2 resultados para policy change
em Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte(UFRN)
Resumo:
In Brazil, the selection of school principals is set in a decentralized manner by each state and city, such that processes may vary with time for a specific locality. In the state of Bahia, school principals were appointed by a higher political hierarchy until 2008, when schools under state administration started selecting principals by elections. The main goal of this work is to evaluate whether changing this specific rule affected students proficiency levels. This is achieved by using a panel data and difference-in-differences approachs that compares state schools (treatment group) to city schools (control group) that did not face a selection rule change and thus kept having their principals politically appointed. The databases used are Prova Brasil 2007, 2009 and 2011, the first one prior and the other two former to the policy change. Our results suggest that students attending schools with principals that are selected and elected have slightly lower mean proficiency levels both in mathematics and in portuguese exams than those attending schools with appointed principals. This result, according to the literature, could be related to perverse effects of selecting school administrators by vote, such as corporatism, clientelism and politicization of the school environment
Resumo:
In Brazil, the selection of school principals is set in a decentralized manner by each state and city, such that processes may vary with time for a specific locality. In the state of Bahia, school principals were appointed by a higher political hierarchy until 2008, when schools under state administration started selecting principals by elections. The main goal of this work is to evaluate whether changing this specific rule affected students proficiency levels. This is achieved by using a panel data and difference-in-differences approachs that compares state schools (treatment group) to city schools (control group) that did not face a selection rule change and thus kept having their principals politically appointed. The databases used are Prova Brasil 2007, 2009 and 2011, the first one prior and the other two former to the policy change. Our results suggest that students attending schools with principals that are selected and elected have slightly lower mean proficiency levels both in mathematics and in portuguese exams than those attending schools with appointed principals. This result, according to the literature, could be related to perverse effects of selecting school administrators by vote, such as corporatism, clientelism and politicization of the school environment
