New evidence on trade liberalization and productivity growth

Although the subject of a large number of studies, the debate on the links between trade reform and productivity growth is still unresolved and most studies at the micro level have not been able to establish a relationship between the two phenomena. Brazil provides a natural experiment to study this issue that is seldom available: it was one of the closest economies in the world until 1988, when trade reform was launched, and intra-industry data are available on an annual basis before, during and after liberalization. Using a panel of industry sectors this paper tests and measures the impact of trade reform on productivity growth. Results confirm the association between the former and the latter and show that the magnitude of the impact of tariff reduction on the growth rates of TFP and output per worker was substantial. Our data reveal large and widespread productivity improvement, so that the estimations in this paper are an indication that liberalization had an important effect on industrial performance in the country. Cross-sectional differences in protection are also investigated.

Impacto de propostas de redução de tarifas em bens não agrícolas (NAMA)

O objetivo deste estudo é avaliar, por meio de um modelo de equilíbrio geral computável, multi-setorial e multi-regional, os impactos de uma redução das tarifas dos bens não agrícolas sobre a economia brasileira, a partir da Fórmula Suíça, com diferentes coeficientes. O modelo de equilíbrio geral utilizado é o Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) e os cortes de tarifas foram estimados a partir de dados do MAcMap. Além dos impactos macroeconômicos e setoriais, testou-se a sensibilidade do modelo ao aumento das elasticidades de Armington e à implementação de liberalização tarifária agrícola.

Agreements and disputes over non-tariff measures

In trade agreements, governments can design remedies to ensure compliance (property rule) or to compensate victims (liability rule). This paper describes an economic framework to explain the pattern of remedies over non-tariff restrictions—particularly domestic subsidies and nonviolation complaints subject to liability rules. The key determinants of the contract form for any individual measure are the expected joint surplus from an agreement and the expected loss to the constrained government. The loss is higher for domestic subsidies and nonviolations because these are the policies most likely to correct domestic distortions. Governments choose property rules when expected gains from compliance are sufficiently high and expected losses to the constrained country are sufficiently low. Liability rules are preferable when dispute costs are relatively high, because inefficiencies in the compensation process reduce the number of socially inefficient disputes filed.