94 resultados para Metafísica
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The allegory of the divided line presents one structure that divides itself into four levels of reality. Two of them move in the world of appearances or opinion, and the others into the world of being or intelligibility: eikasia and pistis, and dianoia and noesis. The difficulty is the following: if there are four levels of reality each with their respective objects that are apprehended according to a type of knowledge involved, is there an interpretation of the justice according to each level? Accordingly, our intention, after presenting the types of knowledge in the allegory of the divided line, is to demonstrate how the justice is comprehended at each level of reality. We understand that Plato uses the characters to represent levels involving different types of knowledge. The characters are Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon, Adimantus and Socrates, and the comprehension about what is the justice at each level follows what these characters understand justice to be
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The philosophical discussion has been present throughout the whole history of reason, for philosophy and reason have been always closely linked. In the following work, Reason, origin, crises and contemporary answers I go into the history of the rational and demonstrative thought, focusing on how rationality can be thought about in contemporary philosophy. To answer this question I discuss the principle of philosophy, the mythical period and the thoughts of Heraclito , Parmenides , Plato and Aristotle in relation to reason and rationality. Also discussed is the medieval period and the philosophical use of logic and the criticism of Aristotle s thoughts, especially focusing on the criticism of Hegel and Luckasiewicz of the non contradiction principle. Lastly I discuss the development of reason in present day philosophy, mainly how modern logics could be putting at stake Aristotle s model of reason
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La recherche presentée, realisée sur le domaine de la méthaphysique, s´agit de rassembler des pressupositions pour une fondamentation ontologique de la technologie de l´Information, basé sur la philophie de Martin Heidegger; foncièrement, sur l´analytique existentiel du Dasein dans l´ouvrage Être et Temps. À partir de la pensée sur ce qui est aujourd´hui , il s´agit d´investiguer sur quels fondaments la Nouvelle Tecnologie se fut érigée de façon a que nous sommes engajés au projet de numérisation des étants que en même temps que destine l´homme a l´oubli de l´Être, l´offre la possibilité de transformation. Le rapport entre la question de l´Être et la question de la technique est analysé comme des chemins croisés et dans ce carrefour il devient possible penser ce qui est technique, ce qui est information pour Heidegger et de quel façon les modes existentiels du Dasein sont prêtes pour caractériser l ´homme au sein de la tecnologie de l´information. Par cette appropriation, il reste penser comment c´est possible l´ouverture d´une perspective de reconduction de l´homme à la vérité de l´Être. Finalement, la structuration des fondements rends possible la réflexion discursive général: avec qui nous nous ocuppons, comme nous sommes, dans quelle direction nous nous acheminons, les thèmes générales, respectivement, des trois chapitres. Les points d´investigation du premier chapitre son: a) La caractérisation précise du Dasein, appuyé sur des considerations de Benedito Nunes, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacques Derrida et Rüdiger Safränski; b) Le concept de technique et son essence chez Heidegger; c) la distinction entre technique et technologie, appuyé sur le pensée de J. Ellul, Michel Séris, Otto Pöggeler, Michel Haar, Dominique Janicaud; c) Le concept de cibernetique chez Heidegger et chez Norbert Wiener; d) La caractérisation preliminaire d´information, l´analyse étimologique e philosophique, l´avis de Heidegger te les théories de Rafael Capurro; f) L´Analyse du phénomène de la numérisation des étants, des considérations de Virilio, et l´analyse d´un concept de virtuel avec Henri Bergson et Gilles Deleuze. Dans le deuxième chapitre, l´analyse des existentiels du Dasein vers le sommaire des fondements de base pour la caractérisation de la technologie de l´information comme un problème philosophique. Finalement, aprés avoir presenté les concepts introdutoires que délimitent le questionement, suivi par les indications et pressupositions ontologiques trouvés sur Être et Temps, le troisième chapitre disserte sur le péril, ce qui sauve et la sérénité, les trois mots-clés de la pensée heideggerienne sur la technique que permettent l´approche conclusif de la question
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This thesis aims better understanding the relation between time and evil in Schelling s Freiheitsschrift, having its starting point in approximations from Gnosticism. For that purpose, before approaching that relation, it is reviewed (chapter I) the question of Gnosticism, a strain of thought essentially concerned with the problem of time and permeated by the belief in an evil nature of creation, and which is alleged to have significantly influenced certain ideas of Schelling. An evaluation of approximations between Gnosticism, gnosis and German thought follows (chapter II), as well as an evaluation of Schellingian aproximations to Gnosticism (chapter III). Then, the Freiheitsschrift is analysed as the text where Schelling, having taken hold of a very distinct appropriation of Gnosticism, goes beyond Kantian theodicy (chapter IV). Some interrogations about whether key ideas of Schellingian philosophy (about gnosis, creation, duality, time, and evil) are conceived in a way that is essentially different from that of historic Gnosticism, despite the much that has been said to the contrary, are then addressed (chapter V). The proposal of a Platonic-Plotinian key to the understanding of the relations between time and evil in the Freiheitsschrift comes next (chapter VI), and then gives way to the concluding remarks (chapter VII). We perceive that Gnosticism and Neoplatonism are systems of thought that sometimes converge, and that German thought is one of the places of this convergence. Notwithstanding this perception, it is possible to affirm that Schellingian thought, with its valorization of time and of a certain perception of evil, is essentially anti-gnostic, despite some contrary observations
