A responsabilização do coordenador líder de ofertas públicas de ações por infração ao dever de informar: como indenizar os danos dos investidores?

O presente trabalho analisa a aplicabilidade dos regimes de responsabilidade civil para indenizar os investidores por danos decorrentes de infrações do coordenador líder de oferta pública de ações. A responsabilização desse agente tem por base o dever de agir com elevado padrão de diligência para: (i) assegurar a qualidade das informações; (ii) divulgar informações de forma que permita o investidor tomar uma decisão fundamentada; e (iii) atuar em conformidade com o princípio da boa-fé. Para tanto, serão estudados os regimes de responsabilidade civil subjetiva, fundado na conduta culposa do coordenador líder, e de responsabilidade objetiva, com base no Código de Defesa do Consumidor e no risco da atividade de intermediação financeira em ofertas públicas de ações. Pretende-se, por fim, identificar o regime mais apropriado para a reparação de danos dos investidores.

Lender liability in the Consumer Credit Market

In many countries consumer credit legislation provides for the extension of liability for product failure to the …nancial institution that advances credit to the consumer. In particular, lender liability is imposed on those credit grantors who closely operate with the supplier of the good. This paper provides a rationale for lender-responsibility in the consumer credit market. It shows that, when judicial enforcement is ine¢cient or there is risk of seller liquidation, lender-liability helps to protect consumers who systematically underestimate the probability of product failure and overestimate the extent to which they can obtain compensation.

Limited liability and non-responsiveness in moral hazard and adverse selection problems

This work analyses the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk neutral principal to a risk averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection and limited liability. There are two output levels, whose probability of occurrence are given by agent’s private information choice of effort. The agent’s cost of effort is also private information. First, we show that without assumptions on the cost function, it is not possible to guarantee that the optimal contract menu is simple, when the agent is strictly risk averse. Then, we provide sufficient conditions over the cost function under which it is optimal to offer a single contract, independently of agent’s risk aversion. Our full-pooling cases are caused by non-responsiveness, which is induced by the high cost of enforcing higher effort levels. Also, we show that limited liability generates non-responsiveness.