The changing politics of preference formation in international trade negotiations: the European Union in the Doha Round

This research seeks to provide an explanation for variations of “politics” of preference formation in international trade negotiations. Building on the ‘policy determines politics’ argument, I hypothesize the existence of a causal relationship between issue-characteristics and their variations with politics dynamics and their variations. More specifically, this study seeks to integrate into a single analytical framework two dimensions along which variations in the “politics of preference formation” can be organized: configurations of power relationships among the relevant actors in the structures within which they interact as well as the logic and the motivations of the actors involved in the policy making process. To do so, I first construct a four-cell typology of ‘politics of preference formation’ and, then, I proceed by specifying that the type of state-society configurations as well as the type of actors’ motivations in the “politics of preference formation” depend, respectively, on the degree to which a policy issue is perceived as politically salient and on the extent to which the distributional implications of such an issue can be calculated by the relevant stakeholders in the policy making process. The empirical yardstick against which the validity of the theoretical argument proposed is tested is drawn from evidence concerning the European Union’s negotiating strategy in four negotiating areas in the context of the so-called WTO’s Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations: agriculture, competition, environment and technical assistance and capacity building.

International Agricultural Trade under Regulatory Asymmetry: An Economic Analysis of SME Export Behavior

Over the last three decades, international agricultural trade has grown significantly. Technological advances in transportation logistics and storage have created opportunities to ship anything almost anywhere. Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements have also opened new pathways to an increasingly global market place. Yet, international agricultural trade is often constrained by differences in regulatory regimes. The impact of “regulatory asymmetry” is particularly acute for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) that lack resources and expertise to successfully operate in markets that have substantially different regulatory structures. As governments seek to encourage the development of SMEs, policy makers often confront the critical question of what ultimately motivates SME export behavior. Specifically, there is considerable interest in understanding how SMEs confront the challenges of regulatory asymmetry. Neoclassical models of the firm generally emphasize expected profit maximization under uncertainty, however these approaches do not adequately explain the entrepreneurial decision under regulatory asymmetry. Behavioral theories of the firm offer a far richer understanding of decision making by taking into account aspirations and adaptive performance in risky environments. This paper develops an analytical framework for decision making of a single agent. Considering risk, uncertainty and opportunity cost, the analysis focuses on the export behavior response of an SME in a situation of regulatory asymmetry. Drawing on the experience of fruit processor in Muzaffarpur, India, who must consider different regulatory environments when shipping fruit treated with sulfur dioxide, the study dissects the firm-level decision using @Risk, a Monte Carlo computational tool.

A Law and Economics Analysis of Trade Secrets: Optimal Scope of Law, Misappropriation and Alternative Damages Regimes

This thesis is primarily based on three core chapters, focused on the fundamental issues of trade secrets law. The goal of this thesis is to come up with policy recommendations to improve legal structure governing trade secrets. The focal points of this research are the following. What is the optimal scope of trade secrets law? How does it depend on the market characteristics such as degree of product differentiation between competing products? What factors need to be considered to balance the contradicting objectives of promoting innovation and knowledge diffusion? The second strand of this research focuses on the desirability of lost profits or unjust enrichment damage regimes in case of misappropriation of a trade secret. A comparison between these regimes is made and simple policy implications are extracted from the analysis. The last part of this research is an empirical analysis of a possible relationship between trade secrets sharing and misappropriation instances faced by firms.