The effects of uncertainty about the timing of deals on consumer behavior

I examine the effects of uncertainty about the timing of de aIs (i.e. temporary price cuts or sales) on consumer behavior in a dynamic inventory model of consumer choice. I derive implications for purchase behavior and test them empirically, using two years of scanner data for soft drinks. I fmd that loyal consumers' decisions, both about the allocation of their purchases over time and the quantity to be purchased in a particular deal, are affected by the uncertainty about the timing of the deal for the product. Loyal consumers buy a higher fraction of their overall purchases during de ais as the uncertainty decreases. This effect increases with an increase in the product' s share of a given consumer' s purchase in the same category or if the consumer stockpiles (i.e., is a shopper). During a particular deal, loyal shoppers increase the quantity they purchase the more time that has passed since the previous de aI, and the higher the uncertainty about the deals' timing. For the non-Ioyal consumers these effects are not significant. These results hold for products that are frequently purchased, like soft-drinks and yogurt, but do not hold for less frequentIy purchased products, such as laundry detergents. The fmdings suggest that manufacturers and retailers should incorporate the effects of deals' timing on consumers' purchase' decisions when deriving optimal pricing strategies.

Demand expectations and the timing of stimulus policies

This paper proposes a simple macroeconomic model with staggered investment decisions. The model captures the dynamic coordination problem arising from demand externalities and fixed costs of investment. In times of low economic activity, a firm faces low demand and hence has less incentives for investing, which reinforces firms’ expectations of low demand. In the unique equilibrium of the model, demand expectations are pinned down by fundamentals and history. Owing to the beliefs that arise in equilibrium, there is no special reason for stimulus at times of low economic activity.

The effect of options on coordination

This paper studies how constraints on the timing of actions affect equilibrium in intertemporal coordination problems. The model exhibits a unique symmetric equilibrium in cut-o¤ strategies. The risk-dominant action of the underlying one-shot game is selected when the option to delay effort is commensurate with the option to wait longer for others' actions. The possibility of waiting longer for the actions of others enhances coordination, but the option of delaying one s actions can induce severe coordination failures: if agents are very patient, they might get arbitrarily low expected payoffs even in cases where coordination would yield arbitrarily large returns.

Growing research where economies grow: essays on strategy and international expansion of companies from emerging countries

In recent years, emerging countries have assumed an increasingly prominent position in the world economy, as growth has picked up in these countries and slowed in developed economies. Two related phenomena, among others, can be associated with this growth: emerging countries were less affected by the 2008-2009 global economic recession; and they increased their participation in foreign direct investment, both inflows and outflows. This doctoral dissertation contributes to research on firms from emerging countries through four independent papers. The first group of two papers examines firm strategy in recessionary moments and uses Brazil, one of the largest emerging countries, as setting for the investigation. Data were collected through a survey on Brazilian firms referring to the 2008-2009 global recession, and 17 hypotheses were tested using structural equation modeling based on partial least squares. Paper 1 offered an integrative model linking RBV to literatures on entrepreneurship, improvisation, and flexibility to indicate the characteristics and capabilities that allow a firm to have superior performance in recessions. We found that firms that pre-recession have a propensity to recognize opportunities and improvisation capabilities for fast and creative actions have superior performance in recessions. We also found that entrepreneurial orientation and flexibility have indirect effects. Paper 2 built on business cycle literature to study which strategies - pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical – enable superior performance in recessions. We found that while most firms pro-cyclically reduce costs and investments during recessions, a counter-cyclical strategy of investing in opportunities created by changes in the environment enables superior performance. Most successful are firms with a propensity to recognize opportunities, entrepreneurial orientation to invest, and flexibility to efficiently implement these investments. The second group of two papers investigated international expansion of multinational enterprises, particularly the use of distance for their location decisions. Paper 3 proposed a conceptual framework to examine circumstances under which distance is less important for international location decisions, taking the new perspective of economic institutional distance as theoretical foundation. The framework indicated that the general preference for low-distance countries is lower: (1) when the company is state owned, rather than private owned; (2) when its internationalization motives are asset, resource, or efficiency seeking, as opposed to market seeking; and (3) when internationalization occurred after globalization and the advent of new technologies. Paper 4 compared five concurrent perspectives of distance and indicated their suitability to the study of various issues based on industry, ownership, and type, motive, and timing of internationalization. The paper also proposed that distance represents the disadvantages of host countries for international location decisions; as such, it should be used in conjunction with factors that represent host country attractiveness, or advantages as international locations. In conjunction, papers 3 and 4 provided additional, alternative explanations for the mixed empirical results of current research on distance. Moreover, the studies shed light into the discussion of differences between multinational enterprises from emerging countries versus those from advanced countries.

The role of consumer's risk aversion on price rigidity

This paper aims at contributing to the research agenda on the sources of price stickiness, showing that the adoption of nominal price rigidity may be an optimal firms' reaction to the consumers' behavior, even if firms have no adjustment costs. With regular broadly accepted assumptions on economic agents behavior, we show that firms' competition can lead to the adoption of sticky prices as an (sub-game perfect) equilibrium strategy. We introduce the concept of a consumption centers model economy in which there are several complete markets. Moreover, we weaken some traditional assumptions used in standard monetary policy models, by assuming that households have imperfect information about the ineflicient time-varying cost shocks faced by the firms, e.g. the ones regarding to inefficient equilibrium output leveIs under fiexible prices. Moreover, the timing of events are assumed in such a way that, at every period, consumers have access to the actual prices prevailing in the market only after choosing a particular consumption center. Since such choices under uncertainty may decrease the expected utilities of risk averse consumers, competitive firms adopt some degree of price stickiness in order to minimize the price uncertainty and fi attract more customers fi.'

Rent dissipation, political viability and the strategic adoption of free trade agreements

This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the “rent dissipation” that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA reduces the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments’ willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are “substantially” welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces welfare. Rent dissipation also implies that the prospects of political turnover may create strategic reasons for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trade bloc simply to “tie the hands” of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, it may want to commit to less distortionary policies in order to reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In nascent/unstable democracies, the incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of a dictatorial takeover and to “consolidate” democracy – a finding that is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements.

Assessing the performance of private equity investments

This study presents an alternative investment projection model to estimate the future values of Private Equity (PE) investments. The performance of PE investments is assessed by analyzing the risk-return relationship relative to simulated Public Market (PM) investments that mimic the cash flow patterns of PE investments. The model allows for a quantified analysis of the underlying inputs that outline the PE performance and risks, and accounts for survivorship bias. These inputs include the fund manager’s decisions regarding the selection, leverage, size, duration and timing of investment and divestments.