What affective neuroscience means for science of consciousness

The field of affective neuroscience has emerged from the efforts of Jaak Panksepp in the 1990s and reinforced by the work of, among others, Joseph LeDoux in the 2000s. It is based on the ideas that affective processes are supported by brain structures that appeared earlier in the phylogenetic scale (as the periaqueductal gray area), they run in parallel with cognitive processes, and can influence behaviour independently of cognitive judgements. This kind of approach contrasts with the hegemonic concept of conscious processing in cognitive neurosciences, which is based on the identification of brain circuits responsible for the processing of (cognitive) representations. Within cognitive neurosciences, the frontal lobes are assigned the role of coordinators in maintaining affective states and their emotional expressions under cognitive control. An intermediary view is the Damasio-Bechara Somatic Marker model, which puts cognition under partial somatic-affective control. We present here our efforts to make a synthesis of these views, by proposing the existence of two interacting brain circuits; the first one in charge of cognitive processes and the second mediating feelings about cognitive contents. The coupling of the two circuits promotes an endogenous feedback that supports conscious processes. Within this framework, we present the defence that detailed study of both affective and cognitive processes, their interactions, as well of their respective brain networks, is necessary for a science of consciousness.© MSM 2013.

Affective disorders, hospital admissions, and seasonal variation of mania in a subtropical area, southern hemisphere

Hospital admissions (n = 15,450) to a state psychiatric hospital in Botucatu, São Paulo State, Brazil, over a 10-year period (1982-1991) were reviewed. 157 (1%) patients received a probable diagnosis of affective disorder according to DSM-III-R criteria. Among them, 46% had been diagnosed by the staff psychiatrists, and their diagnoses were sustained by the researchers, whereas 54% were diagnosed only by one of the researchers (F.K.C.). These last patients had previously received a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia or unspecified psychosis (ICD-9). Most of the patients with affective disorders were bipolar: 72 and 8%, respectively, presented manic and depressive episodes. Thus, only 20% received a diagnosis of major depression. A seasonal pattern in hospital admission was observed only for mania in women, their episodes occurring more often (p < 0.02) in spring and summer. No significant seasonal pattern in hospital admission for depression was found.

Cerebellar Cognitive Affective Syndrome in Machado Joseph Disease: Core Clinical Features

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Influence of gender and estrous cycle in the forced swim test in rats

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Coexisting spatio-temporal scales in neuroscience

In this study I propose an epistemological discussion of multiple spatio-temporal scales in neuroscience. Are such scales merely convenient levels of description of structure and function, or do they correspond to irreducible levels of brain organization? What criteria should we employ in order to reduce one level to another, or to identify levels that are not reducible to others? Should we think of these criteria as based on empirical and/or theoretical reasons? Beginning with an empirical criterion - the necessity of different experimental methodologies for the measurement of different phenomena in the same system - I summarize spatial and temporal scales currently used in neuroscience and discuss the possibility of a more general theoretical criterion. I conclude that multiscaling should be recognized as a central concept in the epistemology of neuroscience.

Representation in cognitive neuroscience

This article discusses the possible representational nature of two brain cognitive functions: perceptual and executive. Assuming the Newellian definition of representational processes as those that establish an isomorphic relation between two structures, I claim that perceptual processes generate only a partial correspondence (between stimuli properties and brain states) and therefore should not be properly conceived as representational. on the other hand, executive processes encompass the combination of copies (i.e., representations) of perceptual patterns, generating new patterns that subserve behavior. In summary, I criticize the notion of perceptual representations, and propose that brain representational processes are related to executive functions, having a pragmatic dimension.

Conceptual spaces and consciousness: Integrating cognitive and affective processes

In the book Conceptual Spaces: the Geometry of Thought [2000] Peter Gärdenfors proposes a new framework for cognitive science. Complementary to symbolic and subsymbolic [connectionist] descriptions, conceptual spaces are semantic structures constructed from empirical data representing the universe of mental states. We argue that Gärdenfors' modeling can be used in consciousness research to describe the phenomenal conscious world, its elements and their intrinsic relations. The conceptual space approach affords the construction of a universal state space of human consciousness, where all possible kinds of human conscious states could be mapped. Starting from this approach, we discuss the inclusion of feelings and emotions in conceptual spaces, and their relation to perceptual and cognitive states. Current debate on integration of affect/emotion and perception/cognition allows three possible descriptive alternatives: emotion resulting from basic cognition; cognition resulting from basic emotion, and both as relatively independent functions integrated by brain mechanisms. Finding a solution for this issue is an important step in any attempt of successful modeling of natural or artificial consciousness. After making a brief review of proposals in this area, we summarize the essentials of a new model of consciousness based on neuro-astroglial interactions. © 2011 World Scientific Publishing Company.

Cortical correlates of affective syndrome in dementia due to Alzheimer’s disease

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Unfaithful narratives: methodological and affective notes about experiences of masculinity in a dating website for married people

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

The affective-emotional communication in shoppingscapes: case study

Shoppingscapes on urban roads, such as streets and avenues, require study and more specific attention. You must be aware of the emotional communication, an important factor with regard to the influence on the perception and acquisition process by the observer. Reaching the consumer cognitively, arousing emotion and desire to want to have the observed object is one of the goals of emotional communication, and that only happens with the proper use of elements of perception. This paper aims to highlight the need for interdisciplinary design and architecture, especially in the case of shoppingscapes in open spaces that sell fashion items. The case study raises a reflection on the elements of perception in the windows as to whether they are being clearly communicated. It also discusses how the same are interfering or being interfered by the shoppingscapes of Avenida da Liberdade in Lisbon.