Apertura comercial y cambio tecnológico en el Istmo Centroamericano

Incluye Bibliografía

Capital flows and their effect on the monetary base

Includes bibliography

¿Por qué hay tanta inseguridad económica en América Latina?

Incluye Bibliografía

Why is there so much economic insecurity in Latin America?

Includes bibliography

La economía del crecimiento impulsado por la demanda. Teoría y evidencia respecto del Brasil

Incluye Bibliografía

The fiscal impact of trade liberalization and commodity price fluctuation: the case of Dominican Republic, 1980-1998

Includes bibliography

Guatemala: evolución económica durante 2006 y perspectivas para 2007

Incluye Bibliografía

Cartera vencida y estrés macrofinanciero: un estudio econométrico para Centroamérica y la República Dominicana en 2008-2009

Incluye Bibliografía

Caribbean policy response to the information age: a review of government information and communications technology policy and services in selected Caribbean countries

Includes bibliography

The Netherlands Antilles: trade and integration with CARICOM

Introduction The Netherlands Antilles is an autonomous entity within the Kingdom of the Netherlands and comprises a federation of five Caribbean islands: Bonaire and Curacao (the Leeward islands) which comprise 80 per cent of the population of 211,000 and Saba, St. Eustatius and the southern part of St. Maarten (the Windward islands). Like the other countries in the Kingdom, it enjoys full autonomy in internal matters as, for example, education, public health, justice and customs. It has a per capita income of about US$ 12,000. The Leeward Islands and the Windward Islands account for about 75 per cent (Curacao (70 per cent) and Bonaire (5 per cent)) and 25 percent respectively of the economy of the Netherlands Antilles. The Netherlands Antilles has its own currency, the Netherlands guilder, which is pegged to the United States dollar at a fixed rate since 1971. The economy has some unique features that stem from its close relations with the Netherlands, its undiversified nature and heavy dependence on tourism, offshore finance, oil refining and shipping, the high share of trade (exports of goods and services of about 75 per cent of GDP), its geographical characteristics, its common border with the French Republic on St. Maarten, its duty-free access for imports from Aruba, its de facto free trade zone (FTZ), partial dollarization, especially for the Windward Islands, and its highly regulated labor market (1). Adverse economic shocks in the last two decades affected particularly the offshore financial sector and the oil refinery and, to a lesser extent, tourism. The repeal of withholding taxes in the United States in the 1980s indirectly caused the collapse of a number of highly profitable offshore financial activities in Curacao, leading to significant drops in government revenue and contributions to foreign exchange earnings. The withdrawal of Shell from Curacao in 1986 and the (temporary) closure of the oil refinery which had been a mainstay of the Curacao economy for almost three quarters of a century was the second major shock. It was subsequently leased to the Venezuelan State Company, Petroleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anonima (PDVSA), which resumed operations and preserved employment. In the 1990s, the Windward Islands were bit by several devastating hurricanes, which destroyed much of the economic infrastructure on the islands, including about half of the number of available hotel rooms in St Maarten. Further negative shocks were related to the discontinuation of certain trade privileges on European markets for Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), the withdrawal by the Netherlands of certain tax privileges for Dutch pensioners residing in the Netherlands Antilles and disruptions in the availability of Solidarity Fund resources for the smaller islands. National income has been on the decline since 1997. GDP declined by about 6 per cent between 1997 and 1999. Underlying fiscal imbalances and structural weaknesses have also impacted negatively on the economy. In recent years, with recession high unemployment and migration have been experienced (2). The Netherlands Antilles has been able to survive thanks to additional aid from the Netherlands, large-scale spontaneous emigration (mostly to the Netherlands), some drop in international reserves, an increase in domestic debt and arrears and reduced outlays for the maintenance of public assets. From 1986 onwards, successive efforts at restoring macroeconomic balance, particularly with regard to public finance, were made, but were unsuccessful. Adjustment was also attempted in 1996 and 1997, but failed to meet the desired targets. In 1999, the government launched a new National Recovery Plan" (NRP). The NRP contains important medium-term structural adjustment measures aimed at restoring macroeconomic balance and conditions for revitalizing the economy. The NRP subsequently served as an important input into a comprehensive adjustment plan drawn up with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and reflected in the government's Memorandum of Economic Policies dated 15 September 2000. Beyond restoring macroeconomic balance and reforming the economic incentive framework, the government aims at establishing a Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) for the formulation and implementation of a sustainable long-term growth strategy. It is against the above background that this study is undertaken. Its main objective is to assess the integration options facing the Netherlands Antilles (3) vis-a-vis the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). A secondary objective is to examine the above taking into account, inter alia, the level of trade between the Netherlands Antilles and CARICOM, the barriers to trade between the two groups of countries and the requirements for increasing trade between the two groups of countries. The Consultant was given an initial Draft Terms of Reference (Annex 1) with the intention of modifying it in the course of the interviews with all the stakeholders. The main idea that emerged from these interviews was a concern with some possible form of association with CARICOM. The Consultant was asked to exam the costs and benefits of various forms of association and to recommend an option. This adjustment of the Terms of Reference (TOR) was substantial and involved the Consultant having to do some interviews and collect documentation in CARICOM. The study essentially revolves around the search for a road map for the Netherlands Antilles. It is tackled in the first instance by describing the existing system of trade of the Netherlands Antilles with a view to determining the import and export structures and the specific nature and extent of trade in goods and services between the Netherlands Antilles and CARICOM. 1 Netherlands Antilles: Elements of a Strategy for Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth. Interim Report of the World Bank Mission, 5-20 December 2000. 2 IMF, IMF Country Report No. 01/73 Kingdom of the Netherlands-Netherlands Antilles-Recent Development, Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix. May 2001 3 The Netherlands Antilles is a country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It contains five islands. Curacao and Bonaire (Leewards) and St Eustatius, Saba and St Maarten (The Windwards)"

