Understanding Recent Developments in the Turkish Labor Market: Empirical Essays with a Gender Focus

This dissertation comprises three essays on the Turkish labor market. The first essay characterizes the distinctive characteristics of the Turkish labor market with the aim of understanding the factors lying behind its long-standing poor performance relative to its European counterparts. The analysis is based on a cross-country comparison among selected European Union countries. Among all the indicators of labor market flexibility, non-wage cost rigidities are regarded as one of the most important factors in slowing down employment creation in Turkey. The second essay focuses on an employment subsidy policy which introduces a reduction in non-wage costs through social security premium incentives granted to women and young men. Exploiting a difference-in-difference-in differences strategy, I evaluate the effectiveness of this policy in creating employment for the target group. The results, net of the recent crisis effect, suggest that the policy accounts for a 1.4% to 1.6% increase in the probability of being hired for women aged 30 to 34 above men of the same age group in the periods shortly after the announcement of the policy. In the third essay of the dissertation, I analyze the labor supply response of married women to their husbands' job losses (AWE). I empirically test the hypothesis of added worker effect for the global economic crisis of 2008 by relying on the Turkey context. Identification is achieved by exploiting the exogenous variation in the output of male-dominated sectors hard-hit by the crisis and the gender-segmentation that characterizes the Turkish labor market. Findings based on the instrumental variable approach suggest that the added worker effect explains up to 64% of the observed increase in female labor force participation in Turkey. The size of the effect depends on how long it takes for wives to adjust their labor supply to their husbands' job losses.

Effects of 2013 Cap reform on land market: regionalized farm payments and changes in farmers’ intended behaviour

The CAP reform process has been a central issue for agricultural economics research in recent years, and is gaining further attention in view of the post-2013 perspectives (Viaggi et al., 2010; Bartolini et al., 2011). Today the CAP is in the middle of a new reform process. Through the debate generated by the official proposals, published in October 2011 (COM(2011)625/3), the European Union (EU) engaged in a revision of the CAP ended on 26 June 2013 when a political agreement has been reached (IP/13/613, MEMO-13-621 and IP/13/864). In particular, in Italy the switch of the payment regime from historical to regional bases will take place. The underlying assumption is that the shift to regionalized payments changes the remuneration of inputs and has an impact on farmers’ allocation of fixed resources. In this context, farmers are expected to adjust their plans to the new policy environment as the regionalization of support is meant to create a change in incentives faced by farmers. The objective of this thesis is to provide an ex-ante analysis of the potential impact of the introduction of regionalized payments, within the post-2013 CAP reform, on the land market. Regionalized payments seem to produce differentiated effects and contribute to a general (slight) increase of land exchanges. The individual reaction to the new payments introduction would be different depending on location and specialization. These effects seem to be also strongly influenced by the difference in historical payments endowment and value, i.e. by the previous historical system of distribution of payments.

The Application of European Competition Law in Arbitration Proceedings

This work provides several policy proposals capable to strengthen the private enforcement of EU competition law in arbitration. It focuses on the procedural law aspects that are permeated by legal uncertainty and that have not yet fallen under the scrutiny of the law and economics debate. The policy proposals described herein are based on the functional approach to law and economics and aim to promote a more qualified decision making process by: adjudicators, private parties and lawmakers. The resulting framework of procedural rules would be a cost-effective policy tool that could sustain the European Commission’s effort to guarantee a workable level of competition in the EU internal market. This project aims to answer the following broad research question: which procedural rules can improve the efficiency of antitrust arbitration by decreasing litigation costs for private parties on the one hand, and by increasing private parties’ compliance with competition law on the other hand?Throughout this research project, such broad question has been developed into research sub-questions revolving around several key legal issues. The chosen sub-research questions result from a vacuum in the European enforcement system that leaves several key legal issues in antitrust arbitration unresolved. The legal framework proposed in this research project could prevent such a blurry scenario from impairing the EU private enforcement of competition law in arbitration. Therefore, our attention was triggered by those legal issues whose proposed solutions lead to relevant uncertainties and that are most suitable for a law and economics analysis.

The market manipulation regime in the European Union

Market manipulation is an illegal practice that enables a person can profit from practices that artificially raise or lower the prices of an instrument in the financial markets. Its prohibition is based on the 2003 Market Abuse Directive in the EU. The current market manipulation regime was broadly considered as a big success except for enforcement and supervisory inconsistencies in the Member States at the initial. A review of the market manipulation regime began at the end of 2007, which became quickly incorporated into the wider EU crisis-era reform program. A number of weaknesses of current regime have been identified, which include regulatory gaps caused by the development of trading venues and financial products, regulatory gaps concerning cross-border and cross-markets manipulation (particular commodity markets), legal uncertainty as a result of various implementation, and inefficient supervision and enforcement. On 12 June 2014, a new regulatory package of market abuse, Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse, has been adopted. And several changes will be made concerning the EU market manipulation regime. A wider scope of the regime and a new prohibition of attempted market manipulation will ensure the prevention of market manipulation at large. The AMPs will be subject to strict scrutiny of ESMA to reduce divergences in implementation. In order to enhance efficiency of supervision and enforcement, powers of national competent authorities will be strengthened, ESMA is imposed more power to settle disagreement between national regulators, and the administrative and criminal sanctioning regimes are both further harmonized. In addition, the protection of fundamental rights is stressed by the new market manipulation regime, and some measures are provided to guarantee its realization. Further, the success EU market manipulation regime could be of significant reference to China, helping China to refine its immature regime.