Essays on Personnel Economics and Gender Issues

This thesis consists of four self-contained essays in economics. Tournaments and unfair treatment. This paper introduces the negative feelings associated with the perception of being unfairly treated into a tournament model and examines the impact of these perceptions on workers’ efforts and their willingness to work overtime. The effect of unfair treatment on workers’ behavior is ambiguous in the model in that two countervailing effects arise: a negative impulsive effect and a positive strategic effect. The impulsive effect implies that workers react to the perception of being unfairly treated by reducing their level of effort. The strategic effect implies that workers raise this level in order to improve their career opportunities and thereby avoid feeling even more unfairly treated in the future. An empirical test of the model using survey data from a Swedish municipal utility shows that the overall effect is negative. This suggests that employers should consider the negative impulsive effect of unfair treatment on effort and overtime in designing contracts and determining on promotions. Late careers in Sweden between 1970 and 2000. In this essay Swedish workers’ late careers between 1970 and 2000 are studied. The aim is to examine older workers’ career patterns and whether they have changed during this period. For example, is there a difference in career mobility or labor market exiting between cohorts? What affects the late career, and does this differ between cohorts? The analysis shows that between 1970 and 2000 the late careers of Swedish workers comprised of few job changes and consisted more of “trying to keep the job you had in your mid-fifties” than of climbing up the promotion ladder. There are no cohort differences in this pattern. Also a large fraction of the older workers exited the labor market before the normal retirement age of 65. During the 1970s and first part of the 1980s, 56 percent of the older workers made an early exit and the average drop-out age was 63. During the late 1980s and the 1990s the share of old workers who made an early exit had risen to 76 percent and the average drop-out age had dropped to 61.5. Different factors have affected the probabilities of an early exit between 1970 and 2000. For example, skills did affect the risk of exiting the labor market during the 1970s and up to the mid-1980s, but not in the late 1980s or the 1990s. During the first period old workers in the lowest occupations or with the lowest level of education were more likely to exit the labor market than more highly skilled workers. In the second period old workers at all levels of skill had the same probability of leaving the labor market. The growth and survival of establishments: does gender segregation matter? We empirically examine the employment dynamics that arise in Becker’s (1957) model of labor market discrimination. According to the model, firms that employ a large fraction of women will be relatively more profitable due to lower wage costs, and thus enjoy a greater probability of surviving and growing by underselling other firms in the competitive product market. In order to test these implications, we use a unique Swedish matched employer-employee data set. We find that female-dominated establishments do not enjoy any greater probability of surviving and do not grow faster than other establishments. Additionally, we find that integrated establishments, in terms of gender, age and education levels, are more successful than other establishments. Thus, attempts by legislators to integrate firms along all dimensions of diversity may have positive effects on the growth and survival of firms. Risk and overconfidence – Gender differences in financial decision-making as revealed in the TV game-show Jeopardy. We have used unique data from the Swedish version of the TV-show Jeopardy to uncover gender differences in financial decision-making by looking at the contestants’ final wagering strategies. After ruling out empirical best-responses, which do appear in Jeopardy in the US, a simple model is derived to show that risk preferences, the subjective and objective probabilities of answering correctly (individual and group competence), determine wagering strategies. The empirical model shows that, on average, women adopt more conservative and diversified strategies, while men’s strategies aim for the greatest gains. Further, women’s strategies are more responsive to the competence measures, which suggests that they are less overconfident. Together these traits make women more successful players. These results are in line with earlier findings on gender and financial trading.

Jobs, Unemployment, and Macroeconomic Transmission

Measuring Job Openings: Evidence from Swedish Plant Level Data. In modern macroeconomic models “job openings'' are a key component. Thus, when taking these models to the data we need an empirical counterpart to the theoretical concept of job openings. To achieve this, the literature relies on job vacancies measured either in survey or register data. Insofar as this concept captures the concept of job openings well we should see a tight relationship between vacancies and subsequent hires on the micro level. To investigate this, I analyze a new data set of Swedish hires and job vacancies on the plant level covering the period 2001-2012. I find that vacancies contain little power in predicting hires over and above (i) whether the number of vacancies is positive and (ii) plant size. Building on this, I propose an alternative measure of job openings in the economy. This measure (i) better predicts hiring at the plant level and (ii) provides a better fitting aggregate matching function vis-à-vis the traditional vacancy measure. Firm Level Evidence from Two Vacancy Measures. Using firm level survey and register data for both Sweden and Denmark we show systematic mis-measurement in both vacancy measures. While the register-based measure on the aggregate constitutes a quarter of the survey-based measure, the latter is not a super-set of the former. To obtain the full set of unique vacancies in these two databases, the number of survey vacancies should be multiplied by approximately 1.2. Importantly, this adjustment factor varies over time and across firm characteristics. Our findings have implications for both the search-matching literature and policy analysis based on vacancy measures: observed changes in vacancies can be an outcome of changes in mis-measurement, and are not necessarily changes in the actual number of vacancies. Swedish Unemployment Dynamics. We study the contribution of different labor market flows to business cycle variations in unemployment in the context of a dual labor market. To this end, we develop a decomposition method that allows for a distinction between permanent and temporary employment. We also allow for slow convergence to steady state which is characteristic of European labor markets. We apply the method to a new Swedish data set covering the period 1987-2012 and show that the relative contributions of inflows and outflows to/from unemployment are roughly 60/30. The remaining 10\% are due to flows not involving unemployment. Even though temporary contracts only cover 9-11\% of the working age population, variations in flows involving temporary contracts account for 44\% of the variation in unemployment. We also show that the importance of flows involving temporary contracts is likely to be understated if one does not account for non-steady state dynamics. The New Keynesian Transmission Mechanism: A Heterogeneous-Agent Perspective. We argue that a 2-agent version of the standard New Keynesian model---where a ``worker'' receives only labor income and a “capitalist'' only profit income---offers insights about how income inequality affects the monetary transmission mechanism. Under rigid prices, monetary policy affects the distribution of consumption, but it has no effect on output as workers choose not to change their hours worked in response to wage movements. In the corresponding representative-agent model, in contrast, hours do rise after a monetary policy loosening due to a wealth effect on labor supply: profits fall, thus reducing the representative worker's income. If wages are rigid too, however, the monetary transmission mechanism is active and resembles that in the corresponding representative-agent model. Here, workers are not on their labor supply curve and hence respond passively to demand, and profits are procyclical.