An analysis of the regulatory chill hypothesis: environmental protection in international investment law

The goal of this thesis has been to find out whether ISDS and international investment law exert a chilling effect on more stringent environmental standards at the domestic level. Due to the lack of consistent empirical and statistical evidence uncovered during the analysis, this thesis largely dismisses the regulatory chill hypothesis. However, two exceptions are identified: first, there is evidence of the efforts made by domestic industrial groups and trade unions to prevent the implementation of stricter environmental standards; second, it has become apparent that unfounded beliefs, e.g. about ISDS, held by lawmakers and regulators can play an important role in chilling stricter environmental standards. For these reasons, a new and narrower definition of the regulatory chill phenomenon has been proposed, one that only encompasses those instances in which lawmakers, governments and government agencies refrain from adopting the laws and regulations that they deem the most appropriate because they believe that doing so would lead to adverse consequences at the international trade and investment level, despite a lack of consistent and robust evidence supporting their concerns. The second part of this thesis focusses on what could be done in international economic law to promote environmentally friendly FDI, while preventing the few instances in which regulatory chill may take place due to ill-founded beliefs held by lawmakers and regulators. Following an analysis that highlights the paramount role played by public participation and responsive institutions to achieve an appropriate level of environmental protection, this study ends with a proposal that recommends the adoption of a clause within IIAs that makes pre-investment environmental screening mandatory and free from ISDS oversight.

Ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims - A law and economics perspective

This research addresses the use of ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims in domestic settings using law and economics research methodologies. Potential economic benefits from using arbitration, particularly between informed and knowledgeable parties and in international business transactions, are not guaranteed in domestic disputes. Arbitration can potentially be used to manipulate the adjudication process. This research has several findings. There is a lack of information available concerning the use of arbitration to adjudicate tort claims. Proxy measurements concerning the demand for third party adjudication and other legal indicators are a poor substitute for the information hidden behind the veil of arbitration. There is the potential for the strategic use of ex ante contracts to arbitrate tort claims by repeat player tortfeasors to domestic tort claims, both individually and in concert with other repeat player firms. These strategic efforts aim to: manipulate enforcement errors for tort claims, avoid procedural rules which have the effect of lowering enforcement errors, enable a unique type of domestic forum arbitrage, shirk from taking due care, capture the economic benefit of using arbitration, manipulate the stock of precedents and production of public goods from courts, collude in these underlying efforts, restrain competition, indirectly fix prices, and other aims which increase the repeat player tortfeasor’s or their industries economic gains related to their underlying contracts and tort disputes. This research also demonstrates how this subject is appropriate for further academic research and why states should be cautious of giving carte blanche to arbitrate all domestic tort claims.