Financiamento externo no ciclo recente da economia brasileira

Incluye Bibliografía

Chile's macroeconomic policies in the 1990s as seen from the vantage point of the Central Bank

Includes bibliography

Urban transport in the era of economic liberalization

In that decade, a different solution was required, because the Latin American economies, with only a few exceptions, were already regulated, protected and supervised by the State. One notable exception was the Chilean economy, which, at the onset of the 1970s, had been among the most controlled economies in the region after Cuba. Beginning in 1976/1977, Chile's economy underwent profound restructuring with the adoption of neoliberal policies, involving a reduction in customs tariffs, a decrease in State subsidies, the first steps towards the privatization of state-owned enterprises and a loosening of controls both over prices and production processes in general. The Chilean experience initially gave good results, but in 1982 Chile fell into a deep recession, caused to some extent by the continued fixing of one of the most important prices, that of the Chilean peso on the foreign exchange market, together with inadequate regulation of the banking sector.

Capital flows to Latin America: recent developments

The external environment has deteriorated sharply as a result of the spiraling financial turmoil, and has led to a weakening in commodity prices and fears of a worldwide recession. Latin America and the Caribbean's fastest expansion in 40 years may be threatened as the global credit crunch makes financing scarce and squeezes demand for the region's commodities. This time around the region is better positioned to weather the crisis than in the past, given improvements in macroeconomic and financial policies as well as a reduced net dependency on external capital inflows. However, Latin American markets are feeling the effects of the crisis through a slowdown in capital inflows, large declines in stock price indexes, significant currency adjustments and an increase in debt spreads. Volatility has soared, with the closely watched Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index moving to an all-time high of 70.33 on October 17, indicating that fear (rather than greed) has been ruling the markets.After reaching record lows in May 2007, emerging markets bond spreads are now above pre-Asian crisis levels. The JPMorgan EMBI+ Latin American composite widened by 146 basis points in the third quarter, with spreads reaching 448 basis points at the end of September. Spreads have widened sharply in recent weeks as foreign investors cut back regional exposure for the safety of U.S. Treasuries. The ongoing lack of liquidity and subsequent liquidation of assets is leading to a collapse in asset prices and a sharp widening in spreads. Daily spreads in October have risen to levels not seen since December 2002, making it much more difficult for governments that need financing to get it. Risk premiums for Latin corporates and sovereigns have risen substantially, but have remained well below U.S. junk (high-yield) bonds. Latin corporates are facing a steep rise in foreign exchange borrowing costs (although less than firms in other emerging markets), which raises concerns that refinancing risks will climb.So far, emerging markets vulnerabilities have been more focused on corporates, as sovereigns have improved public debt dynamics and countries' financing needs are under control. Market performance has been driven by the rapid deterioration of emerging markets bank and corporate market, as well as ongoing losses in emerging markets equities. From January to September 2008, the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Latin American Index lost almost 28%, while the Emerging Markets Index lost 37% and the G-7 Index lost 24%. While in 2007 the Latin America component gained 47%, almost nine times as much as the MSCI-G7 index for developed markets, since mid-September 2008 stocks in Latin America have been doing worse than stocks in developed countries, as concerns about access to credit and the adverse impact of sharp falls in commodity prices and in local currencies contribute to increased risk aversion and to outflows of capital. Many governments in the region have used revenue from the commodity boom to pay down debt and build reserves. Now, facing a global financial crisis and the threat of recession in developed countries, the biggest question for Latin America is how long and deep this cyclical downturn will be, and how much it is going to reduce commodity prices. Prices for commodities such as soy, gold, copper and oil, which helped fund the region's boom, have fallen 28% since their July 2 high, according to the RJ/CRB Commodity Price Index. According to Morgan Stanley (in a September 29 report), should prices return to their 10-year average, Latin America's balanced budgets would quickly revert to a deficit of 4.1% of GDP. As risk aversion increases, investors are rapidly pulling out massive amounts of money, creating problems for local markets and banks. There is an ongoing shortage of dollars (as investors liquidate assets in Latin American markets), and as currencies depreciate, inflation concerns increase despite the global slowdown. In Brazil and Mexico, central banks deployed billions of dollars of reserves to stem steep currency declines, as companies in these countries, believing their local currencies would continue to strengthen against the U.S. dollar, took debts in dollars. Some companies also made bets using currency derivatives that have led to losses in the billions of dollars. Dramatic currency swings have caused heavy losses for many companies, from Mexico's cement giant Cemex SAB to the Brazilian conglomerate Grupo Votorantim. Mexico's third-largest retailer, Controladora Comercial Mexicana, declared bankruptcy recently after reporting huge losses related to exchange rate bets. As concerns about corporate exposure to dollar-denominated derivatives increases, yields on bonds issued by many of Brazil's and Mexico's leading companies have started to rise, sharply raising the cost of issuing new debt. Latin American external debt issuance came to a halt in the third quarter of 2008, totaling only US$ 690 million. The cost of obtaining loans for capital expenditures, M&A and debt refinancing is also rising substantially for Latin American corporates amid contagion from the U.S. financial crisis. According to bankers, a protracted trend of shortening tenors and widening spreads has intensified in the past few weeks, indicating that bank lending is quickly following the way of bonds and equity. Finally, money transfers from Latin American migrants are expected to decline for the first time this decade, as a result of economic downturns in the U.S. and Spain, inflation and a weaker dollar. The Mexican Central Bank announced that money transfers from Mexicans living in the U.S. dropped a record 12.2% in August. In 2008, migrants from the region will send some 1.7% less in remittances year-on-year when adjusted for inflation, according to the IADB, compounding the adverse effects of the deepening financial turmoil.