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Lucrèce, penseur latin du siècle I, avant J.C., écrire que le peur de la mort imputé par la religion et la superstition, nourrit le souhait à la richesse, l'ambition du pouvoir et les actes insensés, dont les conséquences se reflètent dans les maladies de l'âme. La terreur qui s'installe chez l'homme, à l'être confronté au décès, est aussi un obstacle à la liberté et à la vie équilibrée. Les craintes sans fondement seulement seraient surmonter, avec la compréhension de la nature et du mouvement de l'âme, en percevant leur génération, corporéité et finitude. Pour cela, la compréhension des atomes et du vide, les éléments primordiaux de la nature se basent tout la connaissance de l'âme. L'objectif de ce travail est enquêter la nature de l'âme dans Lucrèce, en présentant une réflexion sur les craintes sans fondement et la peur de la mort, comme une manière de percevoir le mouvement de la vie elle-même, et de que manière sa philosophie affronte à la crainte de la mort.
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In The Structure of Empirical Knowledge Laurence Bonjour tries to prove the inefficiency of a foundational explanation as a solution to the skeptical problem. His view is that there are no basic beliefs in the proper sense, that is, beliefs capable of having some justificatory force other than the ones derived by the coherence with other beliefs. We will show that this proposal is not achieved satisfactorily by BonJour, and that a non inferential observational belief in his theory would be more plausible if it were interpreted as being basic in terms of a weak foundational theory.
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This thesis reflects upon the question of how does philosophy think a particular today, which is not only a legitimate philosophical task but a determinative characteristic of philosophy in general. Today's thought follows two paths: first, an hermeneutical-phenomenological analysis of Martin Heidegger's thought with regards to his own contemporaneity; and secondly, through the analysis of the contemporary phenomenon of Information Technology which in the present work is to be considered a privileged sign of our times and distinctive of the mindfulness of philosophy. Therefore, the starting point is an investigation of Heidegger's thinking on his own era to whom facticity is a way of accessing the fundamental question of philosophy. This thesis is led by three guiding words which hold onto a perspective of unity in Heidegger s lifetime of work: 1. Technicity, 2. History, 3. Language, to thereby develop a characterization of human existence as 1. Technopolitical, 2. Technoscientific, and 3. Technological. Finally, in keeping with this triangular characterization of the human, a philosophical comprehension of our times will be established and drawn by Information Technology illustrating three of its' factual signs that are understood to be the 'Remains of Being' today: The Emptying of Speech (Language); The Emptying of Science (History); The Emptying of The Object (Technicity). Through these nowadays phenomenon, it is possible to maintain a grip on the fundamental question, precisely when the task of philosophy seems to have peremptorily lost its meaning and come to its logical end and to show how philosophizing in the information era is as possible as it is necessary.
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Starting from the idea that the result of the Humean analysis of causal inferences must be applied coherently to the remaining part of his work, including its moral theory, the present master thesis aims at investigating whether Hume´s moral philosophy is essentially based on feeling, or whether this would not be rather essentially a consequence of our causal inferences in human actions and deliberations. The main idea consists in showing that our moral inferences, to the extent that they are for Hume empirical , depend on our belief in a connexion between something which has been previously observed and something which is not being observed ( but that it is expected to occur or to be observed in the future). Thus, this very belief must base our moral inferences concerning the actions and deliberations of the individuals. Therefore, must e o ipso induce us to associate actions and behaviors, as well as character and moral claims of men to certain moral feelings. Accordingly, the thesis is unfolded in three chapters. In the first chapter Hume´s theory of the perception is reported as essential part of the explanation or the principles that bind ideas in our mind and constitute our inferences. In the second chapter, the Humean analysis of causal inferences is presented and the way they contribute in the formation of our moral inferences is explained. In the third and last chapter, the formation of our moral inferences and the real contribution of the doctrine of freedom and necessity for the examination or our actions are analysed and discussed.
