Homonymy in natural language processes: A representation using Pustejovsky's Qualia Structure and ontological information

This paper presents a proposal for the semantic treatment of ambiguous homographic forms in Brazilian Portuguese, and to offer linguistic strategies for its computational implementation in Systems of Natural Language Processing (SNLP). Pustejovsky's Generative Lexicon was used as a theoretical model. From this model, the Qualia Structure - QS (and the Formal, Telic, Agentive and Constitutive roles) was selected as one of the linguistic and semantic expedients for the achievement of disambiguation of homonym forms. So that analyzed and treated data could be manipulated, we elaborated a Lexical Knowledge Base (LKB) where lexical items are correlated and interconnected by different kinds of semantic relations in the QS and ontological information.

A homonímia no português: tratamento semântico segundo a estrutura Qualia de Pustejovsky com vistas a implementações computacionais

No presente trabalho, apresentamos uma proposta de tratamento semântico de formas ambíguas do português do Brasil, no caso, lexias homógrafas, com o escopo de oferecermos estratégias lingüísticas para a sua implementação computacional em Sistemas de Processamento das Línguas Naturais (SPLN). O Léxico Gerativo de Pustejovsky foi usado como modelo teórico. Nesse modelo, a Estrutura Qualia - EQ (e os papéis Formal, Télico, Agentivo e Constitutivo) foi selecionada como um dos expedientes lingüístico-semânticos para a realização da desambiguação das formas homônimas. Para que os dados analisados e tratados pudessem ser manipulados, elaboramos uma Base de Conhecimento Lexical (BCL) cujo repertório lingüístico possui seus itens lexicais correlacionados e interligados por diferentes tipos de relações semânticas presentes na EQ.

Dretske e o problema dos qualia

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss Fred Dretske's (1995) suggestion for analysis of the problem of qualia. Such a problem was acknowledged following Thomas Nagel's discussion in his classical paper What is it like to be a bat. In the paper, Nagel (1974) postulates the impossibility of knowing aspects of human experience from a third-person perspective. He considers that qualitative aspects of a subject's experience, fundamental for characterization of qualia, would be lost during the course of objective descriptions of it. Based on his Representational Thesis of Mind, Dretske argues that if we were to consider mind to be the representational aspect of the brain, the nature of qualia would thus be representational. In this context, mental facts related to experiences would be representational facts: if we were to know the nature of these representational facts, we would also know the experience the system represents. Given this understanding, we discuss to what extent the Dretskean proposal constitutes (or not) an alternative for the problem of qualia.

Dretske e o problema dos qualia

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss Fred Dretske’s (1995) suggestion for analysis of the problem of qualia. Such a problem was acknowledged following Thomas Nagel’s discussion in his classical paper “What is it like to be a bat”. In the paper, Nagel (1974) postulates the impossibility of knowing aspects of human experience from a third-person perspective. He considers that qualitative aspects of a subject’s experience, fundamental for characterization of qualia, would be lost during the course of objective descriptions of it. Based on his Representational Thesis of Mind, Dretske argues that if we were to consider mind to be the representational aspect of the brain, the nature of qualia would thus be representational. In this context, mental facts related to experiences would be representational facts: if we were to know the nature of these representational facts, we would also know the experience the system represents. Given this understanding, we discuss to what extent the Dretskean proposal constitutes (or not) an alternative for the problem of qualia.

Do termo à estruturação semântica: representação ontológica do domínio da Nanociência e Nanotecnologia utilizando a Estrutura Qualia

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

What is Consciousness? Towards a Preliminary Definition

There is little or no general agreement about what researchers should focus on when studying consciousness. The most active scientific studies often use the methods of Cognitive Neuroscience and focus mainly on vision. Other aspects and contents of consciousness, namely thoughts and emotions, are much less studied, possibly leading to a biased view of what consciousness is and how it works. In this essay we describe what we call a referential nucleus, implicit in much of consciousness research. In this context, 'consciousness' refers to (partially) reportable content experienced by living individuals. We then discuss the philosophical concept of a phenomenal world and another contemporary view that conscious experience involves, besides integration of information in the brain, participation in action-perception cycles in a natural, social and cultural environment. These views imply a need to reconceptualize 'qualia' as the conscious aspect of subjective experiences, thus stating properties of consciousness that pose serious challenges to an exclusive approach via Cognitive Neuroscience, because experimental settings oversimplify conscious experiences, narrowing them to fragments correlated with measured brain activity and behaviour In conclusion we argue that a science of consciousness requires a broad interdisciplinary range of research, including qualitative methods from the Human Sciences.

A natureza comportamental da mente: behaviorismo radical e filosofia da mente

Pós-graduação em Filosofia - FFC

Duas diferentes perspectivas para o estudo da consciência na Filosofia contemporânea da mente

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)