O FRAGMENTO EM TUTAMÉIA E NO LIVRO SOBRE NADA

This study is connected to the research line Poéticas da Modernidade e Pós -Modernidade, of the Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos da Linguagem, in the subarea: Comparative Literature - CCHLA/UFRN. Its main goal is to see fragmentation of writing as an aesthetic resource highlighted in the work of Tutaméia by Guimarães Rosa (1908-1967), and in Livro sobre nada by Manoel de Barros (1916). We undertake as a starting point the view that these works are allegorical expressions. We have as a basis the German philosopher Walter Benjamin (1984) conception about baroque allegory, that uses amorphous fragment and constitutes a dialectical expression, in which each person, each thing, each relation, may mean any other one (1984, p. 196). We see the stylistic features as used by Guimarães Rosa and by Manoel de Barros in the construction of poetics capable of breaking the boundaries between artistic genres, literary and discursive, adding oral, musical and plastic elements to writing. We also analyze the development of fragmentary poetics, in which the voice of the narrator/lyrical I, the characters, space, plot and time exhibit the fragment as a factor that contributes to the great ambiguity of the two works and to create a new language, performative and vibrant, rich in alluring images, allegories

O conceito de liberdade em o ser e o nada de Jean-Paul Sartre

This dissertation aims to address the concept of freedom from the perspective of the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre with reference to the main work Being and Nothingness. After presenting the concept of freedom we will try to show that it is related to the notion of responsibility, which will lead, ultimately, to define the Sartrean philosophy as a philosophy of action. In the first chapter we will present in passing the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, philosopher from which Sartre will develop his concept of freedom. The Husserlian notion of consciousness (intentionality) is the way to develop his analysis of Sartre phenomenon of being. From this analysis Sartre submits their concepts of being in-itself and being for-itself. Being initself is defined as the things of the world devoid of consciousness, are the things that surround us. The In-itself has as its main brand positivity: it is what it is, is all that can be said about him. In turn being For-itself is the very being of man, which differs radically from the In-itself. The For-itself has as its main intentionality, ie, its ability to project outside itself in existence. That's when Sartre shows that this type of being realizes its existence on the basis of a constant nihilation. Here comes the notion of anything. Among the relations of the For-itself with the surrounding world stands a very special: relationship between consciousnesses. It is when we discuss the issue of another. Intersubjectivity, through sartrean analysis of look, show that the For-itself assumes a new existential dimension: the being-for others. That's when Sartre will emphasize his notion of conflict. The conflict in intersubjectivity would come from the fact that you want to take another- For-itself as an object. Given this we will analyze what Sartre called the concrete relations with others. The philosopher submit such relations in the form of ducts and conduits assimilation of ownership. In the first my-self to try to "get lost" in the consciousness of another, ownership of my conduct in-itself tries to "take ownership" of the subjectivity of the other and try to treat others as things, as objects. In this sense Sartre examines the experiences of love, masochism, indifference, desire and sadism. Following this route we will enter the land of freedom itself, which is the major theme of our work. Since Sartre defines the For-itself as a being that is projected to create your way of being, it can only define it as freedom. The freedom of the For-itself is taken in terms of autonomy of choice. Once the For-itself has no way of being a thing as being in-itself, it just may be picking up, that is, making your being. Here Sartre speaks of the anguish that would be the symptom of freedom itself. The fact that the For-itself have to choose on whether the call as one being distressed. However, in most cases the For-itself tries to escape from the anguish of freedom and takes refuge in bad faith. After setting the man (For-itself) as freedom Sartre defends that he is totally responsible for what he does of himself. Once the philosopher holds that man is not predetermined, ie, does not have an a priori essence, his philosophy has as its basic assumption the action. If Sartre argues that the For-itself must constantly choose your way of being, the action is the basis on which man will exercise his own freedom. In this sense we conclude the work with an approach to work Existentialism is a Humanism, which represent the entry of the philosopher on the practical aspects of life

Existência e liberdade: a trans-descendência extática da vida no livro A religião e o nada de Nishitani Keiji

The dialog between the East philosophy and the Western thinking allow us to think the problems inherent to our time from several point of views. Nishitani Keiji, from the Kyoto School, sees the contemporaneity, or the time of the technic, for Heidegger, as derivation and as an immediate consequence of perspective introduced in the modern era form the Cartesian s cogito which creates a barrier that separates man and world. Scientific thinking that dominates our era was created from the thinking that ennobles human reason to the detriment of the others things in the world, determining that the knowledge just can be produced by the man himself and his set of rational powers. However, alerts us Nishitani, this point of view derived from modern thought which imposes subjectivity egocentric type besides not apprehend things in their truth, neither achieves the true self of man. In an attempt to overcome the abuses produced in modernity and that reverberates in our way of be until today, our philosopher will propose the point of view of the nothingness (śūnyatā) as a way to trans-descendance, that is, to overcome the traditional thinking overvalues the reason for the encounter with the original face of man, which by no longer impose its cognitive power can know all things in their true, in the tathatā

O conceito de consciência em o ser e o nada de J.-P. Sartre

This current discourse intends to prove how consciousness or Being-for-itself presents the idea that in its operation one can emphasize that it s Nothingness, transience and liberty in Jean-Paul Sartre s work O Ser e o Nada. To testify the proposed idea, the conception that Sartre gives to consciousness, representing nothingness, without any content that is connected to the possessor objects of a transphenomenal existence will be the starting point. This way, consciousness will be analyzed transcendently to the object that it s not, demonstrating its revealer-revealed condition, because it unveils a concrete world that exists against its idea, functioning as the revealer intentionality that there are beings instead of nothingness, obeying the ontological proof defended by Sartre. From this idea, every kind of consciousness will always be consciousness of something, a glance of the world, avoiding the fact that the consciousness could be considered nothing in the world. In order to live its original negation state of the world, apprehending this same world, with the purpose of a knowledge, it needs to be divided in two: the first degree consciousness or previous-reflexive cogito, that turns the proper reflexion possible, because, it s the consciousness proper transphenomenality of being different of all that connected to its existence being only its consequence; and the cogito, responsible to the positioning of the first degree consciousness, while aware of its own consciousness, that is, while being certain that knows. From this point, the way to untangle the consciousness or Being-for-itself will be developed as being Chasm, Liberty and transience. From this idea, it s intended to know how consciousness, that in Sartre s thoughts is originally nothing, could turn into Liberty that is presented in the field of transience? In other words, how these three internal structures imbricate one another to form consciousness in Sartre? First of all, it has to be considered the review of a conduct of human reality, the inquiry, that will be possible to understand how Nothingness exists as the mold of all kind of negation. After this, it will be shown, considering its way of existence, the human reality that is connected to Para-si, determined like nothingness, still is proposed like Liberty. Form this point, it will be possible to gleam how Liberty is lived deeply by Para-si in the shape of chasm, trying to how Para-si turns into nothingness, creating a chasm based on its proper liberty. Then, Liberty will be the proper mechanism used by Para-si to modificate its original chasm. The way Being-for-itself has to build to gain its goal will be projecting in transience, the building of something possible that brings one being back. However, will be demonstrated like Chasm can occupy the moment of a choice turning the decision instant an anguish stage, based on the failing of stability of the Being-for-itself, once nothingness persists in the field of the possibilities that human beings preserves in its essence while being essentially Liberty. From this idea, anguish will be studied as the proper consciousness of Liberty, being bad-faith the attempt of avoid Liberty trying to gain a shelter contradicting the fact that life is done of continual choices