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Common understanding about what freedom means has always been more or less related to the power to realize something intended, desired, a capability. Therefore, being free is commonly interpreted under the concept of free-will and the category of possibility to act. Although there are predecessors in History of Philosophy, Schopenhauer refuses the thesis of free will proposing otherwise the denial of willing (to live) as the ultimate possibility for human freedom, if not the only one left. The thesis that would make him famous was deeply misunderstood and so miscarried somewhat due to the way it was many times presented by the means of exotic examples wrapped in a mystical mood besides exaltations to Eastern traditions, which may satisfy anthropological curiosity instead of being capable to satisfy the reader in a philosophical way. It seems to result from Schopenhauer s thought a kind of pessimism against life. Otherwise, typical readings on the Schopenhauerian thesis are found full of inconsistencies once closely regarded, which blame does not belong to the author but to his interpreters. A new reading about the denial of willing as the ultimate possibility for human freedom demands a criticism on the inconsistencies and prejudgments deep grounded. For this, we firstly clarify the ways of understanding the willing nothing , which cannot be reduced to the mere refusal or conformism, being instead positively understood as a special manner of willing: the admission of oneself for the sake of one is. A few more than a century later The world as will and representation came to light, Heidegger proposes in his fundamental ontology that the proper being-free concerns to originary decision by which, in anguish of being suspended in nothingness, Dasein renders itself singular as the being who is in-a-world and to-death, concluding that the ultimate possibility of freedom is being-free-to-death. Developing the hypothesis that freedom, properly understood, concerns to nothingness as to indeterminate possibilities, we seek for a dialogue between Schopenhauer s thought and existential philosophy aiming to reconstitute and overcome Metaphysics tradition turning the question about freedom into a matter of Ontology. From the factual existence perspective, as we must show, every human activity (or inactivity) is ordinarily mediated by representations, in which me and world appear as distinct entities. So, each one among determininate individuals finds itself connected to the things in the world by interest, which proper concept must be sufficiently explored. Starting from this point, we may proceed to detailed analysis of usual representations of freedom aiming their destruction by Ontology and then reaching existential thesis according to Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Turning back to the analysis of Schopenhauer s work, we conclude existential understanding of freedom as will-to-be can also be found in Schopenhauer. In this way, denial of willing means ultimate freedom once the Will turns back to its own essence by suppressing the world as representation, which means the originary absolute indetermination of the extreme possibility to-be
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This work s objective is to make a literal interpretation of Kant s Aesthetic transcendental, the first pilaster of sustentation of the epistemology of Kant and to interpret it at Strawson s light. It contains the doctrine of sensitivity responsible for the intuitions, which rests on the concepts of space and time, and, with this, the tematização of two important questions. For Kant s philosophy in its epistemologic source what s the importance of the concepts of and time? How these concepts of space and time inscribe themselves with such statute as an investigatory task of metaphysics? The specification of the concepts of space and time as ingredients of the theories treated and enrolled in this work are segmented of the Aesthetic transcendental of Kant, and interpreted under Strawson s light. The research is divided in two chapter; first, constituted of two parts, the first part presents an introduction to the Aesthetic transcendental of Kant, to show the doctrine of the sensitivity which is part of with its forms space and time, authentic forms of the intuition. The second chapter, is constituted of four parts, that deal with the interpretation of the austere model of Strawson and related with Kant s transcendental Aesthetic. The conclusion of our work, about the declared objection of Strawson in its austere interpretation that refuses the idea of space and time, even keeping its a priori character, cannot be accepted. The apriority, the intuitivity and the ideality are theories non-separable in a coherent boarding of space and time of Kant s model of epistemology
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This work deals with the relationship between medicine and philosophy, which has existed since Antiquity, and will also be discussed here from Kant s perspective. It presents the historical context formed by reciprocal influences of common notions regarding health/disease, balance/justice, and just measure, which are present in the medical discourse as much as in the philosophical one. It considers that Hippocratic medicine emerges from concerns about dietetics, thus creating the link between philosophy and medicine, which is important for our analysis on Kant s contributions to Hippocratic legacy. Taking into account these considerations, the work distinguishes between two aspects which are associated within the dietetics presented by Kant in his work The conflict of the faculties, studied here in the light of his Doctrine of virtue, particularly the duties to oneself in regard the care of one s body and the teleological conception. In this sense, the work indicates the role of Kantian thinking not only to enrich medical dietetics, by lending to it moral value, but also to enrich philosophy by highlighting its therapeutic effects
