Wittgenstein e Bourdieu: diálogos para uma sociologia prática

The dialogue between philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein s notions and Pierre Bourdieu s sociological concepts related to social practice of language shows that the philosophy of language has an important influence on contemporary social theory. When we compare the ideas of these authors we discover that beyond the direct influences from the philosopher that the sociologist recognizes there are great parallelisms of thought. That is, Wittgenstein s pragmatic thought of the use of language does not concern only language, but also every socially built behavior. When we notice that the social and linguistic behavior are borne by the individual in a tacit way, that leads us to theorize about the prereflective dimension that builds human actions and even the habits of thought. The same processes allow the uses of language to build wider social practices. Besides, John Austin, one of Wittgenstein s disciples, and his speech acts theory, contribute with a way to reflecting on how language ressembles a concrete action. Finally, the linguistc therapy that Wittgenstein means to be his philosophical proposal is assimilated by Bourdieu, who takes it as one of the necessary topics of the sociological work

Crítica ao fundacionismo cartesiano com base no argumento contra a linguagem privada

This assignment ains to prove the pertinency of using the wittgenstein´s argument against private language as a criticism to cartesian fundacionism. Therefore, I want to demonstrate in the first chaper the conceptual viability of facing the cartesian argument of cogito not as a simple silogism but as an exemple of a private experience (process of thinking). At the second chaper, the subordination of the argument against private language give us the idea that rules can only be followed by means of corrections givem by a linguistic community that is external to the private subject, in a way to be unviable the assumption that is possible to name an internal experience without searching external rules of the use of terms. At the chaper 3 the pertinency of the hypothesis raised by A. Kenny, about the overtaking of the argument against private language can be extended to the idea of epistemic and ontologic privacy that would lend validity to the fundacion present at the argument at the cartesian cogito. In oder to become evident the pertinency of use of Wittgenstein´s argument agaist Descartes´ fundation, it´s necessary, at the chaper 3, to demonstrate the impertinency of the objection to the A. Kenny´s hypothesis, based on the experiency of the thought of the brain at the recipient, to make clear the incompatibility existing between the cartesian idea of cogito and Wittgenstein´s notion that language is an activitie followed by rules, wich correction criterion may be external and intersubjective