Managerial turnover and leverage under a takeover threat

How do shareholders perceive managers who lever up under a takeover threat? Increasing leverage conveys good news if it reflects management's ability to enhance value. It conveys bad news, though, if inefficient managers are more pressured to lever up. This paper demonstrates that negative (positive) updating prevails when takeover costs are small (large). Managers who leve r up to end a takeover threat thus may commit to an increase in the firm's value and yet increase their chances of being replaced by their shareholders. The model predicts that intraindustry leverage is less dispersed when takeover costs are low.

Inferring conduct under the threat of entry : the case of Brazilian cement industry

This paper demonstrates that when an industry faces potential entry and this threat of entry constrains pre-entry prices, cost and conduct are not identified from the comparative statics of equilibrium. In such a setting, the identifying assumption behind the well-established technique of relying on exogenous demand perturbations to empirically distinguish between alternative hypotheses of conduct is shown to fail. The Brazilian cement industry, where the threat of imports restrains market outcomes, provides an empirical illustration. In particular, pricecost margins estimated using this established technique are considerably biased downward, underestimating the degree of market power. A test of conduct is proposed, adapted to this constrained setting, which suggests that outcomes in the industry are collusive and characterised by market division.

The price of threat: the role of identity-safe marketplaces in predicting intergroup price sensitivity

In field experiments with subjects living either inside or outside Brazilian slums (n=955), we show that consumers living in slums are less price sensitive, in opposition with recent price sensitivity research. Comparing slum and non-slum dwellers, we found that negatively stereotyped consumers (e.g. slum dwellers) were more likely to pay higher amounts for friendlier customer service when facing social identity threats (SITs) in marketplaces such as banks. The mechanism which makes them less price sensitive is related to the perception of how other people evaluate their social groups, and we argue that they pay more because they are seeking identity-safe commercial relationships. This work, besides extending the literature in SITs, presents a perspective for the exchange between economics and psychology on price sensitivity, showing that consumers living in slums are willing to pay more to avoid possibly social identity threating experiences.