Essays on the general equilibrium effects of barriers to trade on economic growth, foreign trade and the location of economic activity in Brazil

This work presents a fully operational interstate CGE model implemented for the Brazilian economy that tries to quantify both the role of barriers to trade on economic growth and foreign trade performance and how the distribution of the economic activity may change as the country opens up to foreign trade. Among the distinctive features embedded in the model, modeling of external scale economies, port efficiency and land-maritime transport costs provides an innovative way of dealing explicitly with theoretical issues related to integrated regional systems. In order to illustrate the role played by the quality of infrastructure and geography on the country‟s foreign and interregional trade performance, a set of simulations is presented where barriers to trade are significantly reduced. The relative importance of trade policy, port efficiency and land-maritime transport costs for the country trade relations and regional growth is then detailed and quantified, considering both short run as well as long run scenarios. A final set of simulations shed some light on the effects of liberal trade policies on regional inequality, where the manufacturing sector in the state of São Paulo, taken as the core of industrial activity in the country, is subjected to different levels of external economies of scale. Short-run core-periphery effects are then traced out suggesting the prevalence of agglomeration forces over diversion forces could rather exacerbate regional inequality as import barriers are removed up to a certain level. Further removals can reverse this balance in favor of diversion forces, implying de-concentration of economic activity. In the long run, factor mobility allows a better characterization of the balance between agglomeration and diversion forces among regions. Regional dispersion effects are then clearly traced-out, suggesting horizontal liberal trade policies to benefit both the poorest regions in the country as well as the state of São Paulo. This long run dispersion pattern, on one hand seems to unravel the fragility of simple theoretical results from recent New Economic Geography models, once they get confronted with more complex spatially heterogeneous (real) systems. On the other hand, it seems to capture the literature‟s main insight: the possible role of horizontal liberal trade policies as diversion forces leading to a more homogeneous pattern of interregional economic growth.

Barriers to trade: barriers to growth

We study the cxtent to which differences in international trade policies contribute to the significant cross-country disparities in macroeconomic performance. In particular, wc concentrate on the effect of protectionism on generating differences in leveIs (of income and of measured total factor productivity), in growth rates (of output, productivity and inputs), in volatility and in trends (or development traps). We document that these rclationships are strong in cross country data, integrate a Hecksher-Ohlin mode! of international trade into the standard macroeconomic modcl to derive those rclationships analytically, and to quantify them. Our results suggest that a large fraction of the cros::; country variations can be attributed to trade policy.

5th BRICS Trade and Economic Research Network (TERN) meeting: the impact of mega agreements on BRICS

The BRICS TERN – BRICS Trade and Economics Research Network is a group of independent research institutes established four years ago by five think tanks from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The main objective of the network is to study different aspects of trade and economic relations amongst these five countries. The purpose of the V BRICS TERN Meeting was to analyze and debate the effects of the negotiations of the Mega Agreements, mainly those initiated by the US and the EU, already in negotiation, to each of the BRICS Trade Policies. Both Mega Agreements were examined – the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The studies included the main impacts on trade flows and on the international trade rules system, respecting the perspective of each of the countries concerned. This workshop was an initiative of the Center for Global Trade and Investments (CGTI), a think-tank on International Trade held by FGV Sao Paulo School of Economics. Its main objective is the research on trade regulation, preferential trade agreements, trade and currency, trade and global value chains, through legal analysis and economic modelling. One of its main researches, now, is on the potential economic and legal impacts of the Mega Agreements on Brazil and WTO rules. This meeting was organized in March14, 2014, in Rio de Janeiro, in a perfect timing for introducing such issues in the international agenda, in advance of the 6th BRICS Summit scheduled to be held in Brazil in July 2014.

A trajetória do ambiente jurídico-institucional do setor de software no Brasil e na Índia: identidades, diferenças e repercussões

Há mais de 30 anos o Brasil tem desenvolvido políticas específicas para o setor de informática, desde a Política Nacional de Informática da década de 70, passando pelo Período de Reserva de Mercado dos anos 80 e, nos dias de hoje, em que as Tecnologias de Informação e Comunicação (TIC) são tidas como uma das áreas prioritárias na Política Industrial. Dentre as metas atuais, destaca-se o foco na ampliação do volume de exportações de software e serviços. Contudo, apesar dessas pretensões, o país não tem tido destaque internacional expressivo para o setor. Por outro lado, a Índia, também considerada como um país emergente, figurando na lista dos BRIC, foi responsável pela exportação de cerca de US$47 bilhões em software e serviços de Tecnologia da Informação (TI) em 2009, se destacando como um país protagonista no mercado internacional do setor. A implementação de uma indústria tecnicamente sofisticada como a do software, que exige um ambiente propício à inovação, em um país em desenvolvimento como a Índia chama a atenção. De certo existiram arranjos jurídico-institucionais que foram utilizados naquele país. Quais? Em que medida tais arranjos ajudaram no desenvolvimento indiano do setor? E no Brasil? Este trabalho parte da hipótese de que o ambiente jurídico-institucional desses países definiu fluxos de conhecimento distintos, influenciando o tipo de desenvolvimento do setor de software de cada um. Averiguar como, entre outros fatores sócio-econômicos, esses arranjos jurídico-institucionais influenciaram na conformação diversa de fluxos de conhecimento é o objetivo específico desta pesquisa. Entende-se aqui como ambiente jurídico-institucional todas as regulamentações que estabelecem instituições, diretrizes e condições comuns para determinado tema. Partindo do pressuposto de que o setor de software desenvolve atividades intensivas em conhecimento, para cada país em questão, serão analisados apenas arranjos jurídico-institucionais que tiveram, ou têm, poder de delimitar o fluxo de conhecimento referente ao setor, sejam eles provenientes de políticas comerciais (de exportação e importação, ou de propriedade intelectual) ou de políticas de investimento para inovação. A questão fundamental ultrapassa o debate se o Estado deve ou não intervir, para focar-se na análise sobre os diferentes tipos de envolvimento observados e quais os seus efeitos. Para tal, além de revisão bibliográfica, foi feita uma pesquisa de campo na Índia (Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore) e no Brasil (São Paulo, Brasília e Rio de Janeiro), onde foram conduzidas entrevistas com empresas e associações de software, gestores públicos e acadêmicos que estudam o setor.

