23 resultados para trade liberalization
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
This paper applies an endogenous lobby formation model to explain the extent of trade protection granted to Brazilian manufacturing industries during the 1988- 1994 trade liberalization episode. Using a panel data set covering this period, we find that even in an environment in which a major regime shift has been introduced, more concentrated sectors have been able to obtain policy advantages, that lead to a reduction in international competition. The importance of industry structure appears to be substantial: In our baseline specification, an increase in concentration by 20% leads to an increase in protection by 5%-7%.
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Rio de Janeiro
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Although the subject of a large number of studies, the debate on the links between trade reform and productivity growth is still unresolved and most studies at the micro level have not been able to establish a relationship between the two phenomena. Brazil provides a natural experiment to study this issue that is seldom available: it was one of the closest economies in the world until 1988, when trade reform was launched, and intra-industry data are available on an annual basis before, during and after liberalization. Using a panel of industry sectors this paper tests and measures the impact of trade reform on productivity growth. Results confirm the association between the former and the latter and show that the magnitude of the impact of tariff reduction on the growth rates of TFP and output per worker was substantial. Our data reveal large and widespread productivity improvement, so that the estimations in this paper are an indication that liberalization had an important effect on industrial performance in the country. Cross-sectional differences in protection are also investigated.
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Rio de Janeiro
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O objetivo deste trabalho é entender mais sobre o papel da liberalização sobre a desigualdade salarial, mais precisamente, sobre a desigualdade residual dos salários. Usando a abertura comercial brasileira, a extensa redução tarifária que ocorreu entre 1987 e 1995, é investigado empiricamente se os diferentes níveis de exposição ao comércio entre os estados contribuíram para os diferentes movimentos da desigualdade. Os resultados indicam que estados mais expostos à liberalização comercial experimentaram um aumento relativo da desigualdade residual dos salários ou, de forma equivalente, uma menor redução. Estes resultados enriquecem a discussão dos efeitos da abertura comercial sobre a desigualdade.
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This paper examines the extent of rent-sharing in Brazil, between 1988 and 1995, combining two different data sets: annual industrial surveys (pIA) and annual household surveys (PNADs). The aim is to use the trade liberalization policies that took place in Brazil in the early 1990s as a "natural experiment" to examine the impact ofproduct market rents on wages. We first estimate inter-industry wage differentials in Brazil, using the household surveys, afier controlling for various observable workers' characteristics. In a reduced form fixed effects equation, these controlled inter-industry differentials are seen to depend on the industries' rate of effective tariff. We also find that LSDV estimates of the effect of value-added per worker (computed using the industrial surveys) on the wage differentials are positive, but somewhat small. However, we find that instrumenting the valued-added with the effective tariffs more than doubles the estimated rent-sharing coefficient. The paper concludes that rent-sharing is prevalent in the Brazilian manufacturing sector, and this mechanism transferred part of the productivity gains due to trade liberalization to manufacturing workers in the form ofhigher (controlled) wage premium.
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From 1988 to 1995, when trade liberalization was implemented in Brazil, relative earnings of skilled workers decreased. In this paper, we investigate the role of trade liberalization in explaining these relative earnings movements, by checking all the steps predicted by the HeckscherOhlin- style trade transmission mechanism. We find that: i) employment shifted from skilled to unskilled intensive sectors, and each Sector increased its relative share of skilled labor; ii) relative prices fell in skill intensive sectors; iii) tariff changes across sectors were not related to skill intensities, but the pass-through from tariffs to prices was stronger in skill intensive sectors; iv) the decline in skilled eamings differentials mandated by the price variation predicted by trade is very elose to the observed one. The results are compatible with trade liberalization, accounting for the observed rei ative eamings changes in Brazil.
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Wage inequality has increased substantially in Argentina during the nineties. At the same time during this decade Argentina has gone through a rapid and deep process of trade liberalization. In this paper we try to associate both phenomena. In particular, we attempt to answer the following question: Did trade liberalization play any role in shaping the argentine wage structure during the period studied? Specifically, we test whether those sectors where import penetration deepened are also the sectors where, ceteris paribus, a higher increase in wage inequality has taken place. We fmd evidence that supports this hypothesis.
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This paper presents evidence on the key role of infrastructure in the Andean Community trade patterns. Three distinct but related gravity models of bilateral trade are used. The first model aims at identifying the importance of the Preferential Trade Agreement and adjacency on intra-regional trade, while also checking the traditional roles of economic size and distance. The second and third models also assess the evolution of the Trade Agreement and the importance of sharing a common border, but their main goal is to analyze the relevance of including infrastructure in the augmented gravity equation, testing the theoretical assumption that infrastructure endowments, by reducing trade and transport costs, reduce “distance” between bilateral partners. Indeed, if one accepts distance as a proxy for transportation costs, infrastructure development and improvement drastically modify it. Trade liberalization eliminates most of the distortions that a protectionist tariff system imposes on international business; hence transportation costs represent nowadays a considerably larger barrier to trade than in past decades. As new trade pacts are being negotiated in the Americas, borders and old agreements will lose significance; trade among countries will be nearly without restrictions, and bilateral flows will be defined in terms of costs and competitiveness. Competitiveness, however, will only be achieved by an improvement in infrastructure services at all points in the production-distribution chain.
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This paper investigates the impact of monopoly power on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator, concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that industries with higher monopoly power are more protected than competitive sectors. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in sectors with higher monopoly power. We thus have evidence favoring recent growth literature which stresses that interest groups with control over creasing productivity. The results here confirm the first part of this argument and show that organized groups in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce competition.
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This article investigates the impact of trade protection on the evolution of labor productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) of the Brazilian manufacturing sector. An annual panel-dataset of 16 industries for the years 1985 through 1997, a period that includes a major trade liberalization, was used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator (nominal tari®s and e®ective protection rate were used), control variables and time period and suggest that barriers to trade negatively a®ects productivity growth at industry level: those sectors with lower barriers experienced higher growth. We were also able to link the observed increase of industry productivity growth after 1991 to the widespread reduction on exective protection experienced in the country in the nineties.
Resumo:
This paper investigates the impact of industry concentration on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator. concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that the higher the concentration of a given industry the higher its leveI of trade protection. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in more concentrated sectors. Assuming that concentration is ;1 gCl()d proX\' for mOllopoh' po\\'er as it reduces the free-rider problem in coordinating a lobby the results in this paper indicates that interest groups with control over specific markets in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce (international) competition.
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There is substantially more trade within national borders than across borders. An important explanation for this fact is the weak enforcement of international contracts. We develop a model in which agents build reputations to overcome this institutional failure. The model describes the interplay between institutional quality, reputations and the dynamics of international trade. It also rationalizes several empirical regularities. We find that history matters for trade volumes, but that its effects vary with the institutional setting of the country. The same is true for the efticacy of trade liberalization programs. Moreover, while stricter enforcement of contracts enhances trade in the short run, it makes it harder for individual traders to develop good reputations. We show that this indirect negative effect may produce an "institutional trap": for sufliciently low initial levels of contract enforcement, a small tightening in enforcement reduces future trade fiows. We find also that search frictions aggravate the problems created by weak enforceability of contracts, even if they impose no direct cost on agents. The model allows extensions in several directions. We outline two of them, indicating how one could study transnational networks and the effects of firm heterogeneity within our structure.