Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

The Influence of Direct Democracy on Agency Costs: Lessons from Corporate Governance

This dissertation seeks to improve the usage of direct democracy in order to minimize agency cost. It first explains why insights from corporate governance can help to improve constitutional law and then identifies relevant insights from corporate governance that can make direct democracy more efficient. To accomplish this, the dissertation examines a number of questions. What are the key similarities in corporate and constitutional law? Do these similarities create agency problems that are similar enough for a comparative analysis to yield valuable insights? Once the utility of corporate governance insights is established, the dissertation answers two questions. Are initiatives necessary to minimize agency cost if referendums are already provided for? And, must the results of direct democracy be binding in order for agency cost to be minimized?

The Road to Poverty Reduction: Corporate Governance and Female Participation in MFIs

1.Microfinance Industry – Context of Analysis. This paper is an introduction to the microfinance industry. It serves as a context of analysis, for the empirical settings and basis for building the theoretical argument for the thesis. 2.Women in Microfinance Institutions: The Road to Poverty Reduction and Gender Equality? One of the unique aspects of microfinance institutions is their focus on outreach, i.e. their ability to reach the poor. This paper explores whether the presence of women in microfinance institutions is associated with improved outreach. Building on prior research that shows that women tend to improve financial performance and social responsibility, we examine an original dataset of 226 microfinance institutions. The empirical results suggest that the presence of a female CEO, female managers and female loan officers is directly related to improved outreach, while the presence of women board members is not. 3. Women in Microfinance Institutions: Is There a Trade-Off Between Outreach and Sustainability? Abstract This paper’s contribution to the understanding of microfinance is two-fold. First, while it has been shown that female CEOs in MFIs increase financial performance, it will be argued that female managers, female loan officers and female board members will do the same. Secondly, having previously shown that having a female presence in management in MFIs improves social performance the outreach, it will be argued that having females in the MFIs’ management will not lead to a trade-off between outreach and sustainability. These findings are based on an original data set of 226 MFIs. Statistical analysis demonstrates that a weak relationship between female managers and female loan officers vis-à-vis financial performance, but female board members do not. The trade-off between outreach and sustainability can be avoided with the appointment of females to the MFIs’ management positions, but the same cannot be concluded for female board members.