Mundo de medo: inquisição e cristãos-novos nos espaços coloniais capitanias de Pernambuco, Itamaracá e Paraíba (1593-1595)

Founded in 1536, the Court of the Holy Office of the Portuguese Inquisition was established as an ecclesiastical institution, but at the same time subordinate to the real powers. Among the main victims of persecution effected by the Holy Office, were the New Christians - Jews forcibly converted in 1497 or their descendants - that due to their socio-religious were repeatedly accused of heresy. This paper conducted a survey that sought to understand the historical performance of the Inquisition in Brazil in the sixteenth century on the New Christians, especially those accused of secretly retaining the religious customs of the Mosaic law, given the investigative and punitive procedures employed by the Inquisition as part of a set of actions that produce social insecurities and producers / broadcasters of fear in the populations under scrutiny. In this sense, the approach was based on the analysis of documents produced on the first visit of inspection performed in Brazil inquisitorial sixteenth century, concerning the captaincy of Pernambuco and Paraiba Itamaracá (1593-1595), not excluding, however, the sources of the first stage of visitation that occurred between 1591-1593 in the province of Bahia de Todos os Santos, even though its use is ancillary and punctual. The objective of this research was to understand the consequences of inquisitorial procedures generated on the imaginary, and the Inquisition, using the expressions and signs of fears relating to individuals contained in the New Christian complaints to the Holy Office as documentary evidence of the fear caused by the Holy Tribunal. The adoption of specific behaviors by the New Christians in the home - these spaces are appropriate and adapted to the detriment of the religious practices of Judaism features - characterizes the spatial perspective of the study, thus indicating a further objective of the study: to understand how the New Christians experienced domestic spaces in a historical context marked by behavioral surveillance generally considered morally condemned and suspected of heresy. The research was conducted to analyze the complaints and quantitative survey of some indices of documentation for the understanding of overall charges and how individuals New Christians were concerned with the domestic space, using them to maintain criptojudaica religiosity, transformed places housing often esnogas, makeshift synagogue for meetings and celebrations of Judaizing New Christians. The formulations of Michel de Certeau on appropriations and meanings of space - presented by the author in the metaphor of "practice areas" - were integrated into the workforce in order to understand the ways in which the New Christians appropriated the colonial houses, designed these spaces a very specific language in the Crypto, in which women are prominent figures. The works of Jean Delumeau and Bartholomé Benassar integrate the discussion of the Inquisition and the sensibilities of fear in the work performed. The analysis allowed the documentation to understand the meaning and the extent related to the general fear that the Inquisition represented. Some complaints are indicative of fears that can be perceived implicitly based on behaviors and attitudes adopted by the New Christians, others, however, are direct expressions of fear caused by allusion or initiative of the actions of the Inquisition in colonial Brazil in the sixteenth century

O preceptor do Emílio e a autodefinição de Jean-Jacques Rousseau como educador

MEDEIROS, Ana Luiza; RODRIGUES, Marta Bezerra. O preceptor do Emílio e a autodefinição de Jean-Jacques Rousseau como educador. In: CONGRESSO LUSO-BRASILEIRO DE HISTÓRIA DA EDUCAÇÃO, 9., 2012, Lisboa. Atas... Lisboa: Instituto de Educação da Universidade de Lisboa, 2012. p. 3783-3788.

O conceito de liberdade em o ser e o nada de Jean-Paul Sartre

This dissertation aims to address the concept of freedom from the perspective of the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre with reference to the main work Being and Nothingness. After presenting the concept of freedom we will try to show that it is related to the notion of responsibility, which will lead, ultimately, to define the Sartrean philosophy as a philosophy of action. In the first chapter we will present in passing the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, philosopher from which Sartre will develop his concept of freedom. The Husserlian notion of consciousness (intentionality) is the way to develop his analysis of Sartre phenomenon of being. From this analysis Sartre submits their concepts of being in-itself and being for-itself. Being initself is defined as the things of the world devoid of consciousness, are the things that surround us. The In-itself has as its main brand positivity: it is what it is, is all that can be said about him. In turn being For-itself is the very being of man, which differs radically from the In-itself. The For-itself has as its main intentionality, ie, its ability to project outside itself in existence. That's when Sartre shows that this type of being realizes its existence on the basis of a constant nihilation. Here comes the notion of anything. Among the relations of the For-itself with the surrounding world stands a very special: relationship between consciousnesses. It is when we discuss the issue of another. Intersubjectivity, through sartrean analysis of look, show that the For-itself assumes a new existential dimension: the being-for others. That's when Sartre will emphasize his notion of conflict. The conflict in intersubjectivity would come from the fact that you want to take another- For-itself as an object. Given this we will analyze what Sartre called the concrete relations with others. The philosopher submit such relations in the form of ducts and conduits assimilation of ownership. In the first my-self to try to "get lost" in the consciousness of another, ownership of my conduct in-itself tries to "take ownership" of the subjectivity of the other and try to treat others as things, as objects. In this sense Sartre examines the experiences of love, masochism, indifference, desire and sadism. Following this route we will enter the land of freedom itself, which is the major theme of our work. Since Sartre defines the For-itself as a being that is projected to create your way of being, it can only define it as freedom. The freedom of the For-itself is taken in terms of autonomy of choice. Once the For-itself has no way of being a thing as being in-itself, it just may be picking up, that is, making your being. Here Sartre speaks of the anguish that would be the symptom of freedom itself. The fact that the For-itself have to choose on whether the call as one being distressed. However, in most cases the For-itself tries to escape from the anguish of freedom and takes refuge in bad faith. After setting the man (For-itself) as freedom Sartre defends that he is totally responsible for what he does of himself. Once the philosopher holds that man is not predetermined, ie, does not have an a priori essence, his philosophy has as its basic assumption the action. If Sartre argues that the For-itself must constantly choose your way of being, the action is the basis on which man will exercise his own freedom. In this sense we conclude the work with an approach to work Existentialism is a Humanism, which represent the entry of the philosopher on the practical aspects of life