Debt composition and exchange rate balance sheet effects in Brazil: A firm level analysis

In this paper we study the interaction between macroeconomic environment and firms’ balance sheet effects in Brazil during the 1990’s. We start by assessing the influence of macroeconomic conditions on firms’ debt composition in Brazil. We found that larger firms tend to change debt currency composition more in response to a change in the exchange rate risk than small firms. We then proceed to investigate if and how exchange rate balance sheet effects affected the firms’ investment decisions. We test directly the exchange rate balance sheet effect on investment. Contrary to earlier findings (Bleakley and Cowan, 2002), we found that firms more indebted in foreign currency tend to invest less when there is an exchange rate devaluation. We tried different controls for the competitiveness effect. First, we control directly for the effect of the exchange rate on exports and imported inputs. We then pursue an alternative investigation strategy, inspired by the credit channel literature. According to this perspective, Tobin’s q can provide an adequate control for the competitiveness effect on investment. Our results provide supporting evidence for imperfect capital markets, and for a negative exchange rate balance sheet effect in Brazil. The results concerning the exchange rate balance sheet effect on investment are statistically significant and robust across the different specifications. We tested the results across different periods, classified according to the macroeconomic environment. Our findings suggest that the negative exchange rate balance sheet effect we found in the whole sample is due to the floating exchange rate period. We also found that exchange rate devaluations have important negative impact on both cash flows and sales of indebted firms. Furthermore, the impact of exchange rate variations is asymmetric, and the significant effect detected when no asymmetry is imposed is engendered by exchange rate devaluations.

Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance

We argue in this paper that executives can only impact firm outcomes if they have influence over crucial decisions. Based on this idea we develop and test a hypothesis about how CEOs’ power to influence decisions will affect firm performance: since managers’ opinions may differ, firms whose CEOs have more decision-making power should experience more variability in firm performance. Thus performance depends on the interaction between executive characteristics and organizational variables. By focusing on this interaction we are able to use firm-level characteristics to test predictions that are related to unobservable managerial characteristics. Using such firmlevel characteristics of the Executive Office we develop a proxy for the CEO’s power to influence decisions and provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis. Firm performance (measured by Tobin’s Q, stock returns and ROA) is significantly more variable for firms with greater values of our proxy for CEO influence power. The results are robust across various tests designed to detect differences in variability.

Responsabilidade e vinculação dos servidores das Entidades Fiscalizadoras Superiores: uma analise comparativa baseada na Metodologia Q

Esta pesquisa busca compreender perante quem se responsabilizam e com quem se vinculam os altos dirigentes das Entidades Fiscalizadoras Superiores, EFS, no Brasil e no Chile. A pesquisa focou nas unidades voltadas para o controle dos serviços públicos regulados. Adaptou-se o referencial teórico de De Graaf sobre as lealdades dos servidores públicos e adotou-se a pesquisa comparativa, fazendo uso da Metodologia Q para cotejar as percepções sobre lealdades e vinculação dos servidores públicos dessas entidades e suas influencias no processo de tomada de decisão. Os resultados revelam diferenças nas percepções dominantes nas duas EFS, mas também similaridades, principalmente relacionadas com a dominância do ideário weberiano da função publica.