2 resultados para system structure
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
This paper compares the effects on corporate performance and managerial self-dealing in a situation in which the CEO reports to a single Board that is responsible for both monitoring management and establishing performance targets to an alternative in which the CEO reports to two Boards, each responsible for a different task. The equilibrium set of the common agency game induced by the dual board structure is fully characterized. Compared to a single board, a dual board demands less aggressive performance targets from the CEO, but exerts more monitoring. A consequence of the first feature is that the CEO always exerts less effort toward production with a dual board. The effect of a dual board on CEO self-dealing is ambiguous: there are equilibria in which, in spite of the higher monitoring, self-dealing is higher in a dual system. The model indicates that the strategic interdependence generated by the assignment of different tasks to different boards may yield results that are far from the desired ones.
Resumo:
A systematic review was made of studies regarding the capital structure in Brazil during the period of 1988-2003. The recurring themes relate to the static tradeoff and pecking order in various moments of the economy, the fiscal benefits of indebtedness and interest on privately-owned capital, and the inefficacies of the stock market. The Brazilian companies enjoy little leverage as compared to other emerging markets. BNDES is responsible for 5% of the gross formation of fixed capital. The funding of resources occurs at opportune moments, and the financing decision may precede that of investment. Efficacy of the judiciary system and company transparency positively affect access to credit.