Representation in cognitive neuroscience

This article discusses the possible representational nature of two brain cognitive functions: perceptual and executive. Assuming the Newellian definition of representational processes as those that establish an isomorphic relation between two structures, I claim that perceptual processes generate only a partial correspondence (between stimuli properties and brain states) and therefore should not be properly conceived as representational. on the other hand, executive processes encompass the combination of copies (i.e., representations) of perceptual patterns, generating new patterns that subserve behavior. In summary, I criticize the notion of perceptual representations, and propose that brain representational processes are related to executive functions, having a pragmatic dimension.

What the cognitive neurosciences mean to me

Cognitive Neuroscience is an interdisciplinary area of research that combines measurement of brain activity (mostly by means of neuroimaging) with a simultaneous performance of cognitive tasks by human subjects. These investigations have been successful in the task of connecting the sciences of the brain (Neurosciences) and the sciences of the mind (Cognitive Sciences). Advances on this kind of research provide a map of localization of cognitive functions in the human brain. Do these results help us to understand how mind relates to the brain? In my view, the results obtained by the Cognitive Neurosciences lead to new investigations in the domain of Molecular Neurobiology, aimed at discovering biophysical mechanisms that generate the activity measured by neuroimaging instruments. In this context, I argue that the understanding of how ionic/molecular processes support cognition and consciousness cannot be made by means of the standard reductionist explanations. Knowledge of ionic/molecular meclianisms can contribute to our understanding of the human mind as long as we assume an alternative form of explanation, based on psycho-physical similarities, together with an ontological view of mentality and spirituality as embedded in physical nature (and not outside nature, as frequently assumed in western culture).

What is Consciousness? Towards a Preliminary Definition

There is little or no general agreement about what researchers should focus on when studying consciousness. The most active scientific studies often use the methods of Cognitive Neuroscience and focus mainly on vision. Other aspects and contents of consciousness, namely thoughts and emotions, are much less studied, possibly leading to a biased view of what consciousness is and how it works. In this essay we describe what we call a referential nucleus, implicit in much of consciousness research. In this context, 'consciousness' refers to (partially) reportable content experienced by living individuals. We then discuss the philosophical concept of a phenomenal world and another contemporary view that conscious experience involves, besides integration of information in the brain, participation in action-perception cycles in a natural, social and cultural environment. These views imply a need to reconceptualize 'qualia' as the conscious aspect of subjective experiences, thus stating properties of consciousness that pose serious challenges to an exclusive approach via Cognitive Neuroscience, because experimental settings oversimplify conscious experiences, narrowing them to fragments correlated with measured brain activity and behaviour In conclusion we argue that a science of consciousness requires a broad interdisciplinary range of research, including qualitative methods from the Human Sciences.

Mindware semiótico-comunicativo: campos conceituais no ensino de física para deficientes visuais utilizando uma interface cérebro-computador

Pós-graduação em Educação para a Ciência - FC

Deficiência visual e educação científica: orientações didáticas com um aporte na neurociência cognitiva e teoria dos campos conceituais

The aim of this paper is to present an educational proposal with didactic and pedagogical orientations, to the Science Education for people with visual impairments. Then, we use as main reference, Gérard Vergnaud’s Theory of Conceptual Fields, joining with a translational focus, applying empirical results of Cognitive Neuroscience. Within this, we highlight the role of educational activities related with 'multisensory scientific literacy ', focusing on the linguistic triad: read, interpretation and textual representation. We hope this perspective, become in the future an important component on guidelines for composing a 'semiotic protocol' for Science Education. Realizing too, epistemological peculiarities, pedagogic and didactic specificities in this area, and, revealing such properties on the cognitive constructs, for science and technology education.

Effects of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation on the Cognitive Event-Related Potential P300: A Literature Review

The objective of this study was to perform a systematic review regarding the effects of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) on the cognitive event-related potential P300. A search was performed of the PubMed database, using the keywords "transcranial magnetic stimulation" and "P300." Eight articles were selected and, after analysis of references, one additional article was added to the list. We found the comparison among studies to be difficult, as the information regarding the effects of TMS on P300 is both scarce and heterogeneous with respect to the parameters used in TMS stimulation and the elicitation of P300. However, 7 of 9 studies found positive results. New studies need to be carried out in order to understand the contribution of these variables and others to the alteration in the latency and amplitude of the P300 wave.

What affective neuroscience means for science of consciousness

The field of affective neuroscience has emerged from the efforts of Jaak Panksepp in the 1990s and reinforced by the work of, among others, Joseph LeDoux in the 2000s. It is based on the ideas that affective processes are supported by brain structures that appeared earlier in the phylogenetic scale (as the periaqueductal gray area), they run in parallel with cognitive processes, and can influence behaviour independently of cognitive judgements. This kind of approach contrasts with the hegemonic concept of conscious processing in cognitive neurosciences, which is based on the identification of brain circuits responsible for the processing of (cognitive) representations. Within cognitive neurosciences, the frontal lobes are assigned the role of coordinators in maintaining affective states and their emotional expressions under cognitive control. An intermediary view is the Damasio-Bechara Somatic Marker model, which puts cognition under partial somatic-affective control. We present here our efforts to make a synthesis of these views, by proposing the existence of two interacting brain circuits; the first one in charge of cognitive processes and the second mediating feelings about cognitive contents. The coupling of the two circuits promotes an endogenous feedback that supports conscious processes. Within this framework, we present the defence that detailed study of both affective and cognitive processes, their interactions, as well of their respective brain networks, is necessary for a science of consciousness.© MSM 2013.