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The thesis presents interpretations of Augustine of Hippo with regard to the first three chapters of genesis, the first book of the Bible. These interpretation are found in the works Literal Commentary on Genesis, concerning Genesis Against the Manicheans, Literal Commentary on Genesis, Unfinished, Books Xi-XIII of the Confessions, as well a brief exposition in Books XI-XIV of the City of God. Exposition of these Augustinian Commentaries seeks to demonstrate various interpretations made by author in one group of texts revealing a hermeneutics centered in the interpreter and not in established interpretive rules. In sequence there is described succinctly the evolution of textual hermeneutics during the modern period up to the reflections conducted by Martin Heidegger in the first half of the twenties. Based in Heidegger s existential commentaries on the Pauline Epistles (Galatians and I-II Thessalonians) and on the tenth Book of the Confessions, there is shown a return to a interpreter-based hermeneutics, such as practiced by Augustine. The concern manifested by Heidegger with regard to given bases foundations, existent in Dasein, foundations which can influence self-comprehension, constitute themselves in possibilities of explication as much for Augustinian interpretive variations, as for the existential approach applied by Heidegger to the Pauline epistles and Augustine s text
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The ontological investigation of sense, from German philosopher Gottlob Frege s point of view, has, as its foundation, the understanding of reference, representation, thought and sense s categories. According to Frege s writings, On Sense and Reference, and Thoughts Logical Investigations, sense carries itself the solution for the problem of identity s relation. Sense gives us the knowledge s increment that identity doesn t give. But still there is a problem: the definition of sense's nature. Sense couldn t have its nature strictly defined because, in this case, it would be reduced to reference s category and thus, sense would be identified with the own extra-linguistic object, and this is a misconception. But Frege said that thought must be considered as the sense of the sentence. So, with this close relationship between sense and thought, a new goal in this investigation is putt in focus: thought. To Frege, thought is not a simple subjective performance of thinking, it is not a subjective representation, but it is an objective content that is real, eternal, and that exists by itself in a third realm . Thought exists in a realm beyond the world of subjective representations and beyond the world of sensible perception. From this point, the present investigation went back to Plato s World of Ideas. So, the platonic thinking was included in this debate about the metaphysic of the third realm in Frege, trying to clarify the original concepts of knowledge, reality and truth. To achieve this objective, the following dialogues had been included in our research: Theaetetus, Republic and Phaedo. And the following fregean questions had been brought to Plato's scope: how happens the new knowledge? What is the third realm s reality? What is the relation between truth and thought? Doing that we could see as much some of the platonic origins of Frege's approach, as some differences between this two philosophers
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The concept of formativity, coined by Luigi Pareyson, is a key to the development of countless contemporary aesthetic studies. The aim of this dissertation is to present a deep understanding of the notion of Formativity and Interpretation, as evidenciated by the title Formativity and Interpretation: the aesthetical philosophy of Luigi Pareyson. The work Aesthetics - Theory of Formativity, first published in 1954, is considered a mark in the rebirth of aesthetics. In this dissertation, the concept of Formativity is examined as a component applicable to every human action, and not limited to pre-determined practices, nor referred to the application of preexisting. I ve performed an investigation of the triple concept of doing-inventing-interpreting, which simultaneously grounds Formativity. In the first section, Pareyson s Aesthetical Propaedeutic is presented; in the second, the Theory of Formativity: the aesthetical character of the whole human experience is analysed; and in the third chapter, The Aesthetical of Form and the Metaphysics of Figuration is related to the formativity character of the knowledge. Through this analysis, I ve intended to evidence how human operability can be understood as search and trial, figuration and invention, in the search for success. In this sense, this thesis seeks to present an interpretation of the idea of work-form, speculating the inexorability of invention and interpretation in an attempt to establish a new bottom line for the studies Pareyson s Aesthetics in Brazil
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