17 resultados para Return to skill

em Comissão Econômica para a América Latina e o Caribe (CEPAL)


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Events in Argentina dominated most of the third quarter of 2001 until September 11, when the terrorist attacks against the United States prompted a sell-off of emerging markets assets, increasing uncertainty and risk aversion against a background of global economic slowdown. Emerging markets' short term prospects to tap international capital markets deteriorated significantly. In the third quarter of 2001, Latin American countries issued US$7.6 billion in bonds, following US$11.2 billion in the second quarter and US$13.2 billion in the first quarter, which had been a jump from only US$2.9 billion in the last quarter of 2000. At first, it seemed that the pace of debt issuance would slow down considerably given Argentina's troubles in July, as Argentina's bond auction at the beginning of the month was poorly received, forcing the government to shorten the maturity of the new debt and to pay rates as high as those during the Russian crisis in 1998. By August, however, emerging markets rebounded strongly on the back of a new US$8 billion IMF assistance package to Argentina, with both Mexico and Brazil successfully launching large issues. International markets displayed considerable flexibility as investors gave Mexico's US$1.5 billion 30- year bond and Brazil's JPY200 billion two-year samurai issue a warm reception. This return to capital markets was interrupted by the events of September 11, which caused debt issuance to fall sharply in September and October. Following the events of September 11, EMBI+ spreads widened above 1,000 basis points for the first time in nearly two years. According to J.P. Morgan there was a 3.7% market decline in September, which brought year-to-date returns for the EMBI+ to only 0.06%. Emerging markets debt, however, fared better than most other fixed income and equity markets in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. U.S. high-yield market suffered its worst month since August 1998, declining by 6.5%, while the S&P 500 and Nasdaq declined by 8.2% and 17%, respectively. Emerging equity markets suffered even greater declines, with losses as severe as 24% in local currency terms and 31% in U.S. dollar terms.

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The external environment has deteriorated sharply as a result of the spiraling financial turmoil, and has led to a weakening in commodity prices and fears of a worldwide recession. Latin America and the Caribbean's fastest expansion in 40 years may be threatened as the global credit crunch makes financing scarce and squeezes demand for the region's commodities. This time around the region is better positioned to weather the crisis than in the past, given improvements in macroeconomic and financial policies as well as a reduced net dependency on external capital inflows. However, Latin American markets are feeling the effects of the crisis through a slowdown in capital inflows, large declines in stock price indexes, significant currency adjustments and an increase in debt spreads. Volatility has soared, with the closely watched Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index moving to an all-time high of 70.33 on October 17, indicating that fear (rather than greed) has been ruling the markets.After reaching record lows in May 2007, emerging markets bond spreads are now above pre-Asian crisis levels. The JPMorgan EMBI+ Latin American composite widened by 146 basis points in the third quarter, with spreads reaching 448 basis points at the end of September. Spreads have widened sharply in recent weeks as foreign investors cut back regional exposure for the safety of U.S. Treasuries. The ongoing lack of liquidity and subsequent liquidation of assets is leading to a collapse in asset prices and a sharp widening in spreads. Daily spreads in October have risen to levels not seen since December 2002, making it much more difficult for governments that need financing to get it. Risk premiums for Latin corporates and sovereigns have risen substantially, but have remained well below U.S. junk (high-yield) bonds. Latin corporates are facing a steep rise in foreign exchange borrowing costs (although less than firms in other emerging markets), which raises concerns that refinancing risks will climb.So far, emerging markets vulnerabilities have been more focused on corporates, as sovereigns have improved public debt dynamics and countries' financing needs are under control. Market performance has been driven by the rapid deterioration of emerging markets bank and corporate market, as well as ongoing losses in emerging markets equities. From January to September 2008, the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Latin American Index lost almost 28%, while the Emerging Markets Index lost 37% and the G-7 Index lost 24%. While in 2007 the Latin America component gained 47%, almost nine times as much as the MSCI-G7 index for developed markets, since mid-September 2008 stocks in Latin America have been doing worse than stocks in developed countries, as concerns about access to credit and the adverse impact of sharp falls in commodity prices and in local currencies contribute to increased risk aversion and to outflows of capital. Many governments in the region have used revenue from the commodity boom to pay down debt and build reserves. Now, facing a global financial crisis and the threat of recession in developed countries, the biggest question for Latin America is how long and deep this cyclical downturn will be, and how much it is going to reduce commodity prices. Prices for commodities such as soy, gold, copper and oil, which helped fund the region's boom, have fallen 28% since their July 2 high, according to the RJ/CRB Commodity Price Index. According to Morgan Stanley (in a September 29 report), should prices return to their 10-year average, Latin America's balanced budgets would quickly revert to a deficit of 4.1% of GDP. As risk aversion increases, investors are rapidly pulling out massive amounts of money, creating problems for local markets and banks. There is an ongoing shortage of dollars (as investors liquidate assets in Latin American markets), and as currencies depreciate, inflation concerns increase despite the global slowdown. In Brazil and Mexico, central banks deployed billions of dollars of reserves to stem steep currency declines, as companies in these countries, believing their local currencies would continue to strengthen against the U.S. dollar, took debts in dollars. Some companies also made bets using currency derivatives that have led to losses in the billions of dollars. Dramatic currency swings have caused heavy losses for many companies, from Mexico's cement giant Cemex SAB to the Brazilian conglomerate Grupo Votorantim. Mexico's third-largest retailer, Controladora Comercial Mexicana, declared bankruptcy recently after reporting huge losses related to exchange rate bets. As concerns about corporate exposure to dollar-denominated derivatives increases, yields on bonds issued by many of Brazil's and Mexico's leading companies have started to rise, sharply raising the cost of issuing new debt. Latin American external debt issuance came to a halt in the third quarter of 2008, totaling only US$ 690 million. The cost of obtaining loans for capital expenditures, M&A and debt refinancing is also rising substantially for Latin American corporates amid contagion from the U.S. financial crisis. According to bankers, a protracted trend of shortening tenors and widening spreads has intensified in the past few weeks, indicating that bank lending is quickly following the way of bonds and equity. Finally, money transfers from Latin American migrants are expected to decline for the first time this decade, as a result of economic downturns in the U.S. and Spain, inflation and a weaker dollar. The Mexican Central Bank announced that money transfers from Mexicans living in the U.S. dropped a record 12.2% in August. In 2008, migrants from the region will send some 1.7% less in remittances year-on-year when adjusted for inflation, according to the IADB, compounding the adverse effects of the deepening financial turmoil.

