Inflation and debt indexation : the equivalence of two alternative schemes for the case of periodic payments

The presence of inflation has induced the financial institutions to implement procedures devised to protect the real values of theirs loans. Two of such procedurcs, the floaaing rale scheme and the monetary correction mechanism, tend to lead to very different streams of payments. However, whenever the floating rate scheme follows the rule of Strict adhercnce to lhe Fisher equation, lhe two procedures are financially equivalent.

On paternalistic leadership fit: exploring cross-cultural endorsement, leader-follower fit, and the boundary role of organizational culture

Although cross-cultural leadership research has thrived in international business literature, little attention has been devoted to understanding the effectiveness of non-western theories beyond their original contexts. The purpose of this study is to examine the cross-cultural endorsement of paternalistic leadership, an emerging non-western leadership theory, using data from GLOBE project. Using multigroup confirmatory factor analyses we found measurement equivalence of a scale derived from GLOBE’s data, which enabled us to compare the endorsement of paternalistic leadership dimensions across 10 cultural clusters and 55 societies. Our study revealed that there are significant differences in the importance societies give to each dimension, suggesting that paternalism as leadership style is not universally nor homogeneously endorsed. Furthermore, results suggest that different patterns of endorsement of each of these dimensions give rise to idiosyncratic shades of paternalistic leadership across societies. Implications for theory and future research on international business are discussed.

Temporal aggregation and bandwidth selection in estimating long memory

This paper reinterprets results of Ohanissian et al (2003) to show the asymptotic equivalence of temporally aggregating series and using less bandwidth in estimating long memory by Geweke and Porter-Hudak’s (1983) estimator, provided that the same number of periodogram ordinates is used in both cases. This equivalence is in the sense that their joint distribution is asymptotically normal with common mean and variance and unity correlation. Furthermore, I prove that the same applies to the estimator of Robinson (1995). Monte Carlo simulations show that this asymptotic equivalence is a good approximation in finite samples. Moreover, a real example with the daily US Dollar/French Franc exchange rate series is provided.

Equilibria in security markets with a continuum of agents

We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium for exchange economies with a measure space of agents and for which the commodity space is ` p, 1 < p < +∞. A vector x = (xn) in ` p may be interpreted as a security which promises to deliver xn units of numeraire at state (or date) n. Under assumptions imposing uniform bounds on marginal rates of substitution, positive results on core-Walras equivalence were established in Rustichini–Yannelis [21] and Podczeck [20]. In this paper we prove that under similar assumptions on marginal rates of substitution, the set of competitive equilibria (and thus the core) is non-empty.

Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and non-monotonic auctions

We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilibrium without ties in interdependent values auctions, with multidimensional independent types and no monotonic assumptions. In this case, non-monotonic equilibria might happen. When the necessary and sufficient conditions are not satisfied, there are ties with positive probability. In such case, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy equilibrium with an all-pay auction tie-breaking rule. As a direct implication of these results, we obtain a generalization of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. From the robustness of equilibrium existence for all-pay auctions in multidimensional setting, an interpretation of our results can give a new justification to the use of tournaments in practice.

To cointegrate or not to cointegrate? That's a topological question

We show that for any multivariate I( 1) process which does not cointegrate, it is possible to find another process sufficient1y elose to it where cointegration applies. Closeness is defined in terms of the spectral density matrices of the respective processes in differences, i.e., a metric which takes into account only the information in the (centred) second moments. The result may explain why in practice cointegration is found a bit "too often". Examples developing this point and simulations giving an insight on the metric used are also presented.

Does liquidity constraints matter for Ricardian equivalence?

