.

Il diritto alla mobilita' fra dimensione europea, costituzioni statali e autonomie territoriali

La tesi si prefigge l'obbiettivo di offrire una ricostruzione logico sistematica della disciplina giuridica che regola i trasporti pubblici locali in ambito regionale, statale e comunitario, affrontando le principali questioni interpretative e di coordinamento che esse pongono. Nella primo capitolo, viene analizzato l'evoluzione storica della normativa nazionale che regola il trasporto pubblico locale, soffermandosi soprattutto sulla riforma del trasporto pubblico locale introdotte dal d.lgs. 422/1997. Particolare attenzione è stata posta agli aspetti di programmazione e finanziamento nonché alle modalità di gestione del trasporto pubblico locale, in quanto il quadro normativo applicabile è caratterizzato da un’estrema complessità dovuta ai numerosi interventi legislativi. Nel secondo capitolo viene esaminato l'evoluzione dell'intervento comunitario in materi di trasporto pubblico locale, partendo dal (CE) n. 1191/69 che si limitava a disciplinare gli aiuti di Stato, fino alla normativa quadro per il settore (Regolamento (CE) n. 1370/2007). L'obbiettivo è quello di verificare se le scelte del legislatore italiano, per quanto concerne le modalità di gestione del trasporto pubblico locale possano dirsi coerenti con le scelte a livello comunitario previste dal Regolamento (CE) n. 1370/2007. Viene inoltre affronta la questione dell'articolazione della potestà normativa e amministrativa del settore dei trasporti pubblici locali nelle disposizioni del Titolo V della Costituzione. Lo studio si sofferma soprattutto sulla giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale per tracciare una chiara individuazione del riparto delle competenze tra Stato e Regioni in materia. Infine nell'ultima parte, esamina le diverse problematiche interpretative e applicative della normativa che disciplina il settore del TPL, dovute all'azzeramento della normativa generale dei servizi pubblici locali di rilevanza economica in seguito al referendum abrogativo del 12 e 13 giugno 2011, nonché della illegittimità costituzionale della normativa contenuta nell'art 4 del d.l. n. 138/2011, ad opera della sentenza della Corte costituzionale n. 199/2012.

Rebooting the constitutional debate: deliberative constitutionalism in the European Union

The aim of my thesis is to investigate the possibility and necessity to rethink a constitutional framework and debate in a transnational polity such as the European Union. My effort focuses on a promising theory called deliberative constitutionalism, which carries on new insights on how democracy and constitutions relate each other. The EU is a unique political entity which poses unanswered questions about its political legitimacy and constitutional foundation, if a Constitution will ever be possible. Going beyond the classical conception of the national and sovereign ‘people’, we keep wondering how citizens may deliberate and discuss about their rights and political communities across borders, in what could be defined as a transnational civic society. The development of the latter brings with it necessary constitutional changes, if not an evolution of constitutionalism itself. Chapter 1 deals with defining the theoretical framework, which develops the distinctiveness of the deliberative constitutional paradigm not only with respect to other more 'classical' models of democracy, but also with respect to other deliberative models that have marked the constructivist debate. Chapter 2 presents a conceptual history of constituent power, mainly studying the evolution of the constitution-sovereignty-constituent power dialectic, up to contemporary theories that explain the negation, separation, union or plurality of a transnational constituent with respect to its national counterparts. Chapter 3 develops the discourse of constitutional pluralism, through its main claims and strands that especially pertain to Neil Walker's (2002, 2016) institutional and epistemic claims. Chapter 4 applies a deliberative constitutionalist framework to the case of the European Union. Through the exposition of DC normative tenets, a form of self-learning process is proposed that can reconcile the heterarchical arrangement of constitutional claims and the new demand for legitimacy, as well as the relationship between European peoples and European citizens.

Transitional Justice as a Post-Revolution Constitutional Arrangement: A Law and Economics Approach

This dissertation addresses the timely questions of transitional justice (TJ) in the aftermath of revolutions against autocratic regimes, dealing with TJ as a constitutional arrangement through the lenses of constitutional economics. After an introductory chapter, chapter 2 deals with why nations rarely adopt meaningful TJ processes in the first place, it then explains the limitations of civil society as the arbiter, facilitator, and enforcer of TJ policies. Chapter 3 tackles the question of which mechanisms to choose? It uses the UN Guidelines on TJ that sets five principal TJ mechanisms. It provides a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of each mechanism and suggests policy implications accordingly. The CBA inspires chapter 4 analysis, suggesting a tradeoff between restrictive fair trial standards under constitutional laws and justice considerations. The tradeoff explains the suggested efficiency of the balanced TJ approaches that combine trials and amnesties. This approach is used for the case study analysis of TJ in Tunisia after the 2011 revolution in chapter 5. The chapter presents the first index of TJ mechanisms in Tunisia through novel data collected by the author. It shows an ultimate TJ design that ended with a modest harvest in the application. The lack of cooperation between the Tunisian parties, added to the absence of transparency in many TJ measures, threatens any possible positive outcomes of the partial TJ process. It is also alarming regarding constitutional compliance in a system that – until recently - was considered the only democracy in the Arab region. Chapter 6 is a summary

Comparative constitutional design for divided societies: a model to explain vonstitutional asymmetries

Comparative studies on constitutional design for divided societies indicate that there is no magic formula to the challenges that these societies pose, as lots of factors influence constitutional design. In the literature on asymmetric federalism, the introduction of constitutional asymmetries is considered a flexible instrument of ethnic conflict resolution, as it provides a mixture of the two main theoretical approaches to constitutional design for divided societies (i.e., integration and accommodation). Indeed, constitutional asymmetries are a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, as their degree of intensity can vary across constitutional systems, and there are both legal and extra-legal factors that may explain such differences. This thesis argues that constitutional asymmetries provide a flexible model of constitutional design and aims to explore the legal factors that are most likely to explain the different degrees of constitutional asymmetry in divided multi-tiered systems. To this end, the research adopts a qualitative methodology, i.e., Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), which allows an understanding of whether a condition or combination of conditions (i.e., the legal factors) determine the outcome (i.e., high, medium, low degree of constitutional asymmetry, or constitutional symmetry). The QCA is conducted on 16 divided multi-tiered systems, and for each case, the degree of constitutional asymmetry was analyzed by employing standardized indexes on subnational autonomy, allowing for a more precise measure of constitutional asymmetry than has previously been provided in the literature. Overall, the research confirms the complex nature of constitutional asymmetries, as the degrees of asymmetries vary substantially not only across systems but also within cases among the dimensions of subnational autonomy. The outcome of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis also confirms a path of complex causality since the different degrees of constitutional asymmetry always depend on several legal factors, that combined produce a low, medium, or high degree of constitutional asymmetry or, conversely, constitutional symmetry.