B. F. Skinner: Teórico da ciência e teórico da moral?

Would Skinner's moral theory be dependent on his scientific theory to the point of becoming meaningless without it? The mere suggestion of such hypothesis brings the problem of naturalistic fallacy, that is, the problem of deriving statements of ought kind from statements of is kind. This issue is used here as an indication that suggests how problematic sustaining a moral and a scientific theory in the same ambit can be. The aim of this article, in this context, is to analyze if that is the case of Radical Behaviorism. Inspired by the naturalistic fallacy dilemma, the first step is to expose the structural and functional differences between statements of ought kind and statements of is kind. To do so, the strategy is to present, under the scope of language philosophy, the differences between factual and valuative assertions. The next step consists in analyzing what the nature of relations between Skinner's scientific and moral theories is. That is, if there are necessary or contingencial relations. By doing so it is expected to be plausible the presentation of a possible answer to the central question of this article.

O desenvolvimento do raciocínio moral por meio da técnica da discussão moral: estudo realizado com alunos do ensino fundamental, na disciplina de Língua Portuguesa

Pós-graduação em Educação - IBRC

Competência moral e perfil de profissionais que atendem o adolescente em conflito com a lei

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

O desenvolvimento moral em aulas de Ciências: explorando uma interface de contribuições

Pós-graduação em Educação para a Ciência - FC

Movimento dos trabalhadores sem terra: observações sobre a reforma intelectual e moral gramsciana

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Vítimas invisíveis: o pânico moral acerca do tráfico de pessoas para exploração sexual por uma perspectiva de gênero

Pós-graduação em Direito - FCHS

O papel dos conflitos no desenvolvimento do juízo moral em crianças da educação infantil

This research sets up as a reflection on the development of moral judgment in children from 04, 05 years of the Early Childhood Education with the main theoretical reference the studies of Jean Piaget (1932/1994) on the subject. To this end, we conducted a case study in order to understand what types of conflicts that arise among children in the school of early childhood education and how the teacher seeks to solve them, or not assisting in promoting the moral autonomy of the small. Behaviors and conflicts observed were described and analyzed by correlating them to the practice of the teacher in the classroom that is the case study. We found that conflicts are avoided and unwanted by the teacher and, when they arise, are quickly resolved through attitudes centered educator without enable dialogue and reflection among the children involved. In this sense, we infer that the teaching practice focused on the development of moral judgment of children showed failure and ineffective. As a result of feedback from the first phase of this research we deem necessary to investigate about the training of teachers of early childhood education in relation to theories that deal with the development of moral judgment in children of this educational stage and identify the implications that such training reflects teacher practices in. We hope that by making such reflection can contribute to the debate on the need to educate morally in early childhood education, whose main objective is to promote the integral development of children