Finding a maximum skewness portfolio - A general solution to three-moments portfolio choice

Considering the three first moments and allowing short sales, the efficient portfolios set for n risky assets and a riskless one is found, supposing that agents like odd moments and dislike even ones. Analytical formulas for the solution surface are obtained and important geometric properties provide insights on its shape in the three dimensional space defined by the moments. A special duality result is needed and proved. The methodology is general, comprising situations in which, for instance, the investor trades a negative skewness for a higher expected return. Computation of the optimum portfolio weights is feasible in most cases.

Incomplete contracts and the problem of social harm

We construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative extemality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. We analyze several kinds of rights, including damages, injunctions, and rights to exclude (arising from covenants or land ownership). There are cases in which allocating any of these basic rights to the first mover-i.e., first-party rights-is dominated by second-party rights, and cases in which the reverse is true. A Coasian result (efficiency regardless of the rights allocation) only holds under a limited set of conditions. As corollaries of a theorem ranking the basic rights regimes, a number of results emerge contradicting conventional wisdom, including the relative inefficiency of concentrated land ownership and the relevance of the generator's identity. We conclude with a mechanism and a new rights regime that each yield the first best in all cases.