Pré-ipo capital infusion and underwriting in Brazil: a study on conflicts of interests in the universal banking system

Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas

Underpricing of equity offerings in Brazil

We examine the underpricing of twenty-seven IPOs and twenty-nine SEOs issued in Brazil from January 1999 to March 2006. Determinants on pre-market demand, underwriting activities and information asymmetry were discussed. Common characteristics seem to exist between all issues. 94% have been on premium market corporate level and 93% were realized via bookbuilding. Underpricing for IPOs and SEOs has been recorded at 9.6% and 3.6%, respectively. IPOs are more underpriced when (i) more informed investors receive shares, (ii)better ranked underwriters lead the offer, and (iii) there is positive revision in the final price compared to the initial price range defined before information disclosure. SEOs are more underpriced when (i) shares presents higher appreciation in pre-offer period, and (ii) the proportion of primary offers are larger, supporting adverse selection costs theory.

Informational spillovers in the pre-1914 London sovereign debt market

We document a novel type of international financial contagion whose driving force is shared financial intermediation. In the London peripheral sovereign debt market during pre-1914 period financial intermediation played a major informational role to investors, most likely because of the absence of international monitoring agencies and the substantial agency costs. Using two events of financial distress – the Brazilian Funding Loan of 1898 and the Greek Funding Loan of 1893 – as quasi-natural experiments, we document that, following the crises, the bond prices of countries with no meaningful economic links to the distressed countries, but shared the same financial intermediary, suffered a reduction relative to the rest of the market. This result is true for the mean, median and the whole distribution of bond prices, and robust to an extensive sensitivity analysis. We interpret it as evidence that the identity of the financial intermediary was informative, i.e, investors extracted information about the soundness of a debtor based on the existence of financial relationships. This spillover, informational in essence, arises as the flip-side of the relational lending coin: contagion arises for the same reason why relational finance, in this case, underwriting, helps alleviate informational and incentive problems.

Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.