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Abstract If there is a geographical area that will be particularly affected by the tragedy of September 11, that will be the international borders of the United States. It is understandable that a country that enters in a state of war after been attacked with enormous losses, reacts by closing its international borders. Such immediate reaction has now been substituted by a more strict control over everything that crosses the border but, a fact remains, the border life is not going to be what it used to before September 11. In the short run, everything that crosses the border has slowed down by new controls. In the long run many things will return to what it was before that Tuesday, but for a long while, life at the border will not be the same. An intense interaction of more than twelve million people from the two sides of the U.S.-Mexico border have made us live in many instances as if the border does not exist. This is the case among many of us in the way we practice our family life. For the planning of weddings, birthdays, reunions, ceremonies, the border is more virtual than real. This is reversed as we get more serious in what it means to the space where institutions, the laws and the governments reminds us that there is a line that marks the beginning and the end of two different nations.

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Following a five-year period during which economic and social performance in Latin America and the Caribbean surpassed anything seen in recent decades, the global economic and financial crisis not only hurt macroeconomic variables but also impacted heavily on labour markets in the region’s countries. Between 2003 and 2008 employment rates had risen considerably, especially in the formal sector, but the crisis spelled a reversal of this trend. Nevertheless, the region was better prepared than it had been in previous crises, since it had achieved a sound fiscal footing, a good level of international reserves and low rates of inflation. This meant that the authorities had the space to implement countercyclical policies on both fiscal and monetary levels. Be this as it may, faced with the worst global crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, these measures could only attenuate the impact on the region’s economies —they could not prevent it altogether. Furthermore, the crisis struck with notable differences among subregions and countries depending on the nature of their trade integration, and not all the countries had the fiscal space to implement vigorous countercyclical policies. As discussed in this third ECLAC/ILO bulletin, the crisis did less damage to the region’s labour markets than had been feared at the beginning of last year, thanks to the implementation of public policies geared towards employment, as reviewed in the two previous bulletins. This bulletin offers an additional analysis from the perspective of gender equality. Moreover, some countries in the region, notably Brazil, managed to rapidly stabilize and revive economic growth, with positive effects on labour variables. The fact remains, however, that millions in Latin America and the Caribbean lost their jobs or were obliged to accept more poorly paid employment in more precarious conditions. The macroeconomic data indicate that recovery is under way and is stronger and occurring more rapidly than foreseen one year ago. In fact, regional growth in 2010 may well exceed the 4.1% forecast at the end of 2009. Consequently, although the unemployment rate may be expected to record a modest drop, it may not return to pre-crisis levels. The upturn is taking many different forms in the countries of the region. In some, especially in South America, recovery has benefited from the buoyancy of the Asian economies, whose demand for natural resources has driven large increases in exports, in terms of both volume and price. Countries whose economies are closely tied to the United States economy are benefiting from the recovery there, albeit more slowly and with a certain lag. Conversely, some countries are still suffering from major disequilibria, which are hampering their economic reactivation. Lastly, Chile and Haiti were both victims of devastating earthquakes early in the year and are therefore facing additional challenges associated with reconstruction, on top of their efforts to sustain an economic upturn. Despite the relatively favourable outlook for regional growth in 2010, great uncertainty still surrounds the global economy’s recovery, which affects the region’s economic prospects over the longer term. The weakness of the recovery in some regions and the doubts about its sustainability in others, as well as shocks that have occurred in international financial markets, are warning signs which authorities need to monitor continuously because of the region’s close integration with the global economy. In addition, a return to growth does not directly or automatically mean higher employment rates —still less decent working conditions. Although some labour indicators have performed reasonably favourably since the end of last year, the countries still face daunting challenges in improving the labour market integration of millions in Latin America and the Caribbean who are not seeing the fruits of renewed growth. This is why it is important to learn the lessons arising from the policies implemented during the crisis to offset its impact on labour markets. With this third joint bulletin, ECLAC and ILO continue to pursue their objective of affording the region the information and analyses needed to face these challenges, as regards both trends in the region’s labour markets and the corresponding policy options.