Malware distributed collection and pre-classification system using honeypot technology

Malware has become a major threat in the last years due to the ease of spread through the Internet. Malware detection has become difficult with the use of compression, polymorphic methods and techniques to detect and disable security software. Those and other obfuscation techniques pose a problem for detection and classification schemes that analyze malware behavior. In this paper we propose a distributed architecture to improve malware collection using different honeypot technologies to increase the variety of malware collected. We also present a daemon tool developed to grab malware distributed through spam and a pre-classification technique that uses antivirus technology to separate malware in generic classes. © 2009 SPIE.

Context-sensitive analysis of obfuscated x86 executables

A method for context-sensitive analysis of binaries that may have obfuscated procedure call and return operations is presented. Such binaries may use operators to directly manipulate stack instead of using native call and ret instructions to achieve equivalent behavior. Since definition of context-sensitivity and algorithms for context-sensitive analysis have thus far been based on the specific semantics associated to procedure call and return operations, classic interprocedural analyses cannot be used reliably for analyzing programs in which these operations cannot be discerned. A new notion of context-sensitivity is introduced that is based on the state of the stack at any instruction. While changes in 'calling'-context are associated with transfer of control, and hence can be reasoned in terms of paths in an interprocedural control flow graph (ICFG), the same is not true of changes in 'stack'-context. An abstract interpretation based framework is developed to reason about stack-contexts and to derive analogues of call-strings based methods for the context-sensitive analysis using stack-context. The method presented is used to create a context-sensitive version of Venable et al.'s algorithm for detecting obfuscated calls. Experimental results show that the context-sensitive version of the algorithm generates more precise results and is also computationally more efficient than its context-insensitive counterpart. Copyright © 2010 ACM.

Context-sensitive analysis without calling-context

Since Sharir and Pnueli, algorithms for context-sensitivity have been defined in terms of 'valid' paths in an interprocedural flow graph. The definition of valid paths requires atomic call and ret statements, and encapsulated procedures. Thus, the resulting algorithms are not directly applicable when behavior similar to call and ret instructions may be realized using non-atomic statements, or when procedures do not have rigid boundaries, such as with programs in low level languages like assembly or RTL. We present a framework for context-sensitive analysis that requires neither atomic call and ret instructions, nor encapsulated procedures. The framework presented decouples the transfer of control semantics and the context manipulation semantics of statements. A new definition of context-sensitivity, called stack contexts, is developed. A stack context, which is defined using trace semantics, is more general than Sharir and Pnueli's interprocedural path based calling-context. An abstract interpretation based framework is developed to reason about stack-contexts and to derive analogues of calling-context based algorithms using stack-context. The framework presented is suitable for deriving algorithms for analyzing binary programs, such as malware, that employ obfuscations with the deliberate intent of defeating automated analysis. The framework is used to create a context-sensitive version of Venable et al.'s algorithm for analyzing x86 binaries without requiring that a binary conforms to a standard compilation model for maintaining procedures, calls, and returns. Experimental results show that a context-sensitive analysis using stack-context performs just as well for programs where the use of Sharir and Pnueli's calling-context produces correct approximations. However, if those programs are transformed to use call obfuscations, a contextsensitive analysis using stack-context still provides the same, correct results and without any additional overhead. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011.

Context-sensitive analysis of x86 obfuscated executables

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