A retórica em Aristóteles: da orientação das paixões ao aprimoramento da eupraxia

This research brings into focus the relationship between the work Rhetoric, from Aristotle, and the conceptions of ethics and practical wisdom of the philosopher from Stageira. Accordingly, it attempts to show that Aristotle's Rhetoric was produced to guide the construction and orientation of oratory passions of the Greek man, setting it as a reference for practices aimed at social ordering of the polis. In other words, the Aristotelian Rhetoric, designed by the author as the study of what is persuasive in every speech, is not composed with the meaning of persuasion at any cost, in another sense it is conceived by Aristotle as a useful knowledge for the improvement eupraxic (the good act in accordance with the fair and true). This research finds that such work has been prepared by Stagirite a time of strong social transformations and upheavals in ancient Greece: The skepticism expanded, with each person wanting to live their own businesses, and especially in Athens, a city that served as intellectual and political reference, there was a lack of collective spirit. In this tumultuous social environment, Aristotle, with a culture of Greeks eager Trusted reviews and socially shareable in the field of verisimilitude, sought with his Rhetoric, contributing to the development of ethics and political science; referrals for legal and organization of inter-social relations in varied environments, including seeking to provide knowledge about human passions and emotional status of active citizens in deliberative meetings

Hegel e a refutação do ceticismo

The present thesis intends to analize the relationship between Hegelian System and philosophical Skepticism. It focuses Hegel´s interpreteation of Schulzean and Pyrronian Skepticism, as well as his attempt to refute both of them. The main Idea is that Agrippa´s Tropes assume a capital role in the process of justification of the Hegelian Science

Agostinho e o ceticismo: um estudo da crítica agostiniana ao ceticismo em Contra Acadêmicos

The assent of the Truth: here's a formula that seems to have puzzled philosophers since antiquity. The possibility of apprehending truth was defended by some philosophers who have been called dogmatic, due to their haste to judge appearances as representations of reality, and refuted by those who chose to continue questioning rather than engage with his predicament. These thinkers were called skeptics. Among those who defended the consent of the truth, is highlighted by St. Augustine in this research, which aims to combat the widespread skepticism in the ancient doctrine of the Academy of Plato in his work Against Academicos. Thus, to conduct this research we ask: What are the main arguments made by St. Augustine against the scholarly skepticism? In order to address the problem identified, we propose to investigate the critical skepticism of St. Augustine, identifying and analyzing the main rebuttals he built. For this purpose, we conducted a survey of aspects of both the skepticism about the life and thought of St. Augustine about this doctrine

Programas de verdade, "mundos de crença": o verdadeiro segundo Paul Vayne

This study comes to reflect on the place of truth in everyday human experience. The notion of truth, expressed in different ways, in different systems of thought, cultural and historical, reveals the non-uniformity of their meaning and the arbitrary grouping under one name, truth. Given this fact, of so many beliefs taken as absolute, we ask with the historian Jean Marie Paul Veyne, if the truth is only one, or many called by a word namesake. If, through their ideas, men cannot access a definitely solid knowledge, unchanging and jaunty interference of the human condition (as their interests and affections), then in what sense it can claim a greater and exclusivist truth? Assuming the impossibility of apprehension of the reality of this type, Paul Veyne develops the notion of truth programs, referential beliefs assumed as cartographies that direct action and thought. He defends thus the idea of heterogeneity and plurality, as irreducible elements of human truths. On the one hand there is in society a plurality of truth programs, on the other there is a plurality of beliefs that is inside man. That is, in the way they believe the men also shows plural, because they believe in more than one program and counter programs. The thought of Paul Veyne is nonetheless a form of skepticism directed at all supposedly absolute and universal anthropological truths, because depending on the belief system studied and the specific moment in its history, a set of rules is established to distinguish the true from the false.