Wood : from the forest to the consumer

Illegal logging causes a number of environmental and social damages in countries where wood is sourced from native forests. Logging in protected areas is an act of irresponsibility that exacerbates the loss of biodiversity. In addition, uncontrolled deforestation and bushfires may aggravate climate change, not to mention the negative effects they impose on local populations, such as the impoverishment of rural communities whose livelihoods depend on forest products. Several studies show that Brazil ranks high in terms of irresponsible use of natural resources, including native wood from the Amazon. Even more worrisome is the fact that the state, despite being responsible for regulating logging activities, is one of the largest consumers of native wood, which subverts the goals of any government committed to sustainable environmental management. By monitoring the development and impacts of illegal timber production and consumption around the world, the Friends of the Amazon Network – an initiative by the Getulio Vargas Foundation with support from the British Government and the European Commission – identified a need to describe and evaluate, in a brief and instructive manner, the different mechanisms the state has available to reverse this predatory practice. One of the aspects discussed in this book is the role of civil servants in major efforts aimed at repressing illegal logging and timber production, as well as identifying products derived from these activities in order to prevent their consumption. This is the purpose of this publication, which uses detailed infographics and a journalistic approach, including interviews and true stories, to outline the complexity of Amazon timber’s chain of custody – from logging, processing and transportation to commercialization in the Brazilian market.

Exclusivity contracts and competition : the case of the Brazilian fuels market

Exclusivity contracts can help stations by providing brand-value that allows them to obtain higher profits, relative to unbranded retailers. However, branded retailers may have a stronger negative effect over its competitors’ profits. It is not clear which one of these two effects dominates (brand-value vs competition effect). Therefore, the impact of exclusivity over the number of participants in the downstream market is not determined. In this paper, I empirically study the effects of exclusivity agreements on competition in the Brazilian gasoline sector. In order to do so, I estimate an entry model of endogenous product-type choices using data of retailers’ locations and contract choices along with data from the 2010 Brazilian Census. I use my estimates to simulate entry decisions under two counterfactual scenarios: i) mandatory exclusivity and ii) no exclusivity.