Multiple equilibria and protectionism

In a nonnative approach, I analyze trade policies when the industrial sector genentes positive extemalities in production, and there are adjustments costs to changing production from one sector to the other. Protectionist trade policy can make workers intemalize the benetits from moving into the industrial sector, but it is a second best policy as it also causes consumption distortions. I show that if the govemment is able to fully commit to its tariff schedule for the future, the welfare maximizing policy is to maintain a positive tariff forever, even after all adjustment has already taken place . However, if the govemment is not able to commit at all, the only time consistent policy is zero tariff at any point in time. The time inconsistency of the full commitment policy is derived from the fact that in the model only production needs interference, and the production distortion is lagged one period with respect to the tariff wbile the consumption distortion is simultaneous to the tariff. In the intermediary case, i.e., when the government can commit for a limited period of time, the time consistent optimal tariff will be positive but lower than the "full commitment" tariff. This result indicates that some institutions that have always been considered pure sources of inefficiency, such as protectionist lobbying, may in fact be welfare improving in some cases!

Uma avaliação da economia convencional ou abandonando-se o trade off eficiência equidade

O objetivo desta proposta é discutir os limites da análise walrasiana convencional e apresentar uma alternativa a ela. Os limites daquela análise são o de supor custos zero de transação e normas e preferências dos agentes dados exogenamente. A visão alternativa considera que muitas e importantes transações no capitalismo, chamados relações contestadas, demandam custos de controle e monitoramento, e podem gerar endogenamente diferentes formas de comportamentos. Estas condições podem dar lugar a fundamentos alternativos para as análises micro e macroeconômicos bem como ver implicações importantes para as políticas de estabilização.

On the growth effects of barriers to trade

We study the macroeconomic effects of international trade policy by integrating a Hecksher-Ohlin trade model into an optimal-growth framework. The model predicts that an open economy will have higher factor productivity and faster growth. Also, under protectionist policies there may be “development traps,” or additional steady states with low income. In the last case, higher tariffs imply lower incomes, so that the large cross-country differences in barriers to trade may explain part of the huge dispersion of per capita income observed across countries. The model simulation shows that the link between trade and macroeconomic performance may be quantitatively important.

Rent-sharing in Brazil: using trade liberalization as a natural experiment

This paper examines the extent of rent-sharing in Brazil, between 1988 and 1995, combining two different data sets: annual industrial surveys (pIA) and annual household surveys (PNADs). The aim is to use the trade liberalization policies that took place in Brazil in the early 1990s as a "natural experiment" to examine the impact ofproduct market rents on wages. We first estimate inter-industry wage differentials in Brazil, using the household surveys, afier controlling for various observable workers' characteristics. In a reduced form fixed effects equation, these controlled inter-industry differentials are seen to depend on the industries' rate of effective tariff. We also find that LSDV estimates of the effect of value-added per worker (computed using the industrial surveys) on the wage differentials are positive, but somewhat small. However, we find that instrumenting the valued-added with the effective tariffs more than doubles the estimated rent-sharing coefficient. The paper concludes that rent-sharing is prevalent in the Brazilian manufacturing sector, and this mechanism transferred part of the productivity gains due to trade liberalization to manufacturing workers in the form ofhigher (controlled) wage premium.

Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

Citizens and the future of multilateralism in a polycentric world at 2030: the perspectives of emerging countries for the trading system: the impasse of WTO, the trends of mega agreements, the logic of value chains and the advent of consumers concerns on international trade

A new paradigm is modeling the World: evolutionary innovations in all fronts, new information technologies, huge mobility of capital, use of risky financial tools, globalization of production, new emerging powers and the impact of consumer concerns on governmental policies. These phenomena are shaping the World and forcing the advent of a new World Order in the Multilateral Monetary, Financial, and Trading System. The effects of this new paradigm are also transforming global governance. The political and economic orders established after the World War and centered on the multilateral model of UN, IMF, World Bank, and the GATT, leaded by the developed countries, are facing significant challenges. The rise of China and emerging countries shifted the old model to a polycentric World, where the governance of these organizations are threatened by emerging countries demanding a bigger participation in the role and decision boards of these international bodies. As a consequence, multilateralism is being confronted by polycentrism. Negotiations for a more representative voting process and the pressure for new rules to cope with the new demands are paralyzing important decisions. This scenario is affecting seriously not only the Monetary and Financial Systems but also the Multilateral Trading System. International trade is facing some significant challenges: a serious deadlock to conclude the last round of the multilateral negotiation at the WTO, the fragmentation of trade rules by the multiplication of preferential and mega agreements, the arrival of a new model of global production and trade leaded by global value chains that is threatening the old trade order, and the imposition of new sets of regulations by private bodies commanded by transnationals to support global value chains and non-governmental organizations to reflect the concerns of consumers in the North based on their precautionary attitude about sustainability of products made in the World. The lack of any multilateral order in this new regulation is creating a big cacophony of rules and developing a new regulatory war of the Global North against the Global South. The objective of this paper is to explore how these challenges are affecting the Tradinge System and how it can evolve to manage these new trends.