The social construction of cooperation: exchange, identification and collective intentions within the organization

My aim is to develop a theory of cooperation within the organization and empirically test it. Drawing upon social exchange theory, social identity theory, the idea of collective intentions, and social constructivism, the main assumption of my work implies that both cooperation and the organization itself are continually shaped and restructured by actions, judgments, and symbolic interpretations of the parties involved. Therefore, I propose that the decision to cooperate, expressed say as an intention to cooperate, reflects and depends on a three step social process shaped by the interpretations of the actors involved. The first step entails an instrumental evaluation of cooperation in terms of social exchange. In the second step, this “social calculus” is translated into cognitive, emotional and evaluative reactions directed toward the organization. Finally, once the identification process is completed and membership awareness is established, I propose that individuals will start to think largely in terms of “We” instead of “I”. Self-goals are redefined at the collective level, and the outcomes for self, others, and the organization become practically interchangeable. I decided to apply my theory to an important cooperative problem in management research: knowledge exchange within organizations. Hence, I conducted a quantitative survey among the members of the virtual community, “www.borse.it” (n=108). Within this community, members freely decide to exchange their knowledge about the stock market among themselves. Because of the confirmatory requirements and the structural complexity of the theory proposed (i.e., the proposal that instrumental evaluations will induce social identity and this in turn will causes collective intentions), I use Structural Equation Modeling to test all hypotheses in this dissertation. The empirical survey-based study found support for the theory of cooperation proposed in this dissertation. The findings suggest that an appropriate conceptualization of the decision to exchange knowledge is one where collective intentions depend proximally on social identity (i.e., cognitive identification, affective commitment, and evaluative engagement) with the organization, and this identity depends on instrumental evaluations of cooperators (i.e., perceived value of the knowledge received, assessment of past reciprocity, expected reciprocity, and expected social outcomes of the exchange). Furthermore, I find that social identity fully mediates the effects of instrumental motives on collective intentions.

Non-Linear Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Markets

This thesis is dedicated to the analysis of non-linear pricing in oligopoly. Non-linear pricing is a fairly predominant practice in most real markets, mostly characterized by some amount of competition. The sophistication of pricing practices has increased in the latest decades due to the technological advances that have allowed companies to gather more and more data on consumers preferences. The first essay of the thesis highlights the main characteristics of oligopolistic non-linear pricing. Non-linear pricing is a special case of price discrimination. The theory of price discrimination has to be modified in presence of oligopoly: in particular, a crucial role is played by the competitive externality that implies that product differentiation is closely related to the possibility of discriminating. The essay reviews the theory of competitive non-linear pricing by starting from its foundations, mechanism design under common agency. The different approaches to model non-linear pricing are then reviewed. In particular, the difference between price and quantity competition is highlighted. Finally, the close link between non-linear pricing and the recent developments in the theory of vertical differentiation is explored. The second essay shows how the effects of non-linear pricing are determined by the relationship between the demand and the technological structure of the market. The chapter focuses on a model in which firms supply a homogeneous product in two different sizes. Information about consumers' reservation prices is incomplete and the production technology is characterized by size economies. The model provides insights on the size of the products that one finds in the market. Four equilibrium regions are identified depending on the relative intensity of size economies with respect to consumers' evaluation of the good. Regions for which the product is supplied in a single unit or in several different sizes or in only a very large one. Both the private and social desirability of non-linear pricing varies across different equilibrium regions. The third essay considers the broadband internet market. Non discriminatory issues seem the core of the recent debate on the opportunity or not of regulating the internet. One of the main questions posed is whether the telecom companies, owning the networks constituting the internet, should be allowed to offer quality-contingent contracts to content providers. The aim of this essay is to analyze the issue through a stylized two-sided market model of the web that highlights the effects of such a discrimination over quality, prices and participation to the internet of providers and final users. An overall welfare comparison is proposed, concluding that the final effects of regulation crucially depend on both the technology and preferences of agents.

Reti di contratti e reti di imprese

Il lavoro di ricerca prende le mosse da una premessa di ordine economico. Il fenomeno delle reti di impresa, infatti, nasce dalla realtà economica dei mercati. In tale contesto non può prescindere dal delineare un quadro della situazione- anche di crisi- congiunturale che ha visto coinvolte specialmente le imprese italiane. In tale prospettiva, si è reso necessario indagare il fenomeno della globalizzazione, con riferimento alle sue origini,caratteristiche e conseguenze. Ci si sofferma poi sulla ricostruzione dogmatica del fenomeno. Si parte dalla ricostruzione dello stesso in termini di contratto plurilaterale- sia esso con comunione di scopo oppure plurilaterale di scambio- per criticare tale impostazione, non del tutto soddisfacente, in quanto ritenuto remissiva di fronte alla attuale vis espansiva del contratto plurilaterale. Più convincente appare lo schema del collegamento contrattuale, che ha il pregio di preservare l’autonomia e l’indipendenza degli imprenditori aderenti, pur inseriti nel contesto di un’operazione economica unitaria, volta a perseguire uno scopo comune, l’“interesse di rete”, considerato meritevole di tutela secondo l’ordinamento giuridico ex art. 1322 2.co. c.c. In effetti il contratto ben si presta a disegnare modelli di rete sia con distribuzione simmetrica del potere decisionale, sia con distribuzione asimmetrica, vale a dire con un elevato livello di gerarchia interna. Non può d’altra parte non ravvisarsi un’affinità con le ipotesi di collegamento contrattuale in fase di produzione, consistente nel delegare ad un terzo parte della produzione, e nella fase distributiva, per cui la distribuzione avviene attraverso reti di contratti. Si affronta la materia della responsabilità della rete, impostando il problema sotto due profili: la responsabilità interna ed esterna. La prima viene risolta sulla base dell’affidamento reciproco maturato da ogni imprenditore. La seconda viene distinta in responsabilità extracontrattuale, ricondotta nella fattispecie all’art. 2050 c.c., e contrattuale.