Representation in cognitive neuroscience

This article discusses the possible representational nature of two brain cognitive functions: perceptual and executive. Assuming the Newellian definition of representational processes as those that establish an isomorphic relation between two structures, I claim that perceptual processes generate only a partial correspondence (between stimuli properties and brain states) and therefore should not be properly conceived as representational. on the other hand, executive processes encompass the combination of copies (i.e., representations) of perceptual patterns, generating new patterns that subserve behavior. In summary, I criticize the notion of perceptual representations, and propose that brain representational processes are related to executive functions, having a pragmatic dimension.

What the cognitive neurosciences mean to me

Cognitive Neuroscience is an interdisciplinary area of research that combines measurement of brain activity (mostly by means of neuroimaging) with a simultaneous performance of cognitive tasks by human subjects. These investigations have been successful in the task of connecting the sciences of the brain (Neurosciences) and the sciences of the mind (Cognitive Sciences). Advances on this kind of research provide a map of localization of cognitive functions in the human brain. Do these results help us to understand how mind relates to the brain? In my view, the results obtained by the Cognitive Neurosciences lead to new investigations in the domain of Molecular Neurobiology, aimed at discovering biophysical mechanisms that generate the activity measured by neuroimaging instruments. In this context, I argue that the understanding of how ionic/molecular processes support cognition and consciousness cannot be made by means of the standard reductionist explanations. Knowledge of ionic/molecular meclianisms can contribute to our understanding of the human mind as long as we assume an alternative form of explanation, based on psycho-physical similarities, together with an ontological view of mentality and spirituality as embedded in physical nature (and not outside nature, as frequently assumed in western culture).

Visão e percepção, investigação dos modelos cognitivos: uma abordagem neurobiológica em design e emoção

Pós-graduação em Design - FAAC

Transformação de hábitos e sustentabilidade: a evolução de interpretantes na (auto) construção da cidade

Pós-graduação em Filosofia - FFC

Duas diferentes perspectivas para o estudo da consciência na Filosofia contemporânea da mente

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Ciência cognitiva, sistêmica e filosofia Bergsoniana: uma reflexão acerca da vida em sua capacidade organizativa

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Planejamento de um ambiente virtual de aprendizagem baseado em interfaces dinâmicas e uma aplicação ao estudo de potência elétrica

Pós-graduação em Engenharia Elétrica - FEIS

Dados, informação e conhecimento enquanto elementos de compreensão do universo conceitual da ciência da informação: contribuições teóricas

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Percepção e impercepção: a experiência sensível na tradição fenomenológica

In this paper, we circumscribe a domain of theoretical research on the combination dynamics between the dimensions of presence and absence, visibility and invisibility, which emerges in the phenomenology of perception as an essential trait which marks both our experience of the perceived world and our subjective and intersubjective experience. We prioritize a theoretical axis that integrates Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s thinking into Renaud Barbaras’ recent contributions. To this philosophical framework, we link contributions especially of psychology, outlining the circular movement observed between the phenomenology of perception and phenomenological psychology, Gestalt psychology, psychoanalysis, cognitive sciences and neurosciences.