A ação civil pública como meio de concretização do direito à saúde na Constituição de 1988

The work presented here is about aspects of the constitutional extension in which is the public civil action with the objective of verifying its aptitute in tutelaging subjective situations derived from fundamental rights, especially right to health assistance. Thus, it offers a clear analysis of the practical functioning of most aspects of the public civil action (lawsuit), with philosophical foundation and necessary doctrinaire to your comphehension. How it once was (history), how it could be (reform suggestion), how it is (current interpretation of the law) and how it should be (critic analysis of the microsystem of collective tutelaging of rights, its perspectives, as well as the efficacy of the public cilvil action about accomplishment of the right to health as supraindividual right). The objective is to analyse the main version of the theme (for instance: the impacts caused to the dissociation of the Procurations theory), so that it can be extracted the philosophy and the general theory, of the public civil action and collective tutelaging in general, pragmatically applicable to study purposes. With this theorical fountain, the reader will be in a more solid position, not only being able to understand the subtilities of the public civil action, but mainly being able to recognize its faults and present solid reform proposals and improvement. It is know that the Juridical Power (Procuration) does not allow any more inactivity about negating accession to health in its collective dimension (lato sensu: spread, collective stricto sensu and homogeneous individuals), being imputed to it novel usage that consolidates in the assumption of the role instrument set aside to be used by all with organized instancy of solution to collective conflicts in large sense. This happens, overall, because of the current justice politization, understood as juridical activism, connected to the struggle between the groups defending their interests and the acceptance of the constitution about solidifying the public politics of quality health

Os argumentos transcendentais: kant e o problema de hume

This work whose title is "The transcendental arguments: Kant Andy Hume's problem" has as its main objective to interpret Kant's answer to Hume's problem in the light of the conjunction of the causality and induction themes which is equivalent to skeptical- naturalist reading of the latter. In this sense, this initiative complements the previous treatment seen in our dissertation, where the same issue had been discussed from a merely skeptical reading that Kant got from Hume thought and was only examined causality. Among the specific objectives, we list the following: a) critical philosophy fulfills three basic functions, a founding, one negative and one would argue that the practical use of reason, here named as defensive b) the Kantian solution of Hume's problem in the first critisism would fulfill its founding and negative functions of critique of reason; c) the Kantian treatment of the theme of induction in other criticisms would will fulfill the defense function of critique of reason; d) that the evidence of Kant's answer to Hume's problem are more consistent when will be satisfied these three functions or moments of criticism. The basic structure of the work consists of three parts: the first the genesis of Hume's problem - our intention is to reconstruct Hume's problem, analyzing it from the perspective of two definitions of cause, where the dilution of the first definition in the second match the reduction of psychological knowledge to the probability of following the called naturalization of causal relations; whereas in the second - Legality and Causality - it is stated that when considering Hume in the skeptic-naturalist option, Kant is not entitled to respond by transcendental argument A􀁴B; A⊢B from the second Analogy, evidence that is rooted in the position of contemporary thinkers, such as Strawson and Allison; in third part - Purpose and Induction - admits that Kant responds to Hume on the level of regulative reason use, although the development of this test exceeds the limits of the founding function of criticism. And this is articulated in both the Introduction and Concluding Remarks by meeting the defensive [and negative] function of criticism. In this context, based on the use of so-called transcendental arguments that project throughout the critical trilogy, we provide solution to a recurring issue that recurs at several points in our submission and concerning to the "existence and / or the necessity of empirical causal laws. In this light, our thesis is that transcendental arguments are only an apodictic solution to the Hume s skeptical-naturalist problem when is at stake a practical project in which the interest of reason is ensured, as will, in short, proved in our final considerations