Border crossings in Mercosur countries: obstacles and their cost

In a recent ECLAC study of inefficiency at border crossings in Mercosur countries, it was found that the cost of delays in traffic between Argentina and Brazil amounted to a minimum of US$ 170 per truck for the most problematic border crossing. This is over 10 % higher than the typical price of freight between Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo or Porto Alegre. It was estimated that the extra-cost on this border crossing may amount to a maximum of US$ 273 per truck. These problems, which have to do more with organization than with infrastructure, cause serious losses to the sectors involved in international transport, and especially to end users of intermediate or consumer goods transported.This edition of the Bulletin includes a summary of a study entitled: Identificación de obstáculos al transporte terrestre internacional de cargas en el Mercosur: los casos de Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay.

The economic costs associated with landlocked status

Two Latin American republics, Bolivia and Paraguay, lack sovereign access to ocean ports. Their landlocked status effectively forces them to export and import products through borders with neighbouring countries; for this purpose, they frequently use land transport modes which are intrinsically more costly than ocean transport. However, being distant from ocean ports is an attribute not only of landlocked countries; but also of states or provinces, such as Mato Grosso, in Brazil, or Tucumán, in Argentina, which belong to countries with direct access to the sea. If perfect political and economic integration were to be achieved in the region, the distances and topographic accidents between points such as La Paz, Bolivia, and Arica, Chile, or Asunción, Paraguay and Paranaguá, Brazil, would remain unchanged. What would disappear would be the delays at border crossings and their related costs. For the two landlocked countries, border expenses, although significant, are a relatively small fraction of the cost of the land segments of international transport. More important for these countries, are the dependency of infrastructure services and the institutional framework of the transit countries for the transport of their external trade.

Transandean railroads: the interruption of service and prospects for resumption

Building the infrastructure and then operating a railroad which starts on the Pacific coast of South America and which, a few score kilometres inland, must climb close to 4,000 metres above sea level in the Andes mountains has always presented challenges both for the civil engineers responsible for its construction and for the managers in charge of its operation.As at mid-2001, two of the four transandean railroads that ran 20 years ago are out of service, owing to adverse weather conditions, and a third is not operating as a result of institutional problems.Nevertheless, two of the three railroads that are now shut down could resume service soon. Furthermore, there is a possibility that a new transandean railroad could be built that would cross the Andes mountains further south, at an altitude of less than 1,750 meters.

The opportunities and risks associated with privatizing railways in Latin America

Most railways in Latin America were built by private firms, often foreign owned. Over time, owing to a combination of nationalizations and competition from road transport, virtually all railways passed into government hands; the railroad industry became more and more of a white elephant for the Government because of the ever-increasing subsidies it swallowed up, its dwindling role in national economies, and a conviction that Governments should not be involved in productive activities. Consequently, the late 1980s saw the start of a trend towards denationalization of railways, with the latter being turned over to private, often foreign, interests. In this way, the railway industry in Latin America has come full circle in the space of 150 years. So far, there has not been any assessment of the recent privatization of railways in Latin America. However, the conclusion would probably be that: (i) privatization has on the whole been successful, and (ii) the results achieved would have been more positive still, had some things been done slightly differently. One problem is that the bidding process has failed to take into account the positive externalities associated with railways, such as the contribution they make to reducing road maintenance costs and environmental damage caused by road transport. Another unresolved issue is whether to put the entire railway system up for tender, or to invite separate bids for infrastructure and services. Economies of scale operate in the railway industry, favouring the existence of a number of rail companies. In the past, the railway companies of neighbouring countries such as Argentina and Paraguay, and Bolivia and Chile, enjoyed ties at director level, but these came to an end with the nationalization of railways. Now that the era of State involvement is itself drawing to a close, we can expect to see the formation of integrated railway systems, one of which might extend from Quijarro, on the border between Bolivia and Brazil, to Puerto Montt in the south of Chile.