Um estudo sobre o status moral dos animais desde uma perspectiva deontológica

The main concern of this work is to offer an analysis of the possibility of an ethical approach to the interaction between human beings and animals. As far as possible we seek an approach which rely neither on utilitarian considerations nor on indirect reasons to explain the attribution of dignity or moral rights to animals. We take for granted that some of them (if not all) do possess it. And then we try to show that a deontological ethical theory (one which centers in the human as the agent but is not restricted to humans as the objects of the moral action) can afford us a good theoretical basis for the grounding of the attribution of rights or dignity to animals. Analyzing the main features of Kantian ethics, as well as some of its alternatives, it will be possible to show that an ethical theory which does not presuppose reciprocity nor depends solely upon particular human concerns is not only possible but also reveals itself as the most sensible and adequate to the nature of our values and of the case at hand.

Um estudo sobre o status moral dos animais desde uma perspectiva deontológica

The main concern of this work is to offer an analysis of the possibility of an ethical approach to the interaction between human beings and animals. As far as possible we seek an approach which rely neither on utilitarian considerations nor on indirect reasons to explain the attribution of dignity or moral rights to animals. We take for granted that some of them (if not all) do possess it. And then we try to show that a deontological ethical theory (one which centers in the human as the agent but is not restricted to humans as the objects of the moral action) can afford us a good theoretical basis for the grounding of the attribution of rights or dignity to animals. Analyzing the main features of Kantian ethics, as well as some of its alternatives, it will be possible to show that an ethical theory which does not presuppose reciprocity nor depends solely upon particular human concerns is not only possible but also reveals itself as the most sensible and adequate to the nature of our values and of the case at hand.