Essays on Wage and Price Formation in Sweden

Study IReal Wage Determination in the Swedish Engineering Industry This study uses the monopoly union model to examine the determination of real wages and in particular the effects of active labour market programmes (ALMPs) on real wages in the engineering industry. Quarterly data for the period 1970:1 to 1996:4 are used in a cointegration framework, utilising the Johansen's maximum likelihood procedure. On a basis of the Johansen (trace) test results, vector error correction (VEC) models are created in order to model the determination of real wages in the engineering industry. The estimation results support the presence of a long-run wage-raising effect to rises in the labour productivity, in the tax wedge, in the alternative real consumer wage and in real UI benefits. The estimation results also support the presence of a long-run wage-raising effect due to positive changes in the participation rates regarding ALMPs, relief jobs and labour market training. This could be interpreted as meaning that the possibility of being a participant in an ALMP increases the utility for workers of not being employed in the industry, which in turn could increase real wages in the industry in the long run. Finally, the estimation results show evidence of a long-run wage-reducing effect due to positive changes in the unemployment rate. Study IIIntersectoral Wage Linkages in Sweden The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the wage-setting in certain sectors of the Swedish economy affects the wage-setting in other sectors. The theoretical background is the Scandinavian model of inflation, which states that the wage-setting in the sectors exposed to international competition affects the wage-setting in the sheltered sectors of the economy. The Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration approach is applied to quarterly data on Swedish sector wages for the period 1980:1–2002:2. Different vector error correction (VEC) models are created, based on assumptions as to which sectors are exposed to international competition and which are not. The adaptability of wages between sectors is then tested by imposing restrictions on the estimated VEC models. Finally, Granger causality tests are performed in the different restricted/unrestricted VEC models to test for sector wage leadership. The empirical results indicate considerable adaptability in wages as between manufacturing, construction, the wholesale and retail trade, the central government sector and the municipalities and county councils sector. This is consistent with the assumptions of the Scandinavian model. Further, the empirical results indicate a low level of adaptability in wages as between the financial sector and manufacturing, and between the financial sector and the two public sectors. The Granger causality tests provide strong evidence for the presence of intersectoral wage causality, but no evidence of a wage-leading role in line with the assumptions of the Scandinavian model for any of the sectors. Study IIIWage and Price Determination in the Private Sector in Sweden The purpose of this study is to analyse wage and price determination in the private sector in Sweden during the period 1980–2003. The theoretical background is a variant of the “Imperfect competition model of inflation”, which assumes imperfect competition in the labour and product markets. According to the model wages and prices are determined as a result of a “battle of mark-ups” between trade unions and firms. The Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration approach is applied to quarterly Swedish data on consumer prices, import prices, private-sector nominal wages, private-sector labour productivity and the total unemployment rate for the period 1980:1–2003:3. The chosen cointegration rank of the estimated vector error correction (VEC) model is two. Thus, two cointegration relations are assumed: one for private-sector nominal wage determination and one for consumer price determination. The estimation results indicate that an increase of consumer prices by one per cent lifts private-sector nominal wages by 0.8 per cent. Furthermore, an increase of private-sector nominal wages by one per cent increases consumer prices by one per cent. An increase of one percentage point in the total unemployment rate reduces private-sector nominal wages by about 4.5 per cent. The long-run effects of private-sector labour productivity and import prices on consumer prices are about –1.2 and 0.3 per cent, respectively. The Rehnberg agreement during 1991–92 and the monetary policy shift in 1993 affected the determination of private-sector nominal wages, private-sector labour productivity, import prices and the total unemployment rate. The “offensive” devaluation of the Swedish krona by 16 per cent in 1982:4, and the start of a floating Swedish krona and the substantial depreciation of the krona at this time affected the determination of import prices.

Essays on Development Policy and the Political Economy of Conflict

Electoral Rules and Leader Selection: Experimental Evidence from Ugandan Community Groups. Despite a large body of work documenting how electoral systems affect policy outcomes, less is known about their impact on leader selection. We study this by comparing two types of participatory decision making in Ugandan community groups: (i) vote by secret ballot and (ii) open discussion with consensus. Random assignment allows us to estimate the causal impact of the rules on leader types and social service delivery. Vote groups are found to elect leaders more similar to the average member while discussion group leaders are positively selected on socio-economic characteristics. Further, dropout rates are significantly higher in discussion groups, particularly for poorer members. After 3.5 years, vote groups are larger in size and their members save less and get smaller loans. We conclude that the secret ballot vote creates more inclusive groups while open discussion groups favor the already economically successful. Preparing for Genocide: Community Meetings in Rwanda. How do political elites prepare the civilian population for participation in violent conflict? We empirically investigate this question using data from the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Every Saturday before 1994, Rwandan villagers had to meet to work on community infrastructure. The practice was highly politicized and, according to anecdotal evidence, regularly used by the political elites for spreading propaganda in the years before the genocide. This paper presents the first quantitative evidence of this abuse of the community meetings. To establish causality, we exploit cross-sectional variation in meeting intensity induced by exogenous weather fluctuations. We find that an additional rainy Saturday resulted in a five percent lower civilian participation rate in genocide violence. Selection into Borrowing: Survey Evidence from Uganda. In this paper, I study how changes to the standard credit contract affect loan demand and selection into borrowing, using a representative sample of urban micro enterprises, most with no borrowing experience. Hypothetical loan demand questions are used to test whether firm owners respond to changes in loans' contractual terms and whether take-up varies by firms' risk type and other firm owner characteristics. The results indicate that contracts with lower interest rates and less stringent collateral requirements attract less risky borrowers, suggesting that there is scope for improvement of standard financial contract terms. Credit Contract Structure and Firm Growth: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial. We study the effects of credit contract structure on firm outcomes among small and medium sized firms. A randomized control trial was carried out to distinguish between some of the key constraints to efficient credit use connected to the firms' business environment and production function, namely (i) backloaded returns (ii) uncertain returns and (iii) indivisible fixed costs. Each firm was followed for the 1-year loan cycle. We describe the experiment and present preliminary results from the first 754 out of 2,340 firms to have completed the loan cycle. Firms offered a grace period have higher profits and higher household income than firms receiving a rebate later on as well as the control group. They also increased the number of paid employees  and reduced the number of unpaid employees, an effect also found among firms that received a cash subsidy at the beginning of the loan cycle. We discuss potential mechanisms behind these effects.