The paper analysis a general equilibrium model with two periods, several households and a government that has to finance some expenditures in the first period. Households may have some private information either about their type (adverse selection) or about some action levei chosen in the first period that affects the probability of certain states of nature in the second period (moral hazard). Trade of financiai assets are intermediated by a finite collection of banks. Banks objective functions are determined in equilibrium by shareholders. Due to private information it may be optimal for the banks to introduce constraints in the set of available portfolios for each household as wellas household specific asset prices. In particular, households may face distinct interest rates for holding the risk-free asset. The government finances its expenditures either by taxing households in the first period or by issuing bonds in the first period and taxing households in the second period. Taxes may be state-dependent. Suppose government policies are neutml: i) government policies do not affect the distribution of wealth across households; and ii) if the government decides to tax a household in the second period there is a portfolio available for the banks that generates the Mme payoff in each state of nature as the household taxes. Tben, Ricardian equivalence holds if and only if an appropriate boundary condition is satisfied. Moreover, at every free-entry equilibrium the boundary condition is satisfied and thus Ricardian equivalence holds. These results do not require any particular assumption on the banks' objective function. In particular, we do not assume banks to be risk neutral.

Affiliation, equilibrium existence and the revenue ranking of auctions

We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by assuming affiliation. We show that affiliation is a restrictive assumption in three senses: topological, measure-theoretic and statistical (affiliation is a very restrictive characterization of positive dependence). We also show that affiliation’s main implications do not generalize for alternative definitions of positive dependence. From this, we propose new approaches to the problems of pure strategy equilibrium existence in first-price auctions (PSEE) and the characterization of the revenue ranking of auctions. For equilibrium existence, we slightly restrict the set of distributions considered, without loss of economic generality, and offer a complete characterization of PSEE. For revenue ranking, we obtain a characterization of the expected revenue differences between second and first price auctions with general dependence of types.

The dimensions of trust in interorganizational relationships: how buyer and supplier perspectives differ?

Apesar da pesquisa em confiança interorganizacional e sua relação com performance ter sido conduzida sob as perspectivas da Teoria de Custos de Transação, Teoria das Trocas Sociais e Canais de Marketing, três importantes lacunas na literatura requerem investigação. Primeiro, está em andamento um debate conceitual sobre a multi-dimensionalidade da confiança, e como ela deve ser operacionalizada e medida, e que se divide em três correntes de pensamento - um construto multidimensional definido por dimensões não dominantes, um construto baseado em duas dimensões dominantes (afetiva e calculativa), ou um construto unidimensional. Segundo, existe ambiguidade em como as dimensões da confiança são definidas, levando a artefatos de equivalência nas escalas e resultados contraditórios. Terceiro, as diferentes percepções que compradores e fornecedores podem ter em cada dimensão da confiança e seu impacto na performance logística ainda não estão claros. Esta pesquisa empírica examina a confiança nas relações entre compradores e fornecedores no setor de logística no Brasil, através de duas amostras e estudos independentes: um examina a percepção dos compradores e o outro examina a dos fornecedores. Em seguida, os dois estudos são comparados para determinar as diferentes perspectivas da confiança e as implicações na performance logística. A análise multivariada mostrou que a confiança parece estar presente nas relações interorganizacionais, e é a percepção do comprador que possui maior relação com a performance logística. Ao mesmo tempo, compradores percebem fornecedores de forma mais negativa nas dimensões mensuráveis (competência e performance), enquanto não foram encontradas diferenças nos aspectos sociais (honestidade e benevolência), o que pode ser resultado do ambiente e cultura pesquisados. As análises mostraram que, apesar da confiança poder ser definida como um construto multidimensional, ela deve ser operacionalizada como um construto unidimensional direcionado pela competência e credibilidade. Este estudo contribui para a prática sugerindo formas de aumentar a confiança interorganizacional para aumento da performance.

The spenders-hoarders theory of capital accumulations, wealth distribution and fiscal policy

This paper proposes a simple OLG model which is consistent with the essential facts about consumer behavior, capital accumulation and wealth distribution, and yields some new and surprising conclusions about fiscal policy. By considering a society in which individuais are distinguished according to two characteristics, altruism and wealth preference, we show that those who in the long run hold the bulk of private capital are not so rnuch motivated by dynastic altruism as by preference for wealth. Two types of social segmentation can result with different wcalth distribution. To a large extcnt our results seem to fit reality better than those obtained with standard optimal growth models in which dynastic altruism ( or r ate o f impatience) is the only source of heterogeneity: overaccumulation can appear, public debt and unfunded pensions are not neutra!, estate taxation can improve the welfare of the top wealthy.