Essays in Health Economics

In the first chapter we develop a theoretical model investigating food consumption and body weight with a novel assumption regarding human caloric expenditure (i.e. metabolism), in order to investigate why individuals can be rationally trapped in an excessive weight equilibrium and why they struggle to lose weight even when offered incentives for weight-loss. This assumption allows the theoretical model to have multiple equilibria and to provide an explanation for why losing weight is so difficult even in the presence of incentives, without relying on rational addiction, time-inconsistency preferences or bounded rationality. In addition to this result we are able to characterize under which circumstances a temporary incentive can create a persistent weight loss. In the second chapter we investigate the possible contributions that social norms and peer effects had on the spread of obesity. In recent literature peer effects and social norms have been characterized as important pathways for the biological and behavioral spread of body weight, along with decreased food prices and physical activity. We add to this literature by proposing a novel concept of social norm related to what we define as social distortion in weight perception. The theoretical model shows that, in equilibrium, the effect of an increase in peers' weight on i's weight is unrelated to health concerns while it is mainly associated with social concerns. Using regional data from England we prove that such social component is significant in influencing individual weight. In the last chapter we investigate the relationship between body weight and employment probability. Using a semi-parametric regression we show that men and women employment probability do not follow a linear relationship with body mass index (BMI) but rather an inverted U-shaped one, peaking at a BMI way over the clinical threshold for overweight.

Essays in the Economics of Ageing

In the first paper, I assess if financial incentives may be used as an effective device to induce workers to postpone retirement by evaluating the Italian so called “super bonus” reform. The bonus consisted in economic incentives given for a limited period to private sector workers who had reached the requirements for seniority pension. Crucially for this study, public workers were not entitled to the bonus. Using data from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income andWealth, and exploiting the DID-Probit strategy proposed by Blundell et al. (JEEA, 2004), I assess the effect of the bonus on the decision to postpone retirement, by comparing private and public workers before and after the reform. Results suggest a reduction of 12ppt in the proportion of private workers who decided to retire among those qualifying for retirement. Results also suggest, not trivially, that most of the effect of the reform is driven by low-income workers. Finally, I propose an estimate of the extensive margin elasticity of Italian older workers. The second study estimates a structural reduced form of the “option value” model developed by Stock and Wise (1990) using Italian data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).Exploiting exogenous changes in social security wealth (SSW) results show a significant effect in the expected direction of SSW and of marginal incentives to retire. Results are robust even after controlling for individual heterogeneity and its correlation with financial incentives. Using detailed information on individuals, the results also highlights the importance of individual and job characteristics, which have been very little explored by this literature, as determinants of retirement. This suggests the potential of “tagging” in the design of social security incentives in order to reduce choice distortions and improve the overall efficiency of the system.

Essays in Applied and Labor Economics

This thesis consists of three self-contained papers. In the first paper I analyze the labor supply behavior of Bologna Pizza Delivery Vendors. Recent influential papers analyze labor supply behavior of taxi drivers (Camerer et al., 1997; and Crawford and Meng, 2011) and suggest that reference-dependence preferences have an important influence on drivers’ labor-supply decisions. Unlike previous papers, I am able to identify an exogenous and transitory change in labor demand. Using high frequency data on orders and rainfall as an exogenous demand shifter, I invariably find that reference-dependent preferences play no role in their labor’ supply decisions and the behavior of pizza vendors is perfectly consistent with the predictions of the standard model of labor’ supply. In the second paper, I investigate how the voting behavior of Members of Parliament is influenced by the Members seating nearby. By exploiting the random seating arrangements in the Icelandic Parliament, I show that being seated next to Members of a different party increases the probability of not being aligned with one’s own party. Using the exact spatial orientation of the peers, I provide evidence that supports the hypothesis that interaction is the main channel that explain these results. In the third paper, I provide an estimate of the trade flows that there would have been between the UK and Europe if the UK had joined the Euro. As an alternative approach to the standard log-linear gravity equation I employ the synthetic control method. I show that the aggregate trade flows between Britain and Europe would have been 13% higher if the UK had adopted the Euro.

