Reconciling the Irreconcilable? Sovereign Debt Restructuring and the Principles of International Law. A Law and Economics Perspective

This Thesis focuses on the principles of international law relevant to the resolution of legal disputes arising from sovereign insolvency conflicts. It attempts to contribute to the “incremental” approach literature by identifying principles, justifying their application in litigation and assessing whether they may help to reconcile the trade-offs prevalent in that context. For that purpose, this Thesis distinguishes between two different types of principles. First, it investigates the “Principles of Public International Law” (henceforth, “PIL principles”). Said category refers to norms of the law of nations which can be considered functionally and structurally similar to domestic constitutional principles (i.e., that can be regarded as “optimization” or “prima facie” requirements). This Thesis underscores the PIL principles protecting the interests of the creditors and citizens as well as the “public interest”, arguing that decision makers face a trade-off between these principles in the context of restructurings. Secondly, this Thesis inquires into the “general principles of domestic law” (henceforth, “GPDs”) which can be applied in sovereign debt restructuring. Two GPDs are identified: a “stay” on litigation and a “cram down” on dissenting creditors’ claims. Although both principles have been identified by the prior literature, this work advances a small but significant “twist” in the methodology used for that purpose: it relies exclusively on functional and comparative analysis. Moreover, this work justifies the application of said GPDs for two jurisdictions: New York and Germany. Finally, it posits that those GPDs can help to mitigate the trade-offs between PIL principles, thus reconciling the interests at stake.

Ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims - A law and economics perspective

This research addresses the use of ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims in domestic settings using law and economics research methodologies. Potential economic benefits from using arbitration, particularly between informed and knowledgeable parties and in international business transactions, are not guaranteed in domestic disputes. Arbitration can potentially be used to manipulate the adjudication process. This research has several findings. There is a lack of information available concerning the use of arbitration to adjudicate tort claims. Proxy measurements concerning the demand for third party adjudication and other legal indicators are a poor substitute for the information hidden behind the veil of arbitration. There is the potential for the strategic use of ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims by repeat player tortfeasors to domestic tort claims, both individually and in concert with other repeat player firms. These strategic efforts aim to: manipulate enforcement errors for tort claims, avoid procedural rules which have the effect of lowering enforcement errors, enable a unique type of domestic forum arbitrage, shirk from taking due care, capture the economic benefit of using arbitration, manipulate the stock of precedents and production of public goods from courts, collude in these underlying efforts, restrain competition, indirectly fix prices, and other aims which increase the repeat player tortfeasor’s or their industries economic gains related to their underlying contracts and tort disputes. This research also demonstrates how this subject is appropriate for further academic research and why states should be cautious of giving carte blanche to arbitrate all domestic tort claims.