REPETRO - Regime Aduaneiro Especial de Importação e Exportação de Bens Destinados à Pesquisa e Lavra de Petróleo e Gás: análise dos entraves e propostas de soluções

REPETRO, the special tax regime for importing and exporting goods for the exploration and drilling of oil and gas, aims at bringing foreign assets to Brazil enjoying a suspension or even an exemption of taxes, so that Brazilian industry may profit from about 8 billion American dollars in investments. The creation of normative devices as well as the management of the REPETRO model are under the exclusive responsibility of the Brazilian Internal Revenue Services. REPETRO was created in 1999 and is composed of the following customs treatments: importation of goods with suspension of taxes by use of the drawback special regime, suspension mode for national exporting industry; exportation with fictitious exit for the national industry; temporary admission of goods or assets used in oil exploration and production, attending to the needs of both the national and foreign market. Considering the inability of the Brazilian government in restructuring its foreign trade model so that a strong investment in technology could provide for the sector¿s needs, we must ask how we can change REPETRO to help the various companies in the oil business? The issue is very important for one of our main economic activities, though not enough studied. The energy sector has a strategic importance for the development and the economic independence of any country. The winds of globalization lead Brazil to open its economy in the last decade and the national policy for exploration and drilling (E&D) was altered. The government created a new agency dedicated to market control and energy policies, the National Agency for Oil and Biofuels (ANP). With the opening of the market, Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. - Petrobras, the Brazilian giant, lost the monopoly of the oil business. The P-50 Platform, with a capacity for 180,000 barrels per day, was imported based on REPETRO. When it began operating on April 21st, 2006, Brazil achieved self-sufficiency in oil production. The present work intends to estimate the main variables affecting the importation and exportation of goods and assets for E&D, showing how REPETRO works. We also intend to look at the results yielded by the REPETRO model for the development of the production of oil and gas in Brazil, as well as show proposals for its modernization. It has been established that even though since its implementation the REPETRO model has brought fiscal advantages through the reduction of tax costs relating to foreign commerce operations and the incentive of investments in the E&D area with the increase in the national oil production there remain the following limitations: lack of preparation and of knowledge of the model; lack of adjustement of the model to the reality of actitity of E&D of oil and gas; taxes over the pre-operational stage or investment in oil production stage; non-allowance of full access by the national industry to the supply of goods and products relating to the industrialization of goods allowed by REPETRO; other fiscal and administrative difficulties. We conclude that the REPETRO model is important for the development of the area of E&D of oil and gas, but not completely effective. It is necessary to change it or create a new model based on a new perspective of the customs treatment of the activities of exploration and production, minimizing administrative procedures relating to the operations of exportation and importation.

On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.