Sob a vigência da Ancine (2001-2011): trajetória, mecanismos e a ingerência da economia da cultura na cinematografia

Pós-graduação em Ciências Sociais - FCLAR

Fundamentos teóricos do método de resolução de problemas ampliados

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Contribuição da competência em informação para os processos de gestão da informação e do conhecimento

This study analyzes the interrelations between the models of information literacy (IL), information management (IM) and knowledge management (KM). In order to do so, we, at first, highlight some concepts and definitions related to these terms, then we present some models applied to, so that we know the steps/stages of these recurring models. Finally, we present a comparative study between thestages/phases of models in IL, IM and KM, in order to check whether there are interrelations between the steps/phases of IL and the steps/stages of IM and KM. As a result we show the interrelations between the models, and assert that IL can act in an integrated manner to provide greater effectiveness to the informational processes of IM and KM. The analysis provides the expansion of IL contributions, reachingbeyond the scope of libraries and contributing to the development of this theme in the context of the contemporary society.

Logic TK: algebric notions from Tarski's consequence operator

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

A neighbourhood semantic for the Logic TK

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Livre-arbítrio e a relação mente e cérebro em Benjamin Libet

My purpose is to reflect critically on how Benjamin Libet interprets his experiments, which are focused primarily on the question of free will. These experiments have often been considered as scientific evidence against free will, to the extent that they would have shown that the intention and will result from conscious brain processes, which are unconscious and precedents. But that is not the position of Libet, which distinguishes intention and conscious will, arguing that only the first results from previous and unconscious brain processes, while the second is autonomous and able to act causally on brain. Thus, Libet choose to ignore the suggestion of its initial experiments, that is, that all mental events result of specific brain processes. I argue that Libet ignores it because he is not able to understand how mental events, being essentially separated and at the same time the result of brain activity, could act causally on the brain.