The Bayesian Foundations of solution concepts of games

We transform a non co-operati ve game into a -Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the pr iors of other players on the choice of other players, the priors over priors and so on.We provide a complete characterization between the extent of knowledge about the rationality of players and their ability to successfulIy eliminate strategies which are not best responses. This paper therefore provides the informational foundations of iteratively unàominated strategies and rationalizable strategic behavior (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984». Moreover, sufficient condi tions are also found for Nash equilibrium behavior. We also provide Aumann's (1985) results on correlated equilibria .

Price discovery using a regime-sensitive cointegration approach

This work proposes a method to examine variations in the cointegration relation between preferred and common stocks in the Brazilian stock market via Markovian regime switches. It aims on contributing for future works in "pairs trading" and, more specifically, to price discovery, given that, conditional on the state, the system is assumed stationary. This implies there exists a (conditional) moving average representation from which measures of "information share" (IS) could be extracted. For identification purposes, the Markov error correction model is estimated within a Bayesian MCMC framework. Inference and capability of detecting regime changes are shown using a Montecarlo experiment. I also highlight the necessity of modeling financial effects of high frequency data for reliable inference.