Liberdade e negação da vontade: análise do ser-livre como representação e na angústia

Common understanding about what freedom means has always been more or less related to the power to realize something intended, desired, a capability. Therefore, being free is commonly interpreted under the concept of free-will and the category of possibility to act. Although there are predecessors in History of Philosophy, Schopenhauer refuses the thesis of free will proposing otherwise the denial of willing (to live) as the ultimate possibility for human freedom, if not the only one left. The thesis that would make him famous was deeply misunderstood and so miscarried somewhat due to the way it was many times presented by the means of exotic examples wrapped in a mystical mood besides exaltations to Eastern traditions, which may satisfy anthropological curiosity instead of being capable to satisfy the reader in a philosophical way. It seems to result from Schopenhauer s thought a kind of pessimism against life. Otherwise, typical readings on the Schopenhauerian thesis are found full of inconsistencies once closely regarded, which blame does not belong to the author but to his interpreters. A new reading about the denial of willing as the ultimate possibility for human freedom demands a criticism on the inconsistencies and prejudgments deep grounded. For this, we firstly clarify the ways of understanding the willing nothing , which cannot be reduced to the mere refusal or conformism, being instead positively understood as a special manner of willing: the admission of oneself for the sake of one is. A few more than a century later The world as will and representation came to light, Heidegger proposes in his fundamental ontology that the proper being-free concerns to originary decision by which, in anguish of being suspended in nothingness, Dasein renders itself singular as the being who is in-a-world and to-death, concluding that the ultimate possibility of freedom is being-free-to-death. Developing the hypothesis that freedom, properly understood, concerns to nothingness as to indeterminate possibilities, we seek for a dialogue between Schopenhauer s thought and existential philosophy aiming to reconstitute and overcome Metaphysics tradition turning the question about freedom into a matter of Ontology. From the factual existence perspective, as we must show, every human activity (or inactivity) is ordinarily mediated by representations, in which me and world appear as distinct entities. So, each one among determininate individuals finds itself connected to the things in the world by interest, which proper concept must be sufficiently explored. Starting from this point, we may proceed to detailed analysis of usual representations of freedom aiming their destruction by Ontology and then reaching existential thesis according to Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Turning back to the analysis of Schopenhauer s work, we conclude existential understanding of freedom as will-to-be can also be found in Schopenhauer. In this way, denial of willing means ultimate freedom once the Will turns back to its own essence by suppressing the world as representation, which means the originary absolute indetermination of the extreme possibility to-be

A compaixão como fundamentação moral em Schopenhauer

The scope of this study was to investigate to what extent the feeling of compassion is important for the moral reasons. Thus, we will build on the analysis of moral reasoning of the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, in his essay “On The Basis of Morality”, who was a supporter of the feeling of compassion in their ethical reasoning. In order to deepen the discussion on the dichotomy of the human being, that the split between reason and sensibility in the moral field, also investigate Schopenhauer's criticism of the Kantian moral, which is fundamentally rational. We believe that analyzing both its moral foundation, as his critique of Kantian morality, we can understand the true import of the feeling of compassion in the moral field. Thus, we believe that one must take into account the value of this feeling on ethical grounds. As proposed will try an approach with regard to reason and sensitivity in the moral field.

O eterno retorno como paródia e como colagem na filosofia da diferença de Gilles Deleuze

Gilles Deleuze hás commented on many philosophers, but his relationship with Nietzsche plays a singular role in his thought: appropriating the concept of the “eternal return” to think the central axis of his thesis, Difference and repetition (1968). Terms “difference” and “repetition” appeared associated to eternal return in his Nietzsche and philosophy (1962). Our dissertation thesis analyzes the presentations of that concept in bothworks. Chapter one presents the style construction and critical, methodological aspects of Nietzschean philosophy, fundamental elements to understand Deleuze’s interpretation. It subsequently analyzes the first presentation of that concept, expressed in the following terms: the aesthetic existence, either innocent or justified from the figure of game. We will see how the image of game implies another concept of chance, that leads Deleuze to think of an affirmative philosophical “type”, capable of creating new values. Chapter two evaluates the existential, “ethical-selective”, “physicalcosmological” character of the concept of eternal return, as much as the difficulties it imposes upon Nietzsche’s interpreter. We present afterwards Deleuzian comprehension of eternal return as a “parody” or a “simulacrum of doctrine”. Chapter three analyzes that interpretive position as a transvaluation of values from a rearrange of perspectives in order to overcome the negative comprehensions of existence. We want to question the way Deleuze builds another image of thought from the concept of eternal return – an image that, by a sort of “colagem” and selective elimination of the negativity, proposes a historiographic work and unfolds a lineage of thinkers of immanence and difference, a detour from the thought of identity, the same and the similar. We want thus to understand Deleuze’s critique of “dogmatic image of thought”.

O eterno retorno como paródia e como colagem na filosofia da diferença de Gilles Deleuze

Gilles Deleuze hás commented on many philosophers, but his relationship with Nietzsche plays a singular role in his thought: appropriating the concept of the “eternal return” to think the central axis of his thesis, Difference and repetition (1968). Terms “difference” and “repetition” appeared associated to eternal return in his Nietzsche and philosophy (1962). Our dissertation thesis analyzes the presentations of that concept in bothworks. Chapter one presents the style construction and critical, methodological aspects of Nietzschean philosophy, fundamental elements to understand Deleuze’s interpretation. It subsequently analyzes the first presentation of that concept, expressed in the following terms: the aesthetic existence, either innocent or justified from the figure of game. We will see how the image of game implies another concept of chance, that leads Deleuze to think of an affirmative philosophical “type”, capable of creating new values. Chapter two evaluates the existential, “ethical-selective”, “physicalcosmological” character of the concept of eternal return, as much as the difficulties it imposes upon Nietzsche’s interpreter. We present afterwards Deleuzian comprehension of eternal return as a “parody” or a “simulacrum of doctrine”. Chapter three analyzes that interpretive position as a transvaluation of values from a rearrange of perspectives in order to overcome the negative comprehensions of existence. We want to question the way Deleuze builds another image of thought from the concept of eternal return – an image that, by a sort of “colagem” and selective elimination of the negativity, proposes a historiographic work and unfolds a lineage of thinkers of immanence and difference, a detour from the thought of identity, the same and the similar. We want thus to understand Deleuze’s critique of “dogmatic image of thought”.