Coexisting spatio-temporal scales in neuroscience

In this study I propose an epistemological discussion of multiple spatio-temporal scales in neuroscience. Are such scales merely convenient levels of description of structure and function, or do they correspond to irreducible levels of brain organization? What criteria should we employ in order to reduce one level to another, or to identify levels that are not reducible to others? Should we think of these criteria as based on empirical and/or theoretical reasons? Beginning with an empirical criterion - the necessity of different experimental methodologies for the measurement of different phenomena in the same system - I summarize spatial and temporal scales currently used in neuroscience and discuss the possibility of a more general theoretical criterion. I conclude that multiscaling should be recognized as a central concept in the epistemology of neuroscience.

Representation in cognitive neuroscience

This article discusses the possible representational nature of two brain cognitive functions: perceptual and executive. Assuming the Newellian definition of representational processes as those that establish an isomorphic relation between two structures, I claim that perceptual processes generate only a partial correspondence (between stimuli properties and brain states) and therefore should not be properly conceived as representational. on the other hand, executive processes encompass the combination of copies (i.e., representations) of perceptual patterns, generating new patterns that subserve behavior. In summary, I criticize the notion of perceptual representations, and propose that brain representational processes are related to executive functions, having a pragmatic dimension.

What affective neuroscience means for science of consciousness

The field of affective neuroscience has emerged from the efforts of Jaak Panksepp in the 1990s and reinforced by the work of, among others, Joseph LeDoux in the 2000s. It is based on the ideas that affective processes are supported by brain structures that appeared earlier in the phylogenetic scale (as the periaqueductal gray area), they run in parallel with cognitive processes, and can influence behaviour independently of cognitive judgements. This kind of approach contrasts with the hegemonic concept of conscious processing in cognitive neurosciences, which is based on the identification of brain circuits responsible for the processing of (cognitive) representations. Within cognitive neurosciences, the frontal lobes are assigned the role of coordinators in maintaining affective states and their emotional expressions under cognitive control. An intermediary view is the Damasio-Bechara Somatic Marker model, which puts cognition under partial somatic-affective control. We present here our efforts to make a synthesis of these views, by proposing the existence of two interacting brain circuits; the first one in charge of cognitive processes and the second mediating feelings about cognitive contents. The coupling of the two circuits promotes an endogenous feedback that supports conscious processes. Within this framework, we present the defence that detailed study of both affective and cognitive processes, their interactions, as well of their respective brain networks, is necessary for a science of consciousness.© MSM 2013.