O impacto da orientação empreendedora na performance das empresas brasileiras: evidências de um estudo híbrido

The subject entrepreneurship has been gaining strength within the area of strategy, as the entrepreneurial activity represents one of the gears of economic growth and a political social and economic response of the entrepreneur¿s capital. Nevertheless, there are not many studies that investigated if entrepreneurial orientation influences firm performance in Brazil. The objective of the research is to understand and conclude on the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation and firm performance. To achieve this objective, qualitative research through in-depth interviews with 14 managers was followed by quantitative research through data collection involving 104 managers in a heterogeneous sample of 104 companies. The research used the model of Lumpkin; Dess (1996) for entrepreneurial orientation in five dimensions (autonomy, innovativeness, risk taking, proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness), to which two more dimensions were added: strategic alliances and market orientation ¿ that emerged during the qualitative phase of the study. As a result a generic model was obtained ¿ composed of one variable (proactiveness) which positively impacts the firm performance. Proactiveness was also the key factor that positively impacted the firm performance for the service sector and small businesses. For the commercial sector, the model was composed by three dimensions (innovativeness, risk taking and market orientation). While the industry / construction sectors showed no linear relationship between entrepreneurial orientation and firm performance. Competitive aggressiveness is the key factor that impacts positively on firm performance for big companies, whereas for mediumsized companies it is the market orientation which relates positively to firm performance. Finally, there are no significant differences depending on the sector in which the firm operates or its size.

Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance

Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.

Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance

We argue in this paper that executives can only impact firm outcomes if they have influence over crucial decisions. Based on this idea we develop and test a hypothesis about how CEOs’ power to influence decisions will affect firm performance: since managers’ opinions may differ, firms whose CEOs have more decision-making power should experience more variability in firm performance. Thus performance depends on the interaction between executive characteristics and organizational variables. By focusing on this interaction we are able to use firm-level characteristics to test predictions that are related to unobservable managerial characteristics. Using such firmlevel characteristics of the Executive Office we develop a proxy for the CEO’s power to influence decisions and provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis. Firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROA) is significantly more variable for firms with greater values of our proxy for CEO influence power. The results are robust across various tests designed to detect differences in variability.