As provas metafísicas da existência de deus em René Descartes

Le but de cet article est de présenter les éléments de preuve de l existence de Dieu présentée dans les Méditationes Métaphysiques de René Descartes, en soulignant son importance et son rôle dans le projet philosophique cartésien. La recherche visait á comprendre comment Descartes, étant um homme de science, la recherche de Dieu dans le pilier et d assurer leur philosophie. Par consé quence que Descartes propose de remplacer lui promettant de construire une nouvelle science fondée sur des bases sûres. Ainsi, le texte suit um ordre qu une partie de doute méthodologique comme um élément essentiel pour surmonter une connaissance née de l incertitude et généralisée et d opinions comme étant de droite, pour finalement atteindre la vérité dans les sciencies, Grace à la découverte Du premier cours, le cogito, moi pensant, alors existantes. Trouvé cette certitude, le sujet qui a en elle l idée d um être infini qui contient toutes perfections et, comme Il fera la démonstration de la preuve a posteriori et a priori. Et donc cet être ne peut pas être considéré comme inexistant projet assurant Descartes

Existência e liberdade: a trans-descendência extática da vida no livro A religião e o nada de Nishitani Keiji

The dialog between the East philosophy and the Western thinking allow us to think the problems inherent to our time from several point of views. Nishitani Keiji, from the Kyoto School, sees the contemporaneity, or the time of the technic, for Heidegger, as derivation and as an immediate consequence of perspective introduced in the modern era form the Cartesian s cogito which creates a barrier that separates man and world. Scientific thinking that dominates our era was created from the thinking that ennobles human reason to the detriment of the others things in the world, determining that the knowledge just can be produced by the man himself and his set of rational powers. However, alerts us Nishitani, this point of view derived from modern thought which imposes subjectivity egocentric type besides not apprehend things in their truth, neither achieves the true self of man. In an attempt to overcome the abuses produced in modernity and that reverberates in our way of be until today, our philosopher will propose the point of view of the nothingness (śūnyatā) as a way to trans-descendance, that is, to overcome the traditional thinking overvalues the reason for the encounter with the original face of man, which by no longer impose its cognitive power can know all things in their true, in the tathatā

O conceito de consciência em o ser e o nada de J.-P. Sartre

This current discourse intends to prove how consciousness or Being-for-itself presents the idea that in its operation one can emphasize that it s Nothingness, transience and liberty in Jean-Paul Sartre s work O Ser e o Nada. To testify the proposed idea, the conception that Sartre gives to consciousness, representing nothingness, without any content that is connected to the possessor objects of a transphenomenal existence will be the starting point. This way, consciousness will be analyzed transcendently to the object that it s not, demonstrating its revealer-revealed condition, because it unveils a concrete world that exists against its idea, functioning as the revealer intentionality that there are beings instead of nothingness, obeying the ontological proof defended by Sartre. From this idea, every kind of consciousness will always be consciousness of something, a glance of the world, avoiding the fact that the consciousness could be considered nothing in the world. In order to live its original negation state of the world, apprehending this same world, with the purpose of a knowledge, it needs to be divided in two: the first degree consciousness or previous-reflexive cogito, that turns the proper reflexion possible, because, it s the consciousness proper transphenomenality of being different of all that connected to its existence being only its consequence; and the cogito, responsible to the positioning of the first degree consciousness, while aware of its own consciousness, that is, while being certain that knows. From this point, the way to untangle the consciousness or Being-for-itself will be developed as being Chasm, Liberty and transience. From this idea, it s intended to know how consciousness, that in Sartre s thoughts is originally nothing, could turn into Liberty that is presented in the field of transience? In other words, how these three internal structures imbricate one another to form consciousness in Sartre? First of all, it has to be considered the review of a conduct of human reality, the inquiry, that will be possible to understand how Nothingness exists as the mold of all kind of negation. After this, it will be shown, considering its way of existence, the human reality that is connected to Para-si, determined like nothingness, still is proposed like Liberty. Form this point, it will be possible to gleam how Liberty is lived deeply by Para-si in the shape of chasm, trying to how Para-si turns into nothingness, creating a chasm based on its proper liberty. Then, Liberty will be the proper mechanism used by Para-si to modificate its original chasm. The way Being-for-itself has to build to gain its goal will be projecting in transience, the building of something possible that brings one being back. However, will be demonstrated like Chasm can occupy the moment of a choice turning the decision instant an anguish stage, based on the failing of stability of the Being-for-itself, once nothingness persists in the field of the possibilities that human beings preserves in its essence while being essentially Liberty. From this idea, anguish will be studied as the proper consciousness of Liberty, being bad-faith the attempt of avoid Liberty trying to gain a shelter contradicting the fact that life is done of continual choices

Crítica ao fundacionismo cartesiano com base no argumento contra a linguagem privada

This assignment ains to prove the pertinency of using the wittgenstein´s argument against private language as a criticism to cartesian fundacionism. Therefore, I want to demonstrate in the first chaper the conceptual viability of facing the cartesian argument of cogito not as a simple silogism but as an exemple of a private experience (process of thinking). At the second chaper, the subordination of the argument against private language give us the idea that rules can only be followed by means of corrections givem by a linguistic community that is external to the private subject, in a way to be unviable the assumption that is possible to name an internal experience without searching external rules of the use of terms. At the chaper 3 the pertinency of the hypothesis raised by A. Kenny, about the overtaking of the argument against private language can be extended to the idea of epistemic and ontologic privacy that would lend validity to the fundacion present at the argument at the cartesian cogito. In oder to become evident the pertinency of use of Wittgenstein´s argument agaist Descartes´ fundation, it´s necessary, at the chaper 3, to demonstrate the impertinency of the objection to the A. Kenny´s hypothesis, based on the experiency of the thought of the brain at the recipient, to make clear the incompatibility existing between the cartesian idea of cogito and Wittgenstein´s notion that language is an activitie followed by rules, wich correction criterion may be external and intersubjective