Essays in the Economics of the Family and Cultural Transmission

My research aims at identifying the role cultural-ethnic traits play in marriage choices and at uncovering the implications of marital sorting on consequent intra-household decisions. From different perspectives, this thesis focuses on intermarriages, within the Italian marriage market. In the first chapter, I explore the role of ethnic endogamy on marital instability. I document the existence of a positive differential in marital instability of interethnic marriages compared to homogeneous ones and I demonstrate that genetic and ethnolinguistic measures of cultural diversity are informative about the incidence of marital dissolution. The second chapter investigates a novel channel, which explains the differential in household stability and investments across family types: cultural socialization of children. I propose a marital matching model along cultural-ethnic lines, to study the process of family formation and intra-household decision making in a context where ethnic differences between spouses potentially matter both in terms of preferences and technologies for household production. The observed intermarriage, fertility, separation and socialization rates are in line with theoretical predictions and they are consistent with strong preferences of parents toward cultural socialization of children to their own ethnic identity. In the third chapter, I propose and estimate a marital matching model along ethnic lines. I argue that gains to intermarriage depend on both cultural preferences and legal status motives. Taking advantage of the exogenous EU enlargements to East European countries in 2004 and 2007, I show that gains to intermarriage of East European migrants significantly decrease in response to the acquisition of the legal status. The final chapter aims to understand whether judicial decisions respond to the ethnic identity of spouses and what incentives those judgments are guided, by looking at separation and divorce sentences. Studying the legal custody assignment of children, I document a significant differential interacting mothers’ ethnicities with the family type.

Essays in Applied Insurance Economics

The papers included in this thesis deal with a few aspects of insurance economics that have seldom been dealt with in the applied literature. In the first paper I apply for the first time the tools of the economics of crime to study the determinants of frauds, using data on Italian provinces. The contributions to the literature are manifold: -The price of insuring has a positive correlation with the propensity to defraud -Social norms constraint fraudulent behavior, but their strength is curtailed in economic downturns -I apply a simple extension of the Random Coefficient model, which allows for the presence of time invariant covariates and asymmetries in the impact of the regressors. The second paper assesses how the evolution of macro prudential regulation of insurance companies has been reflected in their equity price. I employ a standard event study methodology, deriving the definition of the “control” and “treatment” groups from what is implied by the regulatory framework. The main results are: -Markets care about the evolution of the legislation. Their perception has shifted from a first positive assessment of a possible implicit “too big to fail” subsidy to a more negative one related to its cost in terms of stricter capital requirement -The size of this phenomenon is positively related to leverage, size and on the geographical location of the insurance companies The third paper introduces a novel methodology to forecast non-life insurance premiums and profitability as function of macroeconomic variables, using the simultaneous equation framework traditionally employed macroeconometric models and a simple theoretical model of insurance pricing to derive a long term relationship between premiums, claims expenses and short term rates. The model is shown to provide a better forecast of premiums and profitability compared with the single equation specifications commonly used in applied analysis.

The Allocation of Asylum Responsibilities in the EU: a Law & Economics Analysis

This dissertation focuses on how the design of the EU asylum allocation system, the system that allocates the EU’s asylum duties to its member states, relates to the development of asylum crises. The current EU asylum allocation system, the Dublin system, has in the literature frequently been blamed as an important factor that contributed to the events that occurred during the 2015/2016 EU Asylum Crisis. In the first part of this dissertation, I use a Law & Economics methodology based on rational choice theory to study how the Dublin system creates behavioural incentives for both asylum seekers and member states and how this relates to the events during the 2015/2016 EU Asylum Crisis. In the second part, I analyse how behavioural incentives for asylum seekers and member states would change if the EU would replace the Dublin system with a so-called (tradable) quota system. By comparing the outcomes of the first and the second part of the dissertation I make some normative recommendations on desirable features for an EU asylum allocation system that provides better incentives for asylum seekers and member states.