DEVIDO PROCESSO LEGAL E PROCESSO ADMINISTRATIVO SANCIONADOR NAS AGÊNCIAS REGULADORAS

This paper discusses the growing attention that, over the last decades, has been given to the administrative procedure in Administrative Law, as it also highlights the procedures which are in tune with the new trappings of this legal field. It focuses on the sanctioning competence of regulatory agencies, notably what concerns the procedural guide that conditions its exercise. It aims at gathering varied elements, many times dispersed over the legal system, so it is possible to list, with a satisfactory degree of detail, the procedural constitutional guidelines which are indispensable to the sanctioning of private entities through punitive action by regulatory agencies. It highlights the due legal process clause, for the abundance of the protective set there is around it, as a guiding constitutional principle for the application of sanctions by regulatory agencies. It examines the repercussion of the constitutional principle of the due legal process on Administrative Law, focusing on the most relevant principles on which the first unfolds itself. It analyzes, in light of the due legal process principle, the sanctioning administrative procedure developed in regulatory agencies. In conclusion, it is asserted that there is no room, in the Brazilian legal system as a whole, for sanctions to be applied summarily; that there reigns, in our system, an absolute presumption, dictated by the Constitution, that only through regular procedures can the best and fairest decision, concerning cases in which the rights of private parties could be affected, be taken by the public administration; that, respecting the principle of the right to a fair hearing, it is indispensable that there be motivation of a decision that imposes a sanction; that there should be, in homage to the principle of full defense and for the need to preserve the autonomy of the regulatory party, an appeal court in every agency; that the principles listed in the federal law No. 9.784/1999 should be mandatorily monitored by the agencies, for this is the only alternative consistent with the Constitution

A objetivação do controle concreto de constitucionalidade nas decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal

The independence of the United States and the revolutions that emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century led to the birth of the written constitution, with a mission to limit the power of the State and to ensure fundamental rights to citizens. Thus, the Constitution has become the norm and ultimate founding of the State. Because of this superiority felt the need to protect her, emerging from that constitutional jurisdiction, taking control of constitutionality of provisions his main instrument. In Brazil, the constitutionality control began with the Constitution of 1891, when "imported" the American model, which is named after incidental diffuse model of judicial review. Indeed, allowed that any judge or court could declare the unconstitutionality of the law or normative act in a concrete case. However, the Brazilian Constituent did not bring the U.S. Institute of stare decisis, by which the precedents of higher courts eventually link the below. Because of this lack, each tribunal Brazilian freely decide about the constitutionality of a rule, so that the decision took effect only between the parties to the dispute. This prompted the emergence of conflicting decisions between judicantes organs, which ultimately undermine legal certainty and the image of the judiciary. As a solution to the problem, was incorporated from the 1934 Constitution to rule that the Senate would suspend the law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. With the introduction of abstract control of constitutionality, since 1965, the Supreme Court went on to also have the power to declare the invalidity of the provision unconstitutional, effectively against all without the need for the participation of the Senate. However, it remained the view that in case the Supreme Court declared the unconstitutionality of the fuzzy control law by the Senate would continue with the competence to suspend the law unconstitutional, thus the decision of the Praetorium Exalted restricted parties. The 1988 Constitution strengthened the abstract control expanding legitimized the Declaratory Action of Unconstitutionality and creating new mechanisms of abstract control. Adding to this, the Constitutional Amendment. No. 45/2004 brought the requirement of general repercussion and created the Office of Binding Precedent, both to be applied by the Supreme Court judgments in individual cases, thus causing an approximation between the control abstract and concrete constitutional. Saw themselves so that the Supreme Court, to be the guardian of the Constitution, its action should be directed to the trial of issues of public interest. In this new reality, it becomes more necessary the participation of the Senate to the law declared unconstitutional in fuzzy control by the Supreme Court can reach everyone, because such an interpretation has become obsolete. So, to adapt it to this reality, such a rule must be read in the sense that the Senate give publicity to the law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, since mutated constitutional