Re-framing risk transfer to assess integrative partnership opportunities: the S.A.R. approach and the AIG/BID/CNO regional surety bond facility of 2007

Identificar, compartilhar e gerenciar os riscos de contratar s��o preocupa����es que impedem o estabelicmento e a administra����o das Parcerias P��blicos Particulares (PPP). Porem, gerentes das entidades p��blicas, bancos de formento, construtoras e seguradoras pesquisam e utilizam muitas t��cnicas para enfrentar a avalia����o e gerenciamento dos riscos. A transfer��ncia de risco �� uma indica����o dos chamados benef��cios que s��o inspirados pelos PPP, contudo devido ��s realidades contratuais e conceptuais, a entidade de cede o risco (o partido p��blico) permanece quase sempre como o portador final do risco. Conseq��entemente, o partido p��blico retem um interesse de resist��ncia na ger��ncia total destes riscos cedidos. Esta disserta����o explora alguns defeitos das aproxima����es comuns a conceituar a gest��o de risco no contexto de um PPP. Focalizando os conceitos da interdepend��ncia e da reciprocidade e usando na decis��o para transferir o risco do projeto, esta disserta����o molda a decis��o para transferir o risco nos termos das realidades interdependentes de relacionamentos sistem��ticos, alargam os conceitos t��cnicos do risco e da avalia����o de risco, considerando o uso reflexivo das diferen��as na analise de um estudo de caso. O autor explora estes conceitos em uma an��lise da decis��o de um gerente de risco da empresa de constru����o civil brasileira Construtora Norberto Odebrecht (ODB) para projetar uma facilidade inovadora da liga����o de garantia com Inter-American Development Bank (BID) e uma seguradora, American International Group (AIG), um neg��cio que ganhe o reconhecimento Trade Finance Magazine���s 2007 deal of the year. O autor mostra que por compreender a transfer��ncia de risco nos termos abordados nesta disserta����o, um atore que transfere o risco pode identificar e criar mais oportunidades de estabelecer relacionamentos em longo prazo, atrav��s dos processos que a literatura atual do PPP ainda n��o considere. Os resultados devem fornecer contribui����es para a pesquisas sobre a transfer��ncia do risco do projeto, na coopera����o entre organiza����es e na sele����o do s��cio do projeto do potencial.

Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principIe which we call the implementation principIe. This principIe provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in competi tive contracting situations, firms in choosing their contracting strategies can restrict attention, without loss of generality, to contract catalogs. Second, we establish a competi tive taxation principIe. This principIe, a refinement of the implementation principIe, provides a complete characterization of all implementable nonlinear pricing schedules in terms of product-price catalogs and allows us to reduce any game played over nonlinear pricing schedules to a strategically equivalent game played over product-price catalogs. Third, using the competitive taxation principIe and a recent result due to Reny (1999) on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games, we demonstrate the existence of a N ash equilibrium for the mixed extension of the nonlinear pricing game.

Parceria p��blico-privada na sa��de no Brasil: estudo de caso do Hospital do Sub��rbio de Salvador - Bahia

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo caracterizar o processo de decis��o e implementa����o da Parceria P��blico-Privada da Sa��de na Bahia ��� Hospital do Sub��rbio. A metodologia utilizada foi a pesquisa qualitativa, na modalidade de estudo de caso, direcionada a compreender esse caso, atrav��s da narrativa dos principais stakeholders, de an��lise documental e da bibliografia nacional e internacional sobre o tema, desde textos legais at�� relatos de experi��ncias internacionais. Com isso, pretende-se contribuir para o maior conhecimento e entendimento da PPP como uma nova modalidade institucional para a gest��o da sa��de, documentando um momento ainda inicial desse processo. Os resultados apontam que as principais condicionantes para a contrata����o de PPP, conforme a literatura internacional, foram atendidas: An��lise Value for Money (VFM), elabora����o de edital e contrato, licita����o, forma����o de Sociedade de Prop��sito Espec��fico (SPE), Fundo Garantidor de PPP. Analisando os pontos centrais na Nova Gest��o P��blica ��� gest��o para resultados, constru����o de um modelo organizacional mais flex��vel e accountability ��� foi poss��vel concluir que o projeto do Hospital do Sub��rbio est�� alinhado com os princ��pios da gest��o p��blica contempor��nea. No entanto, �� preciso amadurecer principalmente a accountability e seguir o caso para acompanhar seus resultados. Palavras chave: Gest��o em Sa��de; Gest��o P��blica da Sa��de; Parceria P��blico-Privada; Administra����o P��blica; Pol��tica de Sa��de no Brasil.

Os efeitos sist��micos de uma reestrutura����o produtiva

A presente disserta����o tem como objetivo estudar o caso da empresa Lupatech CSL no que se refere, fundamentalmente, ao seu processo produtivo. Busca-se tamb��m discutir a possibilidade de se promoverem melhorias e mudan��as que possam oferecer sa��das que oportunizem, atrav��s de uma reestrutura����o produtiva, diferencia����es competitivas ao neg��cio da empresa. Nesse sentido, considerando a an��lise sist��mica do ambiente, prop��e-se a ado����o de alguns princ��pios de gest��o do M odelo Toyota de Produ����o, cujo um dos princ��pios preconiza uma rela����o de efetiva parceria com os fornecedores. Para tanto, considerando a permanente necessidade de as empresas buscarem seu equil��brio e distin����o no mercado, procurou-se fazer uma an��lise do pensamento sist��mico e outras fundamenta����es de converg��ncia te��rica com este trabalho. Al��m disso, a fim de melhor entender os pr��s e contras do pensamento toyotista de administra����o, buscou-se tra��ar uma investiga����o desde o antecessor modelo de produ����o em massa taylorista-fordista at�� os ��ltimos acontecimentos que abalaram mundialmente a imagem da montadora Toyota. Acredita-se, ao final, que a an��lise dissertativa do caso da Lupatech poder�� fortalecer e auxiliar a empresa em sua tomada de decis��o, tanto no campo operacional como na defini����o de uma proposta estrat��gica de gest��o.

Enforcing international financial standards in Brazil: limits and possibilities for adoption of IOSCO principles

Foreign capital and institutional investors play a key role in the Brazilian capital and financial markets. Internationally promoted regulatory patterns, especially IOSCO principles, have been increasingly influencing administrative rule making by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) as well as the adoption of transnational rules in Brazil by means of self-regulatory activity. Even though there is a certain level of convergence of market regulatory standards at the transnational level, implementation and enforcement of rules remains essentially domestic. We analyze two case studies regarding the transposition of international standards into the Brazilian legal system, which illustrate this tension between the transnational and domestic dimensions of financial markets regulation. The first case concerns a CVM rule on disclosure of executive compensation and the its interpretation by local courts. The second case refers to the adoption of suitability rules.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Bras��lia and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Bras��lia. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Bras��lia and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ������regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior������ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe���, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Bras��lia is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Bras��lia is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen���s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to ���play by the rules��� in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